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ABSTRACT 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa must confront the dual problem of development coupled with the complexities 
surrounding climate change.  The region’s stagnated growth has been historically attributed to many 
factors, but the predominant thought from an international law perspective is that if the region 
modernizes its legal and regulatory structures this will engender the confidence of foreign investors. 
With this acknowledgement came the demand on developing nations to modernize local legal and 
regulatory systems initially focusing on globally harmonized intellectual property rights and then 
more recently their energy regulatory infrastructures and processes to attract foreign investments. 
Several international organizations and institutions including the WTO, World Bank and the UN 
have recommended energy policies to hasten sustainable development in the sub-Saharan region.  
The recommended policies have been implemented by many sub-Saharan African nations with little 
change in attracting foreign investors to fund these projects. Despite international commitments, sub-
Saharan African nations have not been the beneficiaries of these initiatives, while countries like 
China, India and Mexico have received an influx of foreign investments within the green energy 
sector.  Two main issues arise from the lack of foreign investments.  First, do flexibilities need to be 
built into international trade and climate change Agreements to encourage developing countries down 
a sustainable development path?  The second issue is whether there are local and regional factors that 
affect a country’s ability to attract foreign direct investments (“FDI”), particularly those focused at 
climate change abatement projects? Sub-Saharan African countries like Ghana, West Africa have 
implemented new energy policies like the Feed-In Tariff (“FIT”) model, but still have not enjoyed 
increase foreign investments in renewable energy projects.  Will the energy sector mimic the 
pharmaceutical sector where promises of investments were made if countries harmonized their laws, 
but failed to deliver rewards for these “modernization” initiatives?  Or are there lessons to be learnt 
regarding local practices, policies and structures that must be modified in order to attract foreign 
investments.  This thesis will examine the local factors beyond modernization efforts within the 
energy sector that may negatively impact on foreign investors’ willingness to undertake green energy 
projects within the region within the context of international trade and climate change Agreements.  
It will use Ghana as a case study to explore some of the issues and regional concerns that explain the 
reluctance of foreign investors to initiate green energy projects.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
“Introduction”  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 A view of the earth from space at night displays a peculiar phenomenon.  While North-
America and Europe appear to be illuminated by flickers of light resembling one harmonious radiant 
bulb, the continent of Africa has few glimmers.  This reality is not a result of a lack of energy potential 
on the continent, but rather untapped renewable resources resulting in low energy consumption, and 
broken promises of investments and development. Prior to the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) and the enactment of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in 1995, the treaty was touted as the solution to sub-Saharan Africa’s 
development problem.1 The advent of the WTO and the treatise emanating there-from, have had a 
revolutionizing effect on global trade regulation.  The evolution of trade negotiations that resulted in 
the creation of the WTO has been one of the most profound enactments affecting global trade.2  These 
new rules, as memorialized by the WTO, has been referenced as epochal in nature, as well as a 
colossal shift away from trade law being the primary prerogative of local states.3  
The notion that countries could encourage development by implementing a globally 
harmonized system was popularized by a movement within the pharmaceutical sector that sought to 
unify intellectual property rights (“IPR”).  In this conjecture, Agreements like TRIPS drew the 
connection between local modernization instruments and the ability to attract foreign investments via 
                                                 
1 TRIPS: 1994, “Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, Appendix 1C of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, Morocco, Apri15), online: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. [hereinafter “TRIPS”]. 
2 Ikechi Mgbeoji, “Trips and Trips-Plus Impacts in Africa” in Daniel J Gervais, ed., Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in Trips-Plus Era (Oxford University Press, 2007) 259. 
3 Ibid at 259; V Chiappetta, “The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion 
and a Few Other Things” (2000) 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 333; Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act 
of 1974; A Endeshaw, “The Paradox of Intellectual Property Law-Making in the new Millennium: Universal Templates 
as Terms of Surrender for non-industrial Nations: Piracy as an Offshoot” (2002) 10 Cardoza Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 47. 
  2
increased confidence in the local legal structures.  The prevailing belief was that if developing 
countries updated their intellectual property regimes, this would be the solution to short and long-
term economic growth through increased foreign direct investments (“FDI”).  Corporations and the 
industrialized nations argued that the lack of harmonized global IPR stifled investments within 
territories harboring weak intellectual property (“IP”) laws.  Originally, it was thought that the initial 
negative economic impact of TRIPS on developing nations would emerge because of the cost of 
implementing a local IPR system.  It was assumed that after this initial hurdle, developing countries 
would soon begin to reap the benefits of heightened intellectual property through FDI.4  However, 
the promises of TRIPS and development have not materialized on the continent of Africa.5  Similar 
promises are being echoed within the energy sector with reports from the World Bank that developing 
nations need to create enabling energy regulatory structures to attract FDI.  This paper begins from 
the heuristic perspective that acknowledges the failed results of modernization efforts in the 
intellectual property realm, and argues that modernization efforts in the renewable energy sector may 
also be insufficient to entice FDI within the region.  Many sub-Saharan African countries have 
implemented regulatory reforms that comply with the international guidelines, yet, they continue to 
face challenges in attracting foreign investors to build the necessary energy infrastructures that are 
necessary for development.  Barriers faced by developing countries in implementing 
recommendations from international organizations like the World Bank and the WTO may be tied to 
systemic issues within these organizations and also local governments and policies.  
 
  
                                                 
4 R Sherwood, “The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries” (1997) 37 IDEA 491. 
5 Mgbeoji, supra note 2. 
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1.1 Research Question & Problem 
 This research aims to understand why, despite the implementation of rigorous modernization 
practices and processes like an international compliant IPR system and the modernized energy 
regulatory infrastructures that were recommended by international organizations like the World 
Bank, sub-Saharan African nations like Ghana still have not benefited from increased foreign 
investments?  Similarly, the United Nations conferences and treaties on climate change and energy 
have also produced anemic results among sub-Saharan African countries; these debates raise 
questions about whether national, cultural and geographical peculiarities affect and mitigate the 
anticipated outcomes of modernization processes with specific reference to the renewable energy 
sector.   In 2015, 80% of renewable energy projects were funded by private sector funds (US$ 242 
billion) versus 20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).6   Domestic frameworks are also 
crucial to attracting FDIs as 92% of private investments were spent in the same country that the funds 
were raised.7  The fact that countries like India, China and Brazil are receiving green energy 
investments in the form of FDI, while the sub-Saharan region has largely been neglected raises 
serious questions about regional facts in sub-Saharan Africa that act as barriers for foreign investors 
undertaking projects within the region.    
 Studies have shown that foreign investors prefer projects in regions where the risks of return 
are low and where there are enabling governmental policies and frameworks, along with guarantees 
and low political risk.8  Sub-Saharan Africa is disproportionately underrepresented, being per capital, 
the least desirable region on the globe for private climate finance flows.  Of the total US$ 391 billion 
investments in 2014, sub-Saharan Africa only yielded USD$ 12 billion (3%) of the total global 
                                                 
6Climate Policy Initiative, “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2015” (November 2015), online: 
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2015.pdf at 6. 
7 Ibid at 10. 
8 Ibid. 
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climate change investments with Asian and the Pacific receiving the largest finance flows of USD 
$119 billion (31%), and China receiving USD$ 84 billion (22%).9  
 Despite promises made to Africa, the numerous COP Meetings and WTO Agreements,10 the 
initiation of international Agreements like TRIPS, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (“SCM”), the sub-Saharan 
continent still struggles to attract foreign investments that will assist in achieving sustainable 
development.  The new Paris Climate Agreement adds further complexities to the desire for 
development while meeting global climate change pledges and standards.  International Agreements 
contain some flexibilities that recognize the obstacles that developing countries face in meeting this 
dual objective.  This research will explore two primary questions: firstly, are there factors, beyond 
creating locally enabling regulatory infrastructure, that act as barriers to attracting FDI for 
renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa and more specifically Ghana?  For example, do 
strict trade provisions that harmonize global standards create impediments for developing countries, 
or are flexibilities within the Agreements sufficient to overcome arising hardships?  Secondly, are 
there local barriers that discourage foreign investments from undertaking projects in sub-Saharan 
Africa?  Ghana has been chosen as a case study to assess, why, despite complying with international 
standards to modernize its energy infrastructure, it continues to struggle to attract foreign 
investments in high capital green energy projects.   Finally, are there any success stories in sub-
Saharan Africa of countries that attracted foreign investments for renewable energy projects. The 
                                                 
9  Ibid. 
10 Cancun COP 16, Cancun Decision 1/CP.16, Sixteenth session of the Conference of Parties (COP 16), November 2010; 
Doha Climate Change Conference, (COP 18) Decision 1/CP.18, Eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
18), 16 November – 7th December, 2012; Lima Climate Change Conference, (COP 20), the 20th session of the Conference 
of Parties and the 10th session of the Conference of Parties serving as the Member of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 
14th December, 2014; Paris Climate Change Conference, (COP21), the Twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties 
(CO) and the eleventh session of the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP), 30th November – 11the December, 2105, Paris, France. 
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lack of access to reliable energy has arguably impeded economic development and this barrier has 
primarily been attributed to local technical and financial factors on the sub-Saharan continent.  
The resulting energy deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa highlights a scenario that is caused, in 
part, by a lack of investment in large scale commercialized renewable energy plants, which is 
primarily due to the unwillingness of financiers to invest in the form of FDI; this reluctance exist 
despite accession to WTO and the enactment of enabling legislation and incentivizing practices such 
as FIT.  The problem arises because foreign investors require some assurance that they will receive 
a return on their investment.  Governments have responded by creating a FIT system that guarantees 
the price that consumers will pay to purchase the energy from the developer.   Still projects never 
pass the approval stage, primarily because countries like Ghana are asked by foreign investors to give 
sovereign guarantees.  In addition, local governments often request domestic incentives like using 
local manufacturers as a concession for an agreement based on the FIT system.  These concessions 
may be at odds with international treaties and the GATT requirement that all trade nations should be 
treated equally in adherence with the most favourable nation status.    International organizations like 
the WTO and the World Bank support programs like FIT, however, international treaties may also 
pose inadvertent barriers for investments into green energy projects.  Treatise including the GATT 
(MFN and Article XX), the SCM Agreement (non-actionable/actionable subsidies) and TRIPS 
(Article 8) may all contain provisions that create uncertainty for foreign investors who are concerned 
that their project may be subject to an international subsidy challenge.  The incentives required to 
redirect choices from cheaper fossil fuel alternatives to green solutions may be in conflict with 
international law.  This concern has not been addressed in the policies espoused by the WTO and 
World Bank that focus primarily on creating a locally enabling infrastructure.  
 
  6
1.2 Energy and Development 
 Energy and development in many sub-Saharan African countries have been guided by failed 
international policies that aim to implement macro structural changes while neglecting locally 
persisting factors. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa radically transformed their regulatory 
framework in the energy sector.  In 2011 this change occurred in Ghana with the enactment of 
Ghana’s Renewable Energy Bill.11  The Bill and the implementation of a feed-in-tariff system, was a 
part of a wider policy that the World Bank and the IMF maintained would make Ghana more 
attractive to FDI.  The provision of energy through a photovoltaic solar source is a good example of 
how governments may adopt a preferential price tariff to encourage developers to invest large sums 
of capital in such plants.   
It is also essential to understand that practices like feed-in-tariffs aim to ensure that solar 
energy producers are able to recoup the cost of development by guaranteeing profitability over the 
total contractual period.  Despite these regulatory changes countries like Ghana find that while they 
have approved green energy initiatives, these projects still have difficulty attracting international 
funding.  The problem arises because, despite having an enabling regulatory environment, a number 
of local barriers to finance have not been addressed.  Consequently, an understanding of barriers to 
actualize green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa requires analysis beyond the scope of 
international agreements to incorporate aspects of climate finance.  For example, a foreign developer 
of a solar PV plant may receive all the government approvals along with a Power Purchase 
Agreement (“PPA”) that contains a good feed-in-tariff rate, but is still unable to attract investors that 
are willing to risk their investment within the region. These corporations that receive project approval 
from governments like Ghana must raise the capital to finance projects. The motivation for 
                                                 
11The Ghanaian Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832), online: 
http://energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20%28ACT%20832%29.pdf. 
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corporations to seek out FDI are therefore numerous, ranging from low labour costs to the provision 
of governmental services, tax havens or the provision of goods and services that are absent from the 
country.  There are a host of problems that these corporations encounter when attempting to attract 
FDI, including political instability, cultural misunderstandings, infrastructural problems, skillfulness 
of the labour force  environmental factors, lack of technology advancement in the region and most 
important, the ability of local governments to financially honour the contractual obligations.  When 
the problem of climate change is compounded with development goals, the cost of development 
increases.  It is for this reason that climate change has been referred to as the “super wicked problem” 
that robs currently impoverished communities of the ability to sustain themselves, often for the 
benefit of the industrialized world that was chiefly responsible, and benefitted from  pollution.12  The 
solutions to climate change are seen as “super wicked” because they require the least able (developing 
countries), which have contributed the least to the climate change problem by way of industrial 
pollution, to undertake expensive solutions to remedy the problem for future generations.    
 The United Nations (“UN”) has acknowledged the importance of factors beyond a country’s 
modernization of laws to attract foreign investments.  More recently, the UN acknowledge the 
importance of a modernized energy infrastructure in contributing to sustainable development; the UN 
highlights that: “[t]he lack of modern fuels and electricity in most developing countries entrenches 
poverty, constrains the delivery of social services, limits opportunities for women, and erodes 
environmental sustainability”.13  The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 
also set a clear mandate to stabilize greenhouse gases (“GHG”) and prevent its undue interference 
with the ecosystem, with the expressed recognition of the role of renewable energy technologies in 
                                                 
12 Richard J Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future” 
(2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1153. 
13 UN-Energy, 2005.  The Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United Nations, 
UN=Energy, 2005 at 5. 
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reducing the negative effects of climate change.  
 The important role that energy plays in development raises questions about whether energy 
production could incorporate environmental considerations.  One impediment to adopting renewable 
energy alternatives is the costs and the inability for countries like Ghana to attract foreign investors 
for renewable energy projects.  Countries like Ghana are still optimistic that the initiative of creating 
enabling legislative and regulatory structure to facilitate renewable energy projects is not in vain.  
However, clear investment barriers appear to exist to prevent foreign investors from initiating high 
capital projects such as solar PV plants within the region.  For example, several green energy projects 
have been approved in Ghana (with an energy license being issued by the governing body), despite 
this approval, the projects have had difficulty acquiring construction financing.  Since 2013, Ghana 
issued 65 licenses for solar projects, however, only one company has successfully commercialized 
and connected a 20 megawatt (“MW”) solar photovoltaic plant to the grid.14   The recent Paris 
Climate Agreement has devoted a substantial part of the Agreement to providing climate finance to 
under-represented regions.  This raises questions about whether there are regional peculiarities that 
act as barriers to FDI and which can explain why some regions have experienced an influx of FDI 
while sub-Saharan Africa has not.  
 Other nations like China, Mexico and India appear to be attracting foreign investment for 
green energy projects.  This reality raises questions about whether there are local factors that may 
discourage foreign investors from initiating projects in certain regions.  Specially, Ghana has 
undergone changes to its regulatory process adopting a feed-in-tariff system and approving several 
energy licenses and projects, yet foreign investors are not readily investing in such initiatives.  What 
are the local factors that may explain this reluctance on the part of foreign investors to undertake 
                                                 
14 Electricity Company of Ghana: Provisional Wholesale Supply and Generation License Holders, online: 
file:///C:/Users/llewis/Downloads/Provisional_Wholesale_Supply_and_Generation_License_Holders%20(1).pdf.  
  9
costly green energy projects within sub-Saharan Africa?  In addition, are there any success stories in 
the region that may serve as lessons for attracting foreign investors that will assist sub-Saharan Africa 
down a green path of development? 
 Concerns of sustainable development further complicate the issue of economic progress in 
Africa.  For example, energy insecurity and the impact that Africa’s development  will have on the 
environment as it continues to grow and expand services, is an ongoing international law concern.   
Over the past decade, the United Nations convened General Assemblies to develop policies and 
mandates on energy in Africa.  By April 14-15, 2004 a group of African delegates met in Rome to 
develop a framework for the creation of UN-Energy/Africa with a mandate to create a “collaborative 
framework with the objective to promote more efficient, coherent and coordinated actions of UN and 
non-UN organizations working in Africa on the issues of energy development.”15 The World Bank 
recognized as early as 1996 that “[n]o country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose from 
subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.”16  In 1993 the 
World Bank created an Electric Power Lending Policy with the mandate of creating reform of the 
power sector.  The Policy set the requirement for the Bank to lend money to those developing 
countries that implemented the following four policy changes:17 
i. Transparent regulatory processes;  
ii. Commercialize and corporatize the power enterprises; 
iii. Allow for the importation of power services; and, 
iv. Encourage private investment in the power sector.  
 
Thus, the two barriers to the optimization of the African power sector were of a technical and 
                                                 
15 UN-Energy/Africa, Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa. Un-Energy/Africa publications to 
CSD15, undated at 53. 
16 World Bank, A Brighter Future? Energy in Africa’s Development (World Bank, 1996). Emphasis added. 
17 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Power Sector in Africa: Policy Guidelines for the Sustainability of 
the Sector” in UN-Energy/Africa. Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa. Un-Energy/Africa 
publications to CSD15, undated at 53 (noted the four points were extracted from this report). 
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financial nature. The Economic Commission for Africa (2004) noted that the lack of energy in Africa 
is not the only problem contributing to the availability of energy, but there is also the lack of 
institutional infrastructures to facilitate the development of the energy sector.  The Commission 
noted that Africa needs to create “…institutions, rules, financing mechanisms, and regulations needed 
to make market work in support of energy for sustainable development.”18  Thus, while several 
international organizations and institutions including the WTO, World Bank and the UN have 
highlighted the importance of energy in development and the desire for Africa to adopt sustainable 
and environmentally sound development paths, the reality posed by the exorbitant costs of green 
technology may render the goal of sustainable development financially unattainable for sub-Saharan 
countries like Ghana.   
 
 1.2.1 Economic Growth, Climate Change and Development  
 
 Economic growth, climate change and sustainable development link governments, 
corporations, and individuals with the collective goal of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions while 
developing the economy.  Economic growth measures annual per capital gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) and consumption.19  Thus, economic growth has often been linked with FDI because of the 
need for foreign investments in new technology.  Similarly, it has been argued that “…the greater the 
technological-knowledge gap between their current practices and new technologies, the greater the 
need for external finance.”20  In addition, scholars have argued that emerging markets benefit from 
FDI because as new technology is introduced, it is diffused locally and some of the technological 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19World Bank, Beyond Economic Growth Student Book (2004), online: 
www.worldbank.org/depweb/English/beyond/global/glossary.html. 
20 Laura Alfaro et al, “FDI and Economic Growth: the Role of Local Financial Markets” (2004) 64  Journal of 
International Economics 89 at 91. 
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know-how is transferred to the local environment.  Specifically, FDI are associated with economic 
growth in that they encourage “the incorporation of new inputs and technologies in the production 
function of the recipient economy.”21   
 The issue of climate change complicates issues of development.22  On the other hand, 
economic development has been defined in terms of a country’s gross national product (“GNP”) and 
the economic ability to generate growth.23 Studies have demonstrated a positive correlation between 
economic development and the increased energy use within a nation.24   Increased energy use is also 
indicative of the wealth of a nation.25   Despite the outcome, it is generally agreed that Africa is in 
need of energy modernization and that this is only achievable through creating an “…environment 
conducive to attracting the huge financial requirement needed to address the energy problem.”26 
 Sustainable Development considers development and economic growth in conjunction with 
the needs of the environment and the “public good”.  The concept of sustainable development was 
popularized by the Brundtland Report as the definition of development “that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their own needs”.27  
 
1.2.2 Creating a Renewable Energy Infrastructure to Attract FDI 
A number of World Bank and United Nations Reports recognize that development requires, 
                                                 
21 Luiz R, de Mello Jr., “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A Selective Survey” (1997) 
34:1 The Journal of Development Studies. 
22 N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (HM Treasury, London, 2006). 
23 World Bank, (2004) supra note 19.   
24 N A Burney, “Socioeconomic Development and Electricity Consumption: A Cross-Country Analysis Using the 
Random Coefficient Method” (1995) 17  Energy Economics 185. 
25 Some studies point to the diminished contribution of energy to economic growth and argue that any correlation is based 
on a false assumption that as energy use increases, so too will work in service industries also increase which has a minimal 
impact on the GDP of a nation. See: K H Ghali, M I T El-Saka, “Energy and Output Growth in Canada: A Multivariate 
Cointegration Analysis” (2004) 26  Energy Economics  225.  
26 Yemane Wolde-Rufael “Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth: A Time Series Experience for 17 African 
Countries” (2006) 34 Energy Policy 1106 at 1113 
27 Gro Harlem Brundtland Report of the World Commission on environment and development:" our common future." 
United Nations, 1987. Online: Our Common Future, ch 7 at: www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm. 
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at minimum, that a nation have access to services that “modern energy provides.”28  As early as 1993, 
the World Bank recognized that development of Africa’s power sector requires technical and 
financial infusion.29  There was a clear acknowledgment by 2004 that the energy problem in Africa 
was related to “the lack of institutional infrastructures”.30  Ten years later, in 2014, the United Nations 
concluded that industrial development in Africa necessitates the implementation of “effective 
Industrial Policy Organizations (IPOs)”31  However, these studies from leading international 
organizations demonstrate that many African countries will need to go beyond changes to their legal 
and regulatory infrastructure in order to attract FDI.   The United Nations poses the question of how 
can countries like Ghana “build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions, 
processes and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa”?32  
Numerous international organizations have conceded that electricity is necessary for 
enhanced economic and social development and this local necessity is a precondition for 
development.  This raises questions about the impact of electricity and its use on the gross domestic 
product of a nation (GDP).33   The United Nations also investigated the causal relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth in 17 African countries.34 More recently, the 2014 
United Nations Report Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa35 highlighted the need for African 
economic development to be tied to the need to formulate and implement effective industrial policy 
                                                 
28 World Bank, A Brighter Future? Energy in Africa’s Development (World Bank, 1996).  
29 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa. Economic Report on Africa 2014: Dynamic Industrial Policy in 
Africa online: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/final_era2014_march25_en.pdf, last visited 
December 11, 2017 [“United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, 2014”].   
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid at xii. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Wolde-Rufael, supra note 26.  
34 Ibid.   
35 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa. Economic Report on Africa 2014. Dynamic Industrial Policy in 
Africa at Africa at 
http://repository.uneca.org/unecawebsite/sites/default/files/page_attachments/final_era2014_march25_en.pdf  last 
visited September 3, 2014 [“United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, 2014”]. 
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within the region.  The report explores the necessity of high–level political support in implementing 
effective industrial policy that will change the landscape of industrial development on the continent.  
The report sites as a cornerstone of development, the need to implement effective Industrial Policy 
Organizations (IPOs) that will create “incentive structures for firms to expand production and 
investment in vital and high growth potential industries”.36   This requires national adjustments in 
infrastructural gaps such as those existing in the energy sector.  The report also recognizes a paradox 
that occurred on the African continent, namely, that while it has experienced unprecedented growth 
over the past decade, “[f]actors of production such as labour have shifted notably from agriculture 
and manufacturing to services—harming productivity and in some cases curtailing employment in 
both agriculture and manufacturing”.37  This shift in labour and production in the region has led to a 
surprising drop in the “contribution of manufacturing to the continent’s GDP and employment over 
the last decade.”38   
 Another economic observation yielded from the Report revealed that Africa’s global trade 
over the last decade was around 3.3 per cent which was well below expectations.39  The Report also 
attempts to answer some unresolved questions about economic development in the African region 
and the role of Industrial Policy Institutions in creating effective industrial policy.   In this regard, 
the ERA 2014 Report highlights the importance of industrial policies and innovation through 
focusing on “how to build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions, processes 
and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa.”40 The focus 
on industrialization and transformation in Africa recognizes the essentials of building policy and 
                                                 
36 Ibid at  xi. 
37 Ibid at xii. 
38 Ibid at xi. 
39 Ibid at xii. 
40 Ibid at xiii. 
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institutional infrastructures that will lay the legal and operational foundations for the development of 
a particular industry: 
“African government intervention through industrial policy can help spur  structural 
transformation by addressing these market failures. The approach  followed by 
policymakers, academics and other industrial stakeholders has been to identify key general 
constraints and devise broad policy interventions to alleviate them.  Unfortunately, these 
responses have rarely focused on the institutions governing industrial policy, or on the impact 
that weaknesses in these institutions have on their own ability to operate in a coordinated, 
dynamic framework.  Indeed, weak institutional structures and poor policy design have been 
at the root of Africa’s industrial policy problem throughout its post-independence history.”41 
 
The Report also reveals the vast potential for the African continent to go down the “green” path to 
industrialization: 
“Climate change could hobble Africa’s economic growth momentum as the continent 
attempts to switch to industrialization and economic transformation. But  it could also 
provide an opportunity: Africa has vast renewable energy resources of hydropower, 
geothermal, biomass, wind and solar. And as Africa is not locked  in any technology 
preferences, it can follow a green and clean industrializing  energy pathway and leapfrog 
old carbon-intensive models.”42 
 
The potential for “green” development is a viable course for Africa to pursue.  The vast need of the 
continent related to energy supply makes this industry ideal for the study of the impact of intellectual 
property on sustainable development.  This Report also acknowledged the uniqueness of Africa’s 
economic development as experienced through “growth poles” which are defined as a “concentration 
of productive economic activity in a region that can foster growth in peripheral regions through 
positive spillovers and backward and forward linkages.”43  In the case of the African continent, 
energy has been identified as a pre-requisite to economic growth and development and would be an 
ideal industry to study from the perspective of a “growth pole”.  Recognizing that policies aimed at 
industrialization will require a great amount of capital infusion, the Report also emphasizes the 
                                                 
41 Ibid  at xiv. Emphasis added. 
42 Ibid at xvi.  Emphasis added. 
43 Ibid. 
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importance of generating external financing for these projects.  They note that the “success of 
industrial policy projects depends heavily on African countries securing public and private finance 
in priority areas, especially infrastructure, education and technology.44   
 Economic development and to some extent FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Ghana 
specifically, are directly tied to energy availability within the region.  Without reliable energy, 
development and even foreign investments can be severely halted.  Therefore, it is not far removed 
to identify one of the most profound problems facing developing economies as one of energy 
deficiency. Amanda Kassaris argues that developing nations can develop their own domestic 
industries based on their strengths.45 Given continental Africa’s geographic location and optimal 
access to the equator, terrestrial photovoltaics (‘PVs’) are an optimal solution to achieving an 
environmentally friendly source of electrical energy while addressing some developmental issues 
that are intrinsically tied to energy deficiency and frequent blackouts.  
 Countries like Ghana that have the potential to choose a green path encounter the dual 
challenge of development and simultaneously adhering to the global climate change standards.  The 
WTO’s recognition of climate change as a public good has raised questions in the international legal 
community about how to shape a collective response to the problem.  This may require new 
reflections and considerations around climate change and international initiatives, especially as these 
requirements may pose added burdens to developing countries.  The costliness of green energy 
projects along with local conditions such as credit risks, political risks, currency risks create added 
burdens for financiers that are not solved by the market.  Financiers often turn to governments to give 
guarantees that the financial commitments within their contracts will be upheld, however, these same 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45Amanda Perry-Kessaris “Socio-legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext” (New York: 
Routledge, 2013).  
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governments are not willing to indebt the entire nation to satisfy an independent power producer that 
is investing in a privately owned project within the region.  In this regard, climate finance may need 
to supplement FDI to eliminate some of the existing regional barriers to investments.  Ghana is an 
example of a sub-Saharan nation that has undergone the necessary regulatory changes to attract FDI 
but is still left in a position of investors refusing projects that do not provide a sovereign guarantee.  
 Could the promises of modernizing the regulatory systems of local governments have been 
too literally tied to the promise of development, or is there a more tacit message about the need for 
countries to not only harmonize laws and processes, but create enabling institutional frameworks that 
are conducive for FDI?   This study will seek to examine how sub-Saharan African can adopt a green 
path to development by choosing green energy projects as a method of electrifying the region.  It will 
shed light on why, despite the attornment to various international laws, modification of the regulatory 
infrastructure and the approval of renewable energy projects, Ghana still is unable to attract FDI to 
finance these projects without a sovereign guarantee.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
 This study will adopt a methodological approach entrenched in empirical research which aims 
to understand why, despite the rigorous implementation of modernization of regulatory frameworks 
in many sub-Saharan Africa countries like Ghana,  foreign investors continue to shy away from green 
energy projects within the region.  In addition, despite flexibilities incorporated in WTO treaties like 
TRIPS and SCM Agreement, and to a lesser extent the GATT to encourage industrialized countries 
and foreign corporations to undertake projects in the region, such initiatives fail to attract its share of 
foreign investors.   
Sub-Saharan African countries like Ghana have adopted the FIT Program, but still lack the 
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ability to attract foreign investments in the renewable energy sector.  Yet, regions like China, Mexico 
and India are successful in attracting foreign investors.  Since the methodological approach herein is 
empirical in nature, case studies like India, China and Mexico may not provide useful observations 
due to regional, cultural economic and political peculiarities despite successes in those countries.  As 
such, this study will use Ghana as a case study and will examine why, despite having approved 65 
energy licenses for solar PV projects since 2013, only one (1) has reached the commercialization 
stage.  It will also borrow from regionally similar success stories in other sub-Saharan African 
countries and attempt to uncover some of the strategies adopted to overcome local barriers in those 
projects.  The study begins by recognizing the contributions of similar trade sectors that have 
attempted to implement harmonization practices to encourage development.  It will examine factors 
beyond mere harmonization of laws, regulatory processes beyond adoption of international trade 
agreements that explain actual barriers in implementing green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Despite strong energy policies emerging from international institutions like the World Bank as early 
as 1990, sub-Saharan African countries still struggle to attract investors for green energy projects.  In 
addition, treaties have also been signed among United Nations and WTO Member States that attempt 
to address issues of development and climate change yield similar failing results in attracting green 
project financing.  In this regard, questions will be raised about whether these international 
organizations and institutions create unintended barriers for developing nations to attract FDI for 
green energy projects.  It will canvass the efficacy of climate finance flexibilities contained in 
international agreements that are designed to address the dual problem of financing sustainable 
development and attracting FDI to the sub-Saharan region.   
The written portion of the PhD will be submitted in a Portfolio format.  This thesis is in partial 
completion of the PhD by published works.  The written requirements of this PhD will be completed 
  18
by publishing a minimum of three articles in peer-reviewed journals.  Page 18 of the Graduate 
Program handbook outlines that “any student in the Graduate Program in law may seek to complete 
their degrees by publishing their scholarship in lieu of submission of a traditional thesis or 
dissertation”.  This portfolio is comprised of six published peer reviewed articles that are arranged in 
chapter format.  Ghana, West Africa has been selected as a case study for these articles because it 
has already begun the process of energy reform,46  and this jurisdiction is prime case study, as many 
of the issues of international law and sustainable development within the renewable energy sector 
that are outlined in this proposal are present in the Ghanaian energy reform process.  
 
1.3.1 The Ghanaian Case Study   
 The Ghanaian case study attempts to reveal, why, despite Ghana’s adherence to the 
modernization of the regulatory framework to entice energy investments, and the approval of 65 PV 
project license, it continues to struggle to attract FDI and commercialize green energy projects.  This 
paper will outline the major issues that must be contemplated in solar photovoltaic projects in Ghana 
and elsewhere in the developing world by exploring some of the infrastructural concerns raised in 
the literature on FDI, and renewable energy projects.  In the past two decades, Ghana’s FDI has 
fluctuated initially dropping substantially from 1994 to 2004 by forty (40%), and later demonstrating 
a sharp increase between 2004 and 2012 of two thousand two hundred and sixty-five percent (2,265 
%) (from 233,000,000 in 1994, reduced to 139,270,000 in 2004, and increased to 3,294,520,000 in 
                                                 
46 Renewable Energy Act, 2011, Act 832 of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, Dec 31, 2011 [“Ghana Renewable 
Energy Act”] online: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20(ACT%2083Ghana; The Ghana 
Renewable Energy Act should be read in conjunction with the Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541). 
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2012).47  Between 2012 to 2016 Ghana’s FDI net flows only increased slight to 3,485,333.37.48  
Despite this increase, there is still a level of consternation among multinational enterprises in 
investing in various sub-Saharan African countries, and particularly in high capital ventures such as 
photovoltaic solar plants.  Several scholars have explored the role of foreign investments in 
contributing to development in sub-Saharan Africa.49  However, few studies have focused on Ghana, 
and there is a clear absence in the literature on scholarly work dedicated to FDI, PV projects.50  
Many sub-Saharan nations did not have laws that facilitated sustainable economic 
development, especially in the renewable energy sector.  For example, renewable energy legislation 
was needed to create the infrastructure that would govern these projects.  Consequently, a part of the 
problem is that no market existed in the renewable energy sector, and in order for development to 
pursue this sustainable path, a number of market barriers need to be removed.  One such barriers 
relates to the fact that renewable energy may cost the consumer more and some mechanism needs to 
be in place to make this alternative affordable.  In addition, this cost savings cannot be passed on to 
the developer, so government off-takers need a mechanism by which they can assure payments for 
the energy produced.  It is expected that the market will solve the problems of sustainable economic 
development, but in the case with renewable energy projects developing nations are expected to sign 
                                                 
47 World Bank, (2014) “Foreign Direct Investment, net flows (BoP, current US$”), Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD; Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis & Jon Sarpong “A Study of the 
Economic and Technical Analysis of Large scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct 
Investments” (2014 July) 3:7 International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology 1415. 
48 Ibid, World Bank Group.  
49 Schneider, Friedrich & Bruno S Frey, "Economic and political determinants of foreign direct investment" (1985) 13:2 
World development 161; David W Loree & Stephen E Guisinger, “Policy and Non-Policy Determinants on US Equity 
Foreign Direct Investment” (1995) Journal of International Business Studies 281; Addison, Tony & Almas 
Heshmati. The new global determinants of FDI flows to developing countries: The importance of ICT and 
democratization. No. 2003/45 (2003) 45 WIDER Discussion Papers//World Institute for Development Economics.  
50 Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis, and Jon Sarpong “A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of Large Scale 
Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments” 3:7 (2014) International Journal of 
Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) 1415. 
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sovereign guarantees that end up indebting the entire nation.  These guarantees have been rejected 
by developing nations for the simple fact that many renewable energy plants are owned by foreign 
entities and it would be imprudent to indebt an entire nation for the benefit of one foreign contract.  
Consequently, the desire to develop sustainably must be augmented by other financial mechanisms 
that address the existing market barriers.   
 The ways in which nations prepare for the infusion of foreign investments necessitates an 
understanding of the legal, regulatory and political framework to induce investors.  Since solar 
projects often require an infusion of capital of sometimes 10s of millions of dollars in capital outlay, 
this industry is ideal for ascertaining the unique features that may go beyond regulatory reform that 
contribute to FDI and economic development in Africa.     
Ghana’s power sector is governed by seven public institutions: the Ministry of Power (MOP), 
Energy Commission (EC), Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC), Volta River Authority 
(VRA), Ghana Grid Company (GridCo), Electricity Company of Ghana Limited (ECG) and the 
Northern Electricity Department Company (NEDCo) which is a subsidiary of the VRA.Energy 
Foundation a private-public sector partnership promoting countrywide energy efficiency and 
conservation. 51  Ghana’s electricity distribution remains dominated by the Electricity Company of 
Ghana (“ECG”) which is a state-owned company which distributes 70% of the electricity in Ghana.  
Ghana recognized the need to incorporate Independent Power Producers into its power procurement 
strategy.   
Currently, Ghana struggles to generate sufficient power for residential and commercial 
purposes,52  but it is also unable to indebt the entire nation by providing sovereign guarantees for 
                                                 
51 Electricity Company of Ghana, online: www.ecgonline.info/index.php/about-the-power-sector-in-ghana.html. 
52 Energy Commission of Ghana. National Energy Statistics 2005 – 2014 (Strategic Planning Policy Division: 2015), 
online www.energycom.gov.gh/files/Energy%20Statistics_2015.pdf  
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projects owned by Independent Power Producers (“IPP”). IPP are essential entities that produce 
energy by first obtaining a contract (PPA) that is subject to the regulation that governs the parties.   
The fact that this entire relationship is governed by enabling legislation, the market for renewable 
energy products is often a new energy market, created by the enactment of local legislation.   
In Ghana, IPP play a significant role in supplementing the energy produced by the state-
owned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority).  The GridCo, 
the ECG, and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) are responsible for feeding 
government produced energy and by IPP into the same grid.53 The PURC sets a guaranteed tariff rate 
which is supposed to act as an assurance to independent power producer that the price of energy will 
not fall below rate for a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years.  The FIT scheme is intended to provide 
some certainty to independent power producers that the high up-front financial outlays associated 
with renewable energy projects can be recouped with a profit over the contract period. 
In the early 1990s the World Bank’s demanded that developing countries that require funding 
from it undergo significant power sectors reforms which entails changing the legal and regulatory 
frameworks to improve transparency.54 The World Bank’s energy policy of the 1990s, that many 
sub-Saharan African nations followed, was borne out of controversy.  In 1994 at the World Bank’s 
annual meeting protestors held placards citing “Fifty Years is Enough,” calling for the abolition of 
the Bank and the International Monetary Fund.55 Many projects in developing countries were 
criticized as creating further impoverishment as countries were unable to afford the repayment on 
their debt and suffered devalued currencies as a result of structural adjustments.  
                                                 
53 Leslyn Lewis, “The WTO Canada Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects 
in the Developing World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green Energy 
Conflicts” 16 (2016) Asper Review of International Business and Trade 98.  
54 World Bank, (1993) The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector, Washington D.C., World Bank. 
55The World Bank, online: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/james-david-
wolfensohn.  
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In compliance with the World Bank’s demand many developing countries adopted a 
transparent power sector model, in 2011 Ghana implemented a renewable energy framework that 
incorporated the Feed-In Tariff scheme under the Ghana Renewable Energy Act (2011) and the 
Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (“RPO”). 56  This model is based on the government off-
taker entering into a PPA with the developer.  In this case, the electricity price and the revenue risks 
are shifted to the government off-taker.  Other than the currency risk (which can also be addressed 
in the PPA), the only other financial risk relates to the inability of the off-taker to make payments on 
the electricity purchased.  In such instances, the government off-taker could agree on a revolving 
bank guarantee security payment that would be replenished monthly.  In this regard, rather than 
indebting the entire nation, the national government can provide a limited guarantee in the form of a 
payment security to the developer to offset the risk of defaulting on the obligations under the PPA.  
Currently Ghana does not have higher tariff rates for peak periods, so setting the default payment 
(bank guarantee) is easier than projecting an increase in energy prices.   
The overwhelming majority of renewable energy projects in Ghana never passed the approval 
stage, primarily because of local barriers to finance. These are interpreted as investment risks to 
financiers, and include the following:  
1. Commercial risks (engineering, procurement and construction (EPC), as well as 
development, operation risks); 
 
2. Political risks (change in governments, dishonouring of contracts regulatory 
changes);57 
                                                 
56 Renewable Energy Act, 2011, Act 832 of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, Dec 31, 2011 [“Ghana Renewable 
Energy Act”] online: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20(ACT%2083Ghana; The Ghana 
Renewable Energy Act should be read in conjunction with the Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541), online: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/ACT.pdf.  
57 Pepukaye Bardouille, From Gap to Opportunity: Business Models for Scaling Up Energy Access. Washington DC: 
International Finance Corporate, 2012; In Kenya and Zambia large scale US $ bonds were issued in 2014 to mitigate 
political risk; see: Tomoko Matsukawa, Odo Habeck, Review of Risk Mitigation Instruments for Infrastructure Financing 
and Recent Trends and Developments. Washington DC: The World Bank, PPIAF 2007.  Trends and Policy Options #4, 
online: www.worldbank.org. 
  23
 
3. Technological barriers including low grid capacity;58 
 
4. High Sovereign Credit Risk (foreign exchange rate risk and inflation; or off-taker 
defaulting on payment, currency risk). 
 
Investors are concerned with off-setting the above risks before a project can be deemed viable.  The 
easiest solution is to request that countries like Ghana give sovereign guarantees to the developers. 
The above list is not exhaustive and certainly not authoritative, as such, barriers beyond those 
traditionally listed by the World Bank will also be considered.  For example, local communities are 
concerned about the specific skills and training that will be required to implement renewable energy 
projects.  This concern includes factors such as knowledge transfer, and policies that address specific 
stages of the project and not merely structural regulatory changes.  Furthermore, the above risks are 
not exclusive to sub-Saharan Africa as countries like Russia identified capacity building as a primary 
barrier for energy policy.59  Even with the more recently created international financial support 
mechanisms including the Global Environmental Facility, the Clean Investment Funds of the World 
Bank, and the Green Climate Funds, issues still arise at the local level relating to how to manage 
these climate finance tools.  In addition, local governments often request domestic incentives like 
using local manufacturers (local content requirements) as a concession for an agreement based on 
the FIT system, and these provisions may run counter to international law.  Thus, this research will 
consider issues beyond the traditional investor risk as listed above, to include questions about how 
the planning stage of a development should be approached, the enabling frameworks, offsetting early 
stage risks, and building a knowledge and technical infrastructure for future projects. This research 
                                                 
58 A Chaurey, T C Kandpal, “Assessment and Evaluation of PV Based Decentralized Rural Electrification: An Overview.  
15 (2011) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2266. 
59 E Martinot, “Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in  Russia: Transaction Barriers, Market Intermediation and 
Capacity Building” 26 (1998) Energy Policy 905. 
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is not limited to exploring investor risks as outline by the World Bank.  It canvasses, whether certain 
international rules act as barriers to implementing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
A solution to attracting foreign investments for green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa requires 
consideration like protect patents, the most-favour nation status, subsidies on green products, and 
local policies and how these trade provisions impact on a country’s ability to undertake green energy 
projects.  
 
 1.4 Structure of Study and Outline of Chapters 
 
 Foreign investments in green energy projects especially to combat climate change are 
required to encourage sub-Saharan African countries down a green development path.   This study 
will examine local factors that may act as impediments for foreign investors within the context of 
energy, climate change and sustainable development.60  This paper will also examine climate finance 
options as a potential solution to funding renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Specifically, it will explore the requisite legal and regulatory infrastructure that will increase the 
viability and infusion of investments into the capital intensive, solar energy industry in Ghana in 
order to better understand the localized impediments  on development in the renewable energy sector, 
and why foreign investors continue to shy away from this region.  Specifically, it raises questions 
about whether the current international trade regime creates unintended impediments to trade, and 
the flexibilities that could be adopted to address potential barriers. Finally, this study is informed by 
the public policy debate on the impact that international environmental agreements have on 
                                                 
60 For a distinction between “development”, “sustainable development” and “sustainable economic development” see: 
John C Dernbach, “Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development” 28:3 (2011) Pace 
Environmental Law Review 613 at 615. 
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sustainable economic development as it relates to energy insecurity and the mitigation of the negative 
effects of climate change.  It raises questions about the role of international agreements in aiding or 
hindering development in the region like sub-Saharan Africa.  Similarly, it looks at specialized means 
of encouraging financing for renewable energy projects.  
 This thesis is divided into three parts.  The first section explores the literature in the area of 
international Agreements that guide a local country’s implementation of enabling legislation that 
governs trade.  For example, WTO Members that wish to upgrade their local laws to make it 
complimentary with international laws must adhere to minimum restrictions as dictated by 
international Agreements like TRIPS, GATT and the SCM.  It explores the role of international treaties 
in encouraging the enabling framework to entice foreign investments in countries like Ghana.  It will 
also examine whether corporate practices like “evergreening”, that have been adopted by 
multinational corporations within the IP setting to prolong the patent life of a product, are applicable 
to the green energy sector.   
 The second part of the study incorporates a case study on renewable energy in Ghana.   In 
providing necessary and essential services in sectors like energy, it seeks to understand some of the 
primary factors and concerns contributing to a company’s ability to invest in these projects in sub-
Saharan Africa?  Specifically, regions like China, India and Mexico have received the lion’s share of 
FDI in renewable energy, while sub-Saharan Africa has been neglected.  Unfortunately, projects from 
China, India and Mexico may not be a suitable comparable cohort due to regional differences.   The 
second section of this study will compare projects in sub-Saharan Africa that have been successful 
and highlight the distinction between those regional policies and those existing in Ghana.  The third 
segment addresses the barriers to foreign investments within the region and examines climate finance 
as a possible solution.  
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 Chapter 2 is a literature review that begins with the assumption that there are lessons to be 
learnt from sectors like pharmaceuticals that have attempted to link ascension to WTO Agreements 
with an increase in development and foreign investments; it examines the reasons why the 
implementation of renewable energy regulations have not led to greater FDI in renewable energy 
industries in Ghana.  It specifically explores the literature on the relationship between increased 
harmonization of international law within sectors that purported assurance that such practices will 
increase trade within the region.   It explores whether the harmonization of international law standards 
represent an impediment in the renewable energy sector in Africa, as it did with the pharmaceutical 
sector after the ratification of TRIPS.   Several theories on economic development, sustainability and 
international agreements as “pull” or “push” factors in sustainable development are highlighted.  The 
literature review canvasses the theories that explain the impact of the international legal regime on 
local factors like trade, technology transfer and affecting foreign investments from the perspective of 
climate change.  From the vantage point of climate change, this chapter will explore international 
agreements such as the SCM, TRIMS, TRIPS and the GATT and assesses whether the subsidies and 
flexibilities contained therein are sufficient to facilitate the development of renewable energy 
industries in the developing world.   
 Chapter 3 builds on the literature review on the harmonization process that occurred within 
the intellectual property sector and the belief that this process would have led to increase investor 
confidence.  This chapter produced a paper for publication titled “The Applicability of TRIPS 
Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change Mitigation as a Public Good in Green 
Technology Projects”61  which explores the various TRIPS flexibilities that can be adopted to achieve 
                                                 
61 This paper has already been published in a double –blind peer review journal.  See: Leslyn A Lewis, “The Applicability 
of TRIPS Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change Mitigation as a Public Good in Green Energy 
Projects” (2015) 15 Asper Review of International Business and Trade 129. 
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climate change abatement in the developing world.    This section also explores whether flexibilities 
in TRIPS that were previously adopted in the global health care crises can be transplanted to the 
energy sector?  This raises questions around whether climate change can be treated as a globally 
“urgent” initiative in the same manner under TRIPS as “affordable medicines”.  Essentially, can 
climate change, as coupled with the desire for development, be viewed as an issue of nation urgency 
pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS? Essentially, does the Declaration of the environment as a “public 
good” alter how TRIPS flexibilities are interpreted in relation to renewable energy projects as was 
the case with essential medicines and the Doha Declaration?  Are the concessions related to 
affordable medicines and compulsory license feasible for addressing climate change?  The theme of 
flexibilities and WTO treaties is also explored within the content of green energy initiatives like feed-
in tariffs and the implications for this practice in relation to the SCM Agreement.   
 Chapter 4 recognizes the need for local climate change policies to be compliant with 
international laws and WTO treaties including the SCM Agreement, Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (“TRIMs”), as well as pre-WTO treaties like the GATT.   Local policies like 
FIT schemes implemented in Ghana to encourage PV plants and solar usage through fixed tariffs 
may infringe WTO trade agreements like the SCM Agreement, GATT and TRIPS if they are deemed 
to be subsidies.  Renewable energy subsidies were first entertained by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body in 2010 when Japan brought a case against Canada’s “FIT” program.62  The WTO Canada 
Renewable Energy decisions63 may be instructive in answering questions relating to international 
                                                 
 
62 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector (WT/DS412/AB/R), China – Measures 
Concerning World Power Equipment (WT/DS419/1); Canada – Measure Relating to Feed-in Tariff Program 
(WT/DS426/AB/R); European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Sector (WT/DS452/1), and European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and 
Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry (WT/DS459/1). 
63 Ibid.  
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trade-related treaties and local environmental policies that may impact on local incentive practices 
like FIT.  The Canada Renewable Energy decision examined the viability of feed-in tariffs as a policy 
to encourage use of renewable energy sources.  This decision raises concerns about the potential 
classification of feed-in tariffs as a subsidy and the future of green energy subsidies altogether.   It 
also highlights the interconnection of international laws and regional environmental policies.  In this 
regard, regional development needs may also necessitate “flexible” policies that contain domestic 
content requirements that may be in contravention of relevant and WTO treaties like TRIPS, the 
GATT and the SCM Agreement.   The Canada Renewable Energy Case is instructive in outlining 
potential roadblocks that other countries may encounter in implementing a feed-in tariff system.  For 
example, the Ghana Electricity Company’s credit rating may not be strong enough to encourage 
foreign investors to invest 10s of millions of dollars in a renewable energy project.  The feed-in tariff 
system that guarantees a fixed price to developers for the energy they produce may assist by 
minimizing the risk arising from a poor credit rating if the proper financial assurances are put in 
place.  There may also be forces beyond mere local factors that may indirectly influence local 
governmental policies.  For example, the feed-in-tariff system is aimed to create an incentive for 
foreign investors to invest in renewable energy projects.  
 This dispute raises questions about the viability of governmental policies that promote FITs 
as a method of encouraging renewable energy usage within the developing world.  In this regard, do 
WTO Agreements impede the development of government climate change abatement policies 
because of the requirement that these programs meet a minimum standard of compliance?  This 
article examines whether green energy programs like the FIT system should be classified as subsidies, 
and should these initiatives be granted an exemption under the SCM because of the public policy goal 
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of facilitating affordable renewable energy in the developing world?64  It argues that climate change 
abatement strategies are linked to international law policies that encourage renewable energy 
alternatives.  In this regard, this chapter queries whether SCM Agreement should be amended to 
include a non-actionable subsidy provision that recognizes the public policy goal of combating 
climate change.  Chapter 4 generated a published paper titled “The WTO Canada Renewable Energy 
Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing World: The 
Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green Energy 
Conflicts”.65 
Chapter 5 explores corporate practices that impede renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan 
Africa that rely on technology transfer like solar PV projects.  It will examine potential corporate 
abuses related to green technology patents that lead to the practice of evergreening.  This chapter 
produced the third published paper which looks at the corporate practice of evergreening intellectual 
property and its impact on green technology transfer within the energy sector. This chapter was 
converted into a paper titled “Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as an Impediment to Green 
Technology Transfer to the Developing World”66 which explores the impact of patent life extension 
practices like evergreening on climate change.  While evergreening has been widely studied within 
the pharmaceutical sector, it has very limited attention within the area of climate change abatement 
strategies.  While corporations promised that countries that adopted treaties like TRIPS would realize 
returns from foreign investments, there is concern that these agreements may lead to inequalities 
between the industrial nations and developing ones, especially for products like photovoltaic solar 
                                                 
64 Lewis (2016), supra note 53.  
65 Ibid.  
66 This paper has passed two peer reviews and is in the final phase of review.  I have been advised that the paper will 
most likely be published as follows:  Leslyn Lewis, “Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as an Impediment to Green 
Technology Transfer to the Developing World” (2018) 18 Asper Review of International Business and Trade 23. 
 
  30
panels that rely heavily on trade-secret protection.  In addition, this non-disclosure may also impact 
on green technology transfer and may impede climate change abatement strategies in the developing 
world.  The efficacy of technology transfer provisions in international Agreements like the UNFCCC 
and TRIPS will be examined within the context of how trade secrets impact on actual green 
technology transfer.  It will canvass whether trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies 
act as an inadvertent barrier to technology transfer within the developing world.  
 Chapter 6 highlights the reluctance of foreign investors to commence renewable energy 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  In this regard, this chapter reviews the optimal investment model for 
foreign investors while taking into consideration technical constraints and the fixed feed-in tariff 
agreement.  It explores the economic feasibility of energy generation projects by highlighting the 
practicability of the FIT scheme as a solution for the African energy insecurity problem.  This chapter 
produced the fourth published paper titled “A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of Large 
Scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments”.67  A general 
model of a solar PV plant in sub-Saharan Africa will be adopted (utilizing common environmental 
and cost factors) to identify the break-even point at which investors will refuse to undertake a project 
if guarantees on return are not secured to cover their minimum out-of-pocket costs.  Regional factors 
that have discouraged high initial investment projects like solar PV plants in sub-Saharan Africa will 
be explored:  these include, political risk associated with the failure to provide sufficient bank 
guarantees along with the inability to secure sovereign guarantees for projects.  Options for utilizing 
climate financing to mitigate these risks will be entertained.  Recommendations of risk mitigation 
will be provided within the context of how to best address the infrastructural issues that previously 
                                                 
67 This paper has already been published. See: Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis, and Jon Sarpong “A Study of the Economic 
and Technical Analysis of Large Scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments” 
3:7 (2014) International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) 1415. 
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discourage private investments within the region. 
Chapter 7 produced a publication titled “Creating a Green Energy Infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Climate Finance as an Innovative Solution to the Under-Representation of Sub-
Saharan Africa in Green Energy Projects”.68 This chapter highlights some of the financial risks that 
are germane to green energy projects within the sub-Saharan African region, and proposes possible 
solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection between public policy, 
finance and private investments.  Various climate finance instruments designed to address the 
problem of sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa are explored within the scope of analysis 
that focuses on renewable energy projects such as solar photovoltaic plants, and the barriers of private 
financing for this high investment initiative.    
Chapter 8 looks at success stories within sub-Saharan Africa’s renewable energy sector.  It 
highlights regional strategies that sub-Saharan African countries have used to attract FDI to finance 
renewable energy projects.   The genesis of this chapter emerged from a conference presentation at 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Four Society Conference where I presented a 
paper in 2016.  Chapter 8 consists of a book chapter titled “Innovative Policies for Overcoming 
Barriers to Financing Green Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa”.69  This chapter examines the 
regional financial impediments that may act as a primary barrier to the implementation alternative 
renewable energy choices.   It explores whether the lack of FDI on the sub-Saharan continent is 
attributable to aspects beyond the implementation of an enabling regulatory framework. The inquiry 
seeks to understand the local obstacles that affect private climate financing and how these conditions 
                                                 
68 Leslyn Lewis, “Climate Finance as a Solution to the Under-Representation of Sub-Saharan Africa in Green Energy 
Projects” 9:1 (2018) The Journal of Sustainable Development, Law and Policy. [publication pending] 
69 Leslyn Lewis, “Innovative Policies for Overcoming Barriers to Financing Green Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” in Neil Craik, Cameron Jefferies, Sara Seck, and Timothy Stevens (eds), Global Environmental Change and 
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can be mitigated, thereby increasing the confidence of investors to undertake projects on the sub-
Saharan continent.  It highlights the local conditions that may explain the reluctance of private 
investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, this chapter highlights some of 
the climate change financial risks that are germane to the sub-Saharan African region, and proposes 
possible solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection between public 
policy, finance and private investments.  The scope of analysis focusses on renewable energy 
projects, such as solar photovoltaic plants, and the barriers of private financing for this high 
investment initiative.  The chapter highlights the notion that innovative results-based funding 
schemes are needed to assist countries like Ghana in moving from the Power Purchase Agreement 
(“PPA”) stage to the financial close stage for solar photovoltaic (“PV”) plants. As such, private 
financiers will require some assurance that their investment is not unduly at risk.  It will utilize Ghana, 
West Africa, as a case study that seeks to answer the following question: why, despite negotiating 
solid PPAs in Ghana, investors remain reluctant to invest the 10s of millions required to bring a solar 
PV plant to commercial operation?  
Ghana has one such success story, but it may not serve as a model of success because the 
Chinese investor essentially gave up on the ability to obtain funding from local banks, and raise funds 
internationally for the project; BXC eventually self-financed.  This is not a realistic expectation, and 
in fact, may serve as an example of a failure to attract foregoing investors to Ghana’s renewable 
energy sector. As a result, the chapter will draw from lessons from other sub-Saharan countries that 
have been able to pass the PPA stage to attract foreign investors; one such country is Uganda which 
has recently implemented a system for addressing investor barriers to investing in renewable energy 
projects.  What are some of the strategies and policies that Ghana can employ to attract financiers for 
these high-risk projects? The aim of this chapter is to also collect a series of best-practices that will 
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enhance the private investment climate for renewable energy projects among sub-Saharan African 
countries through implementing innovative industrial policies.70   
The final chapter of this portfolio ties together the eight preceding chapters under the general 
theme that explores the role of international agreements like TRIPS and the SCM with the climate 
change goals of developing nations, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa.  In addressing the general 
question of why, despite implementing recommendations from international organizations and 
institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and WTO, sub-Saharan nations still lag behind 
other developing countries in attracting FDI for green energy projects? The unintended barriers that 
are built into the international trade regime are highlighted.  Local factors that impact on sustainable 
development by extracting lessons from the Ghanaian case study within the photovoltaic solar energy 
sector and the policy instrument of feed-in tariffs are also referenced in the concluding chapter.  
Generally, this chapter highlights why international agreements and local regulatory changes are 
insufficient to facilitate development especially from a sustainability standpoint.  The chapter 
uncovers some of the struggles arising from the desire for sustainable development in the renewable 
energy sector in Ghana, and unearths some general issues and principles that must be contemplated 
by stakeholder, government regulators and foreign investors for the success of green energy projects 
in Ghana and elsewhere in the developing world.  
  
                                                 
70 For series of best practices in sub-Saharan Africa, see: A Eberhard and K Gratwick, “IPPs in Sub-Saharan  Africa: 
Determinants of Success” (2011) 39 Energy Policy 5541.  
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CHAPTER 2 
“Literature Review” 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In the past, development within sub-Saharan Africa and its connection to international law 
has been linked to modernization of local laws and regulatory structures to fit with international 
standards.   This literature review will explore whether changes to the law and regulatory framework 
are necessary or sufficient to attract foreign investments and thus fuel sustainable development. This 
analysis will necessitate an exploration of development theories as they relate to modernizing local 
regulatory infrastructures and attracting FDI.  The literature on economic growth, development and 
sustainable development will also be highlighted and will borrow from lessons gained from TRIPS 
and the harmonization process for IPR in understanding the role of new laws and regulatory process 
play in development.  Finally, this literature review will attempt to emphasize some gaps in the 
literature on sustainable development and climate change.  
 
2.1 Lessons from the Global Harmonization of IPRs and the Inability to Attract FDI. 
 
Many sub-Saharan African countries are too familiar with the promises of harmonization 
made in sectors outside of renewable energy, that also failed to attract FDI. Similar to the reluctance 
in adopting energy policies like feed-in-tariffs, many developing and least-developed countries were 
also initially reluctant to sign on to international trade Agreements like TRIPS, but eventually 
concede with the optimistic outlook that having stricter IPR would attract FDI,71 and contribute to 
regional economic development.  However, many of these developing countries, especially those 
within sub-Saharan Africa are resource producing economies that may not rely heavily on IPR 
industries and products.  This yields to the conclusion that intellectual property registered in 
                                                 
71 Endeshaw, supra note 3. 
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developing countries would largely be for the benefit of foreigners.72  On the other hand, the lack of 
intellectual property protection in developing countries is said to discourage FDI and contribute to 
brain drain (the migration of local researchers and scientists).73  As developing countries lagged 
behind as producers of products requiring IP protection, many lamented over the benefits of IP 
harmonization.  It appeared that the cost of complying with TRIPS outweighed the initial benefits for 
developing nations. However, TRIPS was touted as a trade-related initiative with compromises that 
could placate developing and least-developed nations that believed the Agreement was initially one-
sided.74   
 Theoretically, TRIPS represented the solution to the development problem, that is, if 
developing countries updated the IPR regimes, this would be the solution to short and long-term 
economic growth in developing nations.75  TRIPS and IPR harmonization led scholars to query the 
impact of the treaty on IPR protection in the developing world.  Some scholars have found the 
“relationship between IPR protection and growth depends upon the level of development, as proxied 
by initial GDP per capita, but in a non-linear way.”76 Carlos Primo Braga and Carsten Fink concluded 
that TRIPS does not guarantee that a country that undergoes strengthening their IPR will yield the 
result of economic growth.  In reviewing the literature on the subject matter, they note: 
“This brief review underscores the limitation of normative recommendations concerning 
changes in the rules of IPRs at the world level.  The strengthening of IPRs protection will 
have different welfare implications depending on the characteristics of each country. 
Generalizations can only be made if strong  assumptions are adopted. For example, if one 
                                                 
72 Douglas F Greer, “The Case Against Patents System in Less-Developed Countries” (1973) 8 J. Int’l L. & Econ 223. 
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L. Rev. 385. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property 
Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Christine Thelen, “Carrots and Sticks: 
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76 Rod Falvey, Neil Foster, & David Greenaway, “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth” (2006) 10:4 
Review of Development Economics 700 at 700.  Note that these scholars found evidence of positive effects of IPR and 
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assumes that the supply of  innovations in the South (i.e. in the developing world) is rather 
inelastic and the IPRs regimes are of limited relevance in influencing trade, foreign direct 
investment, and technology transfer, then it follows that the [TRIPS] Agreement  is in 
essence an exercise in rent transfer.  A much more optimistic view of its  welfare 
implications for developing countries, however, can be put together if the  opposite 
assumptions are held.”77  
 
For Braga and Fink, TRIPS is of primary benefit to countries belonging to the OECD whose assets 
are more closely tied to intellectual property protection.  Accordingly, the world outside of the OECD 
nations, TRIPS represented “an exercise in rent transfer”.78   Thus, Carsten Fink, Keith Maskus and 
Carlos Primo Braga maintained that attracting FDI is largely dependent on the size of the domestic 
market with bigger markets benefitting more from IPR and FDI.79  Maskus noted that shortly 
following TRIPS, he calculated that by 1995 the United States stood to gain the most financially from 
the Agreement: 
“Overwhelmingly the United States would gain the most income in terms of static rent 
transfers, with a net inflow of some $ 5.8 billion per year.  This reflected the fact that U.S. –
headquartered firms owned numerous patents in many countries that were required by TRIPS 
to upgrade their intellectual property protection, while U.S. law was subject to virtually no 
change.  Germany would earn an additional net income of $997 million on its patent portfolio.  
Most countries would experience a rising net outflow of patent rents, both because of 
significant changes in their laws and because they tended to be net technology importers.  The 
largest net outward transfer of some $ 1.3 billion accrued to Canada, in which many U.S. –
owned patents would receive stronger protection. Developing countries also would pay more 
on their patent stocks, with Brazil experiencing a net outward transfer of around $ 1.2 billion 
per year.”80 
 
Specifically, many developing countries recognized that increased IPR were primarily beneficial to 
economies that were based on technological and pharmaceutical innovations.81 Both Professors Keith 
                                                 
77 Carlos A Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, “The Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Patterns of Convergence and Conflict” (1996) 72 CHI.-Kent L. Rev. 439 at 443. 
78 Ibid at 443. 
79 Ibid; Keith E Maskus, "Intellectual property rights and economic development."(2000) 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 471.  
80 Ibid at 493. 
81 P H Schneider, “International trade, economic growth, and intellectual property rights: a panel data study of developed 
and developing countries” (2005) 78 Journal of Development Economics  529-547.  This study explores the role of high 
technology trade in IPRs and FDIs on economic growth and rate of innovation.  For studies on patents and economic 
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Maskus and Daniel Gervais recognized that there is no formula for IPR and economic development, 
and that various polices need to be adopted depending on the level of development of a nation. 82  
Essentially, development policies must take into consideration technology transfer, innovation, and 
human capital. 
 TRIPS promote “pull” over “push” factors.83  It was projected that the implementation of 
international Agreements would “pull” foreign investments to the region and a natural companion 
would be technological transfer.  In “Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology 
Transfer into Developing Countries?” Cameron Hutchison examined the relationship between 
climate change technologies and TRIPS.  He argues that “the international legal regime employs a 
mixture of “push” (encouraging technology transfer from developed countries) and “pull” 
(encouraging private sector trade and investment into developing countries) obligations.”84  
Hutchison identifies push factors as being incorporated in international treaties obligating developed 
countries in “stimulating private sector transfer initiating government to government transfers, and 
increasing financial and technical support to enhance domestic capacities”.85  He views pull factors 
as generated by developing countries such as the implementation of strong local regulatory and legal 
                                                 
Economic Growth" (1997) 153:3 Contemporary Economic Policy 51; See also: S Kanwar & R Everson, “Does 
intellectual property protection spur technical change?” (2003) 55 Oxford Economic Papers 235 where these authors 
found that weak IPR facilitates imitation while stronger IPR increases innovation in the developing country; Y K Kim, 
K Lee and W G Park, (2008) “Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection and Economic Growth in Countries at 
Different Levels of Development” 3rd Annual Conference of the EPIP Association, Bern Switzerland; See additional 
studies on the positive relationship between R&D/GDP ratios: N Varsakelis, “The Impact of Patent Protection, Openness, 
and National Culture on R&D Investment: a Cross-Country Empirical Investigation” (2001) 30 Research Policy 105; 
Edwin Mansfield, “Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer” (1994)  IFC 
discussion paper 19 (The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Washington D.C.), online: 
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82 Keith Maskus, “Incorporating a Globalized Intellectual Property Rights Regime into an Economic Development 
Strategy”(2007) 2 Frontiers of Economics and Globalization 497; Gervais, (2007) supra note 2.  
83 Cameron Hutchison, “Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology to Developing Countries? (2006) 
3 University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal 517. 
84 Ibid at 517.  
85 Ibid at 521.  
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infrastructure such as intellectual property rights.      
 Hutchison highlights several ways by which technology is diffused including “government 
assistance programs, direct purchasing, licensing, foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint 
ventures.”86  Two consequential effects of TRIPS and IPR were identified.  Firstly, Hutchison found 
that stronger intellectual property rights has a negative effect on innovation and technology transfer.  
In this regard, strong IPR were also identified as not having a positive effect on foreign direct 
investments.  The second effect is that TRIPS is inadequate in dealing with the potential for 
compulsory licensing where countries refuse to license technologies.87   
The connection between economic growth and IPR have long been considered by economists, 
especially as they relate to FDI.  This “pull” factor is often viewed in terms of meeting a population’s 
needs as in the case with renewable energy technology.  The WIPO has also recognized the 
importance of policies and strategies beyond mere implementation of IPR and development strategies 
that requires the following: 
“…strategic integration of intellectual property issues with other development  policy 
issues,  such as those in the economic, trade, financial, educational, social,  cultural, 
environmental, and competition fields.”88 
 
Few scholars have turned their minds to the importance of culture, or local factors in intellectual 
property issues and development.89  Beyond culturally unique features, the literature acknowledges 
that IPR cannot substantively contribute to development without first addressing the basic needs of 
the citizens.  Margaret Chon argued that intellectual property must address global public goods and 
that it: 
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“…can no longer afford to be insular, as if it does not affect or is not affected by  the 
provision of other global public goods.  Explicit connections must be made between 
intellectual property and other global public goods addressing basic development needs, 
including food, education as well as the already highly publicized health care sector.  
Intellectual property, after all, cannot “take  root”  absent the basic national capacity, 
which can only be developed with a population that has its essential needs met.”90 
 
In this process, old locally produced products are replaced by new FDI generated goods,91 and 
development must consider the primary goal of meeting the basic needs of the local population. 
Foreign companies may also deem it necessary to invest in FDI where there is a significant amount 
of trade or a service to the local population is provided by the MNC and funded by governments who 
do not have the resources to invest in the initial infrastructural project.  This is the case in the energy 
sector where an essential service is provided to the citizens as channeled through governments.  Thus, 
theories have been devised to predict the optimum time for a foreign company to relocate and invest 
in domestic production.92    
In almost 20 years post-TRIPS, even some of the most comprehensive scholarly dedications 
to understanding its impact on development have been largely confined to the explanatory realm of 
the Agreement.93  The promise of development, that is, corporations investing in developing 
countries with strong IPR, seems to have fallen by the wayside especially on continental Africa.94  At 
minimum it was expected that strong IPR regimes would yield some form of technology transfer.  
Even more surprising is the fact that the benefits of FDI promised for implementing stronger IPR, 
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have not received sufficient scholarly analysis, particularly in Africa.  Ikechi Mgbeoji highlights this 
omission: 
“[s]ince the emergence of economic liberalism in the 1980s, industrializing countries have 
been fed with the message that attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), with the attached 
conditions of strong IPRs will automatically yield economic development. Yet since the 
accession of African countries to the WTO, there is virtually no empirical work on the relation 
between IPRs and FDI in Africa.”95 
 
Studies conducted after the enactment of TRIPS in 1994 tended to conclude that stronger IPR can 
encourage multinational corporations to invest, thus contributing to industrial development,96 
through various means including economic growth,97 economic development,98 development 
policies,99  climate change,100 growth in the recipient’s economy through innovation.101  The issue 
climate change through green energy projects has not been developed in the literature.  As such, the 
review will trace the relevant literature on IPR and development as it relates to Africa, and juxtapose 
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this reality with the promises made to developing countries regarding enhanced energy 
infrastructures.   The analysis will necessitate an exploration of development theories as they relate 
to modernizing local regulatory infrastructures and attracting FDI.  The literature on economic 
growth, development and sustainable development will also be highlighted.  Finally, this literature 
review will attempt to emphasize some gaps in the literature on sustainable development from a 
climate change perspective.    
  
2.2 International Treaties and the Promise of Development  
 
 The notion that harmonized trade laws would entice foreign investors to a region was highly 
popularized by international institutions that sought increased membership in organizations such as 
the WTO: 
“The lure of membership to international treaties was often made more appealing  by the 
work of international institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) and UNESCO, which espoused the conventional wisdom of western intellectual 
property scholars that enactment of European-style intellectual property laws is a necessary 
prerequisite to economic progress and development.”102  
 
The assumption of TRIPS and other WTO trade agreements was that as countries joined the WTO, 
and complied with TRIPS, that bilateral trade flows would increase.103   Tim Bűthe and Helen Mine 
have argued that international trade agreements such as the GATT and WTO create the certainty 
needed by MNCs to engage in foreign investments.  They found that developing countries that joined 
the WTO and participate in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have higher levels of FDI inflows 
than compared to their counterparts.  The argument is that Member States have their obligations 
enshrined in WTO treaties, thereby creating trade certainty and also increasing the cost of a country’s 
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potential breach of their commitments.104  In this regard, it is argued that “trade agreements boost 
FDI precisely because they have not just economic but also political effects, most importantly 
because these international institutions enshrine commitments to open markets and liberal economic 
policies.”105  The rationale is that the WTO binds its Members thereby ensuring that these Member 
States refrain “from a range of interventions in the market that might affect foreign direct 
investors.”106 
 Most empirical data on the role of FDI in sub-Saharan African development have focused on 
regression analysis that considers various infrastructural factors, including: political 
stability,107market size, labour cost, environmental costs, and national bankability for governmental 
projects, from a cross-national econometric perspective,108 simultaneous equation model,109 using 
econometric evidence on the role of patent and utility models in assessing levels of innovation110 and 
the result of local innovation, patents and technology change on FDI in the developing world. The 
push factor of FDI towards certain countries has arguably led several developing countries to enter 
into bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  Poulsen and Aisbett caution against these kinds of treaties 
that may yield dire consequences for unsuspecting developing nations.  They argue that like TRIPS, 
BITs were signed by developing countries with the promise of attracting FDI, without a full 
comprehension of the legal ramifications. 
 The World Bank also acknowledged the importance of private finance by noting: 
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“In many low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa by contrast, internal cash generation 
as a source of investment funds is very limited because of low tariff levels and poor collection 
that result in utilities not covering even their O&M  costs, much less generating profits that 
would allow them to invest in expansion of their networks.  IFIs, ECAs and bilateral donors 
play an important role in financing new investments in these countries…”111 
 
Despite the difference in findings related to international organizations, trade agreements and the 
impact on FDI, the consensus is that international institutions facilitate trade through enabling 
corporations to rely on government decisions and policies regarding trade and investments.112  While 
the importance of international agreements and organizations in creating an environment that 
encourages FDI have been linked, the role of specific domestic policies still needs to be expanded.  
Inward FDI has been found to increase with a nation’s participation in international organizations 
such as the WTO, but has also been determined that such participation reduces the nation’s autonomy 
to deviate from certain policies.113   
 While writing for the World Bank in 1995, Professor Mansfield developed a study that 
attempted to uncover the relationship between IPR and FDI.114  The Mansfield study was seminal in 
its survey of almost 100 U.S. multinational companies with branches worldwide.115  The conclusion 
from the Mansfield studies demonstrates that FDI is closely connected to the perceived strength of 
IP protection in the host country.116  Other studies have found that the probability of receiving FDI 
is linked to the strength of the local IP laws and protection. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik studied FDI 
levels in twenty-four Eastern bloc economies from 1989 to 1994.  By utilizing the Ginarte and Park 
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index, Javorcik’s demonstrated a positive correlation in the high-tech sector between IP protection 
and receipt of FDI.117  Andrea Fosuri (2004) examined IPR protection and other risk factors in 
seventy-five countries between 1981 and 1996.118  This study identified risk factors beyond IP 
strength and enforcement that affect FDI.  In particular, the credit rating of the country, currency 
fluctuation issues, and other country risk factors play a large role in FDI.  The Fosfuri study revealed 
that there are factors beyond IP strength and enforcement that comprise FDI determinants.   
  In mid 1990s after large social unrest caused by the displacement of small farmers and tribal 
groups from a Dam project,119 civil society organizations argued that the World Bank should not be 
at the forefront of climate finance funding if it continues to fund “dirty” energy projects.120  The 
protestors called for the World Bank to adopt a new energy funding strategy that “promotes truly 
clean energy and energy access”.121 
 The Sierra Club and Oil Change International produced a report that revealed that between 
2011 and 2013 only 7 percent of the World Bank’s energy portfolio went to increasing access to 
energy.122  The report found that 84 percent of those who lack access to electricity are located in rural 
areas “where it is often costly to extend existing grids.”123 Based on this finding, the International 
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Energy Agency (IEA) recommends off-grid solutions as an option to meet the 2030 energy access 
for all goal.  The IEA estimates that to meet the 2030 goal the way energy is funded needs to be 
reallocated with 36 percent going to grid extension, 40 percent to mini-grids and 24 percent to off-
grid solutions.124  This recognition is based on a lack of confidence in the current grid system and its 
expansion capacity. While the projections foretell a scenario where 64 percent of investments should 
be directed to off-grid solutions, the reality is that in 2014 on 0.5 percent of the World Bank’s funding 
through the African development Bank was directed towards mini-grid and off-grid solutions.125  
Non-access energy spending accounted for 94.4 percent and other energy access spending totalled 
25.5 percent.126  In addition, the Sierra Club study found that the African Development Bank reduced 
its 2014 spending on energy access from 38 percent to 26 percent.127 
 The World Bank’s energy initiatives have not gone without criticism in sub-Saharan 
Africa.128  The Bank is arguably the biggest lending energy source in the world today.  Critics have 
argued that instead of shaping energy policy to address energy poverty, it has channelled investment 
to large-scale multi-national energy industries.  Medupi coal plant in South Africa provides energy 
for the mining sector, and was labelled as contributing to climate change;129 the World Bank funded 
this controversial South African coal plant project to the tune of US $3 billion loan.130  Similar 
controversy followed the World Bank in Nigeria where privatisation of the state electric company 
did not result in increased access to the poor, but left the public saddled with debt and created an 
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electricity supply emergency.131  Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 3 hydropower 
projects (Inga 1, 2 and 3 Dams) that failed to produce the projected energy output despite the Inga 3 
Dam costing USD $12 billion.132  In the end the Dams were said to enrich the mining companies and 
aluminum smelters.  
More recently, the World Bank has implemented the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program 
(SREP) through its climate investment funds sector an $839 million funding program to improve 
power through the renewable energy usage in the developing world.133  The SREP Program in Ghana 
is designed to address the local problems around the inadequate grid capacity. The solar PV solution 
promoted by the SREP program resolves some immediate energy problems, but does not go as far as 
rectifying Ghana’s low capacity grid problem which is a major factor in why financiers shy away 
from investing in the region.134  Instead, the SREP program infuses rooftop and battery operated 
standalone systems that do not need to be fed into the grid.  The SRED Ghana program identifies the 
main barriers to investment in renewable energy resources “limited experience and track record of 
utility-scale solar development, high perceived risk by private developers of a largely untested new 
FiT regime, and limited access to affordable financing.”135 However, the Ghanaian problem goes 
beyond affordable financing, because even if the project reaches financial close, the grid capacity 
issues may make it impossible for the new power station to feed its energy into the outdated grid.  
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This adds another dimension to the reluctance of foreign investors to undertake renewable energy 
projects in Ghana.  
  It has also been argued that investors will be attracted to countries that also uphold investor 
rights in the form of strong treaties.  Gus Van Harten critically discusses the justifications of 
investment treaty regimes that shift power “from states to multinational companies and from 
domestic courts to a private arbitration industry based in Washington, New York, London, Paris, The 
Hague and Stockholm.”136  Van Harten notes that the system of investment treaties and arbitration is 
often supported by common arguments that are tied to the system’s role in encouraging foreign direct 
investments.137  These entrenched justifications seem to be based on beliefs beyond the attraction of 
foreign investments.  He concludes that “…if the aim of investment treaties is to encourage foreign 
investment between the states parties to the treaty – and not to extend special legal rights and 
privileges broadly to an international class of corporate owners of assets – then the expansive 
approach to forum-shopping that is enabled by broad language in many of the treaties and, in turn, 
by the permissive interpretations of some arbitrators makes no sense.”138  In fact, the UNCTAD also 
concluded that bilateral investments treaties have little or no impact on attracting FDI.139  
Poulsen and Aisbett ascertained that treaties were overwhelmingly powerful in that they: 
“…grant foreign investors a right to file international arbitration claims directly  against 
governments without first needing to exhaust local remedies.  If governments refuse to 
participate in the proceedings or chose not to comply with  an arbitral award, investors are 
allowed to confiscate their commercial property in  most corners of the world, with only 
limited options for courts in the enforcing states to refuse execution.”140 
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Given the high costs of litigation, Poulsen and Aisbett surmised that most developing countries were 
unaware of the consequences of the treaty.  In addition, with the recent downturn in the global 
economy, FDI has also declined.  Poulsen and Hufbauer also cautioned against providing too many 
incentives to corporations in the form of rushing “into investment treaties.”141  For these authors FDI 
did not necessarily lead to development.  They note that: 
“…not all FDI promotes development; larger quantities of FDI flows cannot be the sole 
indicator of successful development policy.  To increase the positive impact of FDI for 
economic development, and avoid the adverse consequences, officials should instead 
consider a “sustainable FDI” strategy, which enhances not only the quantity of investments, 
but also the “quality”…”142 
 
Poulsen argued that these treaties are entered into for the primary purpose of attracting foreign 
investors.  In addition, the purpose of the treaties is to minimize risks to investors arising from 
political risks, bank and currency, insurance, and other market-based risks.  He surmised that 
developing countries should consider other less encumbering means of addressing risk factors such 
as investor-state contracts.143  
Ha-Joon Chang in Kicking Away the Ladder argues that advanced nations established their 
local industries by limiting competition.  In addition, the free trade policies that are currently being 
imposed on developing countries were absent at the time that industrialized nations developed.144  
Chang argues that developed nations once favoured subsidies and controls to assist their once weak 
economies to develop and advance.  This debate is ripe in the renewable energy industry that requires 
subsidies and concessions to compete with traditional energy sources.  Developing nations seek the 
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same favourable trade terms that existed in the past that favoured industrialized nations.  Developed 
nations argue that there is no need to regress back to protectionist trade practices, as there are 
sufficient flexibilities built into international agreements and multilateral investment agreements to 
allow developing countries the room to set domestic policies and pursue a sustainable development 
path.145   On the other hand, sustainable economic development scholars question the legitimacy of 
flexibilities by asking the question “if so much flexibility is allowed, why bother with an 
agreement?”146   
 
 2.3 Local Regulatory Reform and “Pull” Factors 
 The “growth theory”, which is the most popular FDI theory, posits that externalities such as 
capital infusion, knowledge transfer, exports and technology combine to induce enhanced growth 
output.147  This interaction between FDI, technology and growth is often referred to as endogenous 
growth models.148  While endogenous growth models are often substantiated through employing 
statistical models including time series and cross-country growth equations, and economic and 
accounting growth models,149 the effects of FDI are far reaching on the domestic economy: 
“Through knowledge transfers, FDI is expected to augment the existing stock of knowledge 
in the recipient economy through labour training and skill acquisition and diffusion, on the 
one hand, and through the introduction of alternative management  practices and 
organisational arrangements on the other. Even without significant physical capital 
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accumulation, FDI can also be expected to promote knowledge transfer,  in the case of, for 
instance, quasi-investment arrangements such a leasing, licensing and start-up agreements, 
management  contracts and  joint ventures in general.”150 
 
The spill-over of skills emanating from FDI is directly linked to the human capital factor and the 
ability of domestic markets to facilitate and engage in the knowledge transfer referred to above.  In 
this regard, human capital and other externalities have been identified as important to the success of 
FDI.151  Consequently, the theoretical approach to intellectual property rights protection and 
economic growth that is rooted in endogenous growth models,152  recognizes that technology is 
produced in industrialized countries and imported to developing countries that will gain by imitating 
the innovations. This theory recognizes not just the quantitative nature of financial investments, but 
also the externalities resulting from the qualitative impact in the form of “new technologies and 
augmenting human capital stocks”.153   
 
 2.3.1 Intellectual Property Rights and the Promise of Development  
 Some of the earliest studies on IPR and FDI showed a strong connection between more robust 
stronger IPR and increased FDI,154 or at minimum the decision of multinational corporations to invest 
in a country through FDI.155  Where a positive impact was identified between FDI and growth, this 
impact was found only in countries with educated workforces where the population had attained a 
                                                 
150 de Mello, (1997) supra note 21  at 9. 
151 V N  Balasubramanyam, M Salisu & D Sapsford, “Foreign Direct Investment as an Engine of Growth” (1999) 8:1 
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development  27. 
152 Romer, (1990) supra note 148; Grossman & Helpman, supra note 148; L A Rivera-Batiz & P M Romer (1991), supra 
note 148; Aghion & Howitt, (1991) supra note 148.  
153 de Mello, (1997) supra note 21 at 22. 
154 José L Groizard, “Technology Trade” 45:9 (2009) Journal of Development Studies” 1526. This study used panel data 
from eighty countries for 1970 and found that FDI increases and was higher in countries that had stronger IPRs.  
155 Maskus (2000) supra note 79. Note: this study also recognized that in countries such as India a good deal of 
technological development is devoted to jobs where technology is imitated.  The introduction of IPRs actually displaces 
workers in these economies because jobs based on copy may decline.   
  51
minimum secondary education, and in advanced markets.156  Thus, in order for FDI to have a positive 
impact on growth, the domestic recipient host nation must have experienced a minimum level of 
development.  Branstetter et al also used confidential firm data to uncover 16 different periods in IPR 
policies in developing countries.  The findings demonstrated that strong IPR have a positive effect 
on growth in developing countries through multinational corporate FDI.157  For Branstetter et al.158 
the recognition of endogenous FDI in relation to IPR confirms Lai’s159 conclusion about the 
costliness of IPR to the South, by extending Lai’s analysis to specifically show the detrimental impact 
of IPR on imitation industries and activities.  The issue of whether the impact of IPR on growth is 
different depending on the level of FDI was also explored from a global perspective.160  This 
conclusion rests on the fact that stronger IPR increases the cost of imitation because of potential 
litigation and sanctions.  Edwin Mansfield also explored the role of IPR on FDI and joint ventures 
among 100 major U.S. firms in a cross-section of manufacturing industries.161  The survey results 
indicated that countries with weak IPR created a deterrent for FDI and joint ventures especially in 
the research and development sector.   
 Between 1981 and 2001 Albert Hu and I.P.L. Png studied the relationship between patent-
intense industries and economic growth in 54 manufacturing industries in up to 72 countries.162  Their 
study reinforced the relevance of patents in industries such as pharmaceuticals and technology that 
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rely on patents to protect their products and recoup R&D investments.  The Hu and Png study also 
confirmed the association between country wealth, IPR and economic growth, but primarily for 
patent-intensive industries.  Branstetter et al,163 and Hu and Png164 found that strong IPR protection 
act as an incentive for multinationals, especially those with technological products to invest in 
developing economies.  Thus, Hu and Png concluded that: 
“Our results bear upon the public policy debate regarding the role of intellectual  property 
rights in economic growth and development.  We found that patent laws and their 
enforcement do matter for economic growth.  However, we also found that stronger 
patent rights have less impact on economic growth in poorer economies and in less patent-
intensive industries.  Our findings lend empirical support to arguments that patent laws be 
tailored to the particular circumstances of country and industry.”165 
 
The above quote reveals a clear public policy issue in acknowledging that IPR and development 
cannot be applied in a vacuum.166  The ambiguity arising from the factors that cause differing 
correlations between IPR and economic development in developing and developed nations, still 
prevails.   
 Some scholars have found no impact of strong IPR on attracting FDI among poorer countries, 
but have identified a positive correlation for middle income and developed nations.167  Specifically, 
Asian countries that adopted stricter IPR standards have been shown to attract more robust FDI.  
Other studies have found a strong connection between patent files and cross-border licensing fees 
and royalties.  The data also demonstrates that patent activity and licensing is highly concentrated in 
the hands of a few countries.168     
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 Twenty years post TRIPS it is now clear that IPR is insufficient to bring development without 
some change in the legal institutions and policies of the host country.169  The issue of whether the 
impact of IPR on growth varies is different depending on the level of FDI was explored from a global 
perspective.  In her article, “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Relation Between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Growth”, Mila Kasheveeva used panel data techniques in a sample 
of 103 countries between 1970 and 2009 to assess the effects of FDI and IPR on growth and total 
welfare in developing countries.170  
In Keith Maskus and Rugh Okediji’s “Intellectual Property Rights and International 
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options” the issue 
of climate change is addressed from legal, economics and technical perspectives.171  The authors 
found that despite commitments in the UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan calling for developed 
countries to take proactive steps to facilitate technology transfer the multilateral, legal and economic 
framework are not sufficiently entrenched to operationalize the process. 
 The level of IPR enforcement is not the only variable affecting technology transfer, but 
authors like Pamela Smith found that in relation to U.S. exports, the importing country’s ability to 
imitate the invention also played an important role.172   Consequently, patent holders are more 
reluctant to do business in countries with weak IPR enforcement and strong imitative capacity such 
as India and China.173  Several studies of the wind, solar and biofuels industries have examined the 
                                                 
Maskus & Jerome Reichman, International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual 
Property Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
169 Ruth L Gana (Okediji), “Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective” (1999) 7 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 122. 
170 Kashcheeva, supra note 160.  
171 Keith Maskus and Rugh Okediji “Intellectual Property Rights and International Technology Transfer to Address 
Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options” (ICTSD Programme on IPRS and Sustainable Development, 
Issue Paper No 2, December 2010).  
172 Smith, (1999) supra note 96; Maskus and Penubarti (1995) supra note 99; Maskus, (2004) supra note 96.  
173 T O Awokuse & H Yin, Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Protection Induce More Bilateral Trade? Evidence 
from China’s Imports (Selected Paper prepared for the American Economics Association’s Annual Meeting, Orlando, 
  54
role of IPR in transferring technology to emerging markets.174  Many countries in the developing 
world have indicated that they experienced difficulty in obtaining technologies due to high licensing 
costs and the need to turn to off-patent alternatives.175  These off-patent technologies may not be as 
technologically advanced as the products under patent has been proven in the Chinese photovoltaic 
products.    
 
   
 2.4 Power Sector Reforms and the Promise of Development 
 
One of the goals of the United Nations Agenda 2030 is to “ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.”176  Access to electricity is an indicator of where a 
nation is on the development path,177 and may portend economic growth as indicated by GDP 
calculations.  According to the International Energy Agency (“IEA”), energy generation and usage 
contributes to more than 60% of greenhouse gas emissions.178  In developing regions like sub-Saharan 
Africa where there is anticipated population and industrial growth, energy generation and usage is 
bound to increase.  In this regard, renewable energy alternatives represent a means of meeting 
economic development needs, while providing the necessary energy needed to sustain infrastructural 
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growth at environmentally sustainable levels.  Demand for electricity in sub-Saharan Africa will 
indubitably increase as the population increases, with projections that it will double within the next 
25 years.179  The Millennium Development Goals as well as the Paris Agreement has made 
commitments to increasing affordable access to reliable electricity in sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
climate change mitigation targets contained in the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 require 
innovative policies that mitigate the financial barriers encountered by investors that undertake 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
There is also consensus that energy is a quintessential ingredient for not only economic 
growth but also development,180 and this development must be encouraged by an energy supportive 
political environment.181   There are a number of studies that have explored developments in the 
finance sector that can illuminate funding for renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.182 
However, specific scholarly attention needs to be devoted to case-study successes and how they can 
be adapted to other countries within the sub-Saharan region.   
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that approximately 75% of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa (some 730 million people) do not have access to clean cooking 
sources,183 and most of the energy is consumed within the residential sector with a high concentration 
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of biomass used for cooking.184   While the region comprises 13% of the world’s population, it only 
uses 4% of the world’s energy.185 According to the World Health Organization, the CO2 emissions 
from cooking are a major risk factor among women and children in sub-Saharan Africa for diseases 
such as pneumonia, respiratory and pulmonary diseases.186  IEA estimate almost half of the world’s 
1.2 billion people who lack access to electricity reside in sub-Saharan Africa.187 The causes of low 
access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa are multifaceted.  The literature on the subject attributes 
this shortcoming to various factors including the lack of sufficient infrastructure,188 which has been 
attributed to the lack of investments in constructing and maintaining these facilities.189  Economic 
development and to some extent FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Ghana specifically, are directly 
tied to energy availability within the region.  Without reliable energy, development and even foreign 
investments can be severely halted.  Therefore, it is not far removed to identify one of the most 
profound problems facing developing economies as one of energy deficiency. Given continental 
Africa’s geographic location and optimal access to the equator, terrestrial photovoltaics (“PVs”) are 
an optimal solution to achieving an environmentally friendly source of electrical energy while 
addressing some developmental issues that are intrinsically tied to energy deficiency and frequent 
blackouts.  
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2.4.1 Climate Finance and FDI 
The vast energy needs of sub-Saharan Africa are heightened by the need for private investors 
to bridge the financing gap left by public financing.  A common approach to private investing has 
been through Independent Power Producers (IPP) which undertake power-generating projects of a 
non-public utility, that are financed primarily through private funds and are privately developed, 
owned and operated often through a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), with a binding Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) (a contract that binds the government off-taker and the developer).  The solar IPP 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa often have a mix of financing ranging from one corporation funding 
the entire project to various debt and equity finance structures.  Risk assessment is crucial in 
renewable energy projects and the creditworthiness of the off-taker is of paramount importance.  
The vast majority of IPP projects in sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated in Kenya, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.190 The emergence of IPPs has not resolved the barriers that 
financiers encounter in developing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.   Firstly, local 
financing is not an option in a majority of cases.  For example, Nigeria is one of the few countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa that has the infrastructural banking system to finance these large investments, 
however, it often only finances such large-scale projects for up to 5 years (whereas solar PPAs are 
usually for 15 to 20 years).   
Few sub-Saharan African countries have the sovereign wealth funds sufficient to finance 
large-scale, long-term projects.  As such, renewable energy projects based on 20 year PPAs often 
have to find equity on the international market.  With many sub-Saharan African countries low credit 
rating, raising the debt and equity to finance a project can be challenging.  Some scholars have 
attributed the absence of renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa to a decline in publicly 
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funded projects arising from the lack of sustainable management.191  Ikejemba et al concludes that 
despite the implementation of many small and medium-size PV project in sub-Saharan Africa, “most 
of them have been left to deteriorate with no maintenance, no cleaning, no repairs and more 
importantly no sustainable management method that encompasses them all”.192  There is also the fear 
that the projects will not get off the ground.  For example, one of Ghana’s largest renewable energy 
projects by Blue Energy received a substantial amount of attention, but never materialized.193  While 
Blue Energy received a PPA 2011, the project never reached financial close, much less commercial 
operation.194 
 
2.4.2 The Lack of Financing for Renewable Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
In 2015, 80% of renewable energy projects were funded by private sector funds (US$ 242 
billion) versus 20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).195  Countries like India, China and 
Brazil are receiving green energy investments in the form of FDI, while the sub-Saharan region has 
largely been neglected, despite many countries implementing a FIT Program.  Foreign investors 
prefer projects in regions where the risks of return are low and where there are enabling governmental 
policies and frameworks, along with guarantees and low political risk. Consequently, domestic 
frameworks are crucial to attracting FDIs as 92% of private investments were spent in the same 
country that the funds were raised.196  
The IEA World Energy Investment Outlook Report examined energy financing and 
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investment for a period up to 2030.  The report estimated that “$48 trillion of cumulative investment 
in energy supply and efficiency are required by 2035”.  Moreover, investments in alternative energy 
are estimated at $53 trillion.197  These numbers raise serious financing concerns especially among 
developing nations that already struggle with the costs of creating a viable energy infrastructure to 
facilitate economic development.  The goal of increasing energy generating capacity to resolve the 
underdevelopment issue will only be achieved if innovative financing schemes are adopted.  Foreign 
investors have shied away from high capital renewable energy projects due to perceived investment 
barriers.198 Attracting FDI to renewable energy projects in the developing world will require effort 
in reducing perceived risks including those of a regulatory and political nature.199  The UNDP “De-
risking Renewable Energy Investments” identified a number of investment barriers that result in 
higher financing costs for these projects in the developing world.  There are a number of impediments 
such as those caused by political instability and inadequate regulatory frameworks that impact on the 
ultimate barrier of financing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.200  These barriers 
increase the risks associated with the high capital-intensive costs resulting in the initial risk often 
outweighing the financial gains.201  A recent approach to mitigating risks bifurcate the burden so that 
“private international investors are exposed only to the general political risks while international 
development banks cover mainly the regulatory risk.”202  The capital-intensive feature of renewable 
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energy projects increases the financial risks and consequently limits the number of available 
financing tools. In addition, national factors including country-specific political and economic 
barriers,203 must also be considered in project financial risks assessment especially for solar 
projects.204  Many investors insist that a risk-mitigating solution is to have the host country guarantee 
the off-takers payments, should a default arise.  These sovereign guarantees generally arise when the 
off-taker has a poor credit rating, or the risk of default on payments is high. These guarantees are 
recognized as government debts and as such may affect a nation’s balance sheet.205  For this reason 
governments are reluctant to indebt an entire nation in pursuance of one project.  
 
 2.5 Gaps in the Literature 
 
 The literature reviewed explored the theme that if developing nations modernize their 
regulatory infrastructures to protect foreign investors’ assets, then this change will lead to increase 
FDI.   This theory was initially postulated within the IP sector and has proven not to be a viable pull 
factor for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa.  A United Nations study206 found that there was no correlation 
between high levels of IPR protection and the degree of FDI.  In fact, there appears to be a 
contraindication, whereby many countries that have received FDI’s have very poor IPR, and 
countries like Nigeria with strong IPR have received a low level of FDI in certain areas such as 
pharmaceuticals207, but high FDI in industries that are extractive and service providing such as oil 
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and gas, cell phone, satellite T.V., and other service industries that yield rent-like returns to corporate 
investors.   The putative logical conclusion that IPR lead to economic development through FDI, 
have not be substantiated by empirical evidence.208   
The focus on strict IPR as a contributor to economic development may not have thoroughly 
accounted for the various types of industries, political climates, environmental factors, and general 
needs of developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, much of the 
pertinent discourse on IPR and FDI is devoid of an analysis that would account for the cultural 
peculiarities that may be relevant in sub-Saharan African economic growth and prosperity.  The Hu 
and Png findings challenge the traditional neo-classical economic approach that viewed IPR, 
development and innovation as one-dimensionally predicated on the assumption that IPR positively 
affects development and innovation.  However, while there is an abundance of literature on sectors 
like IP that have also relied on modernization of regulatory infrastructures as a basis for enticing 
FDIs, there is an absence of scholarly focus on issues relating to whether modernizing the power 
sectors within developing countries will lead to increase FDI.   
The primary literature on the subject still has not resolved whether there is a causal connection 
between modernizing regulatory processes and economic growth for poorer countries.   Countries 
like Ghana that have created enabling legislation to facilitate renewable energy projects have found 
that this modernization process is insufficient to attract FDI. Other nations like India, Brazil and 
China have adopted similar regulatory infrastructural changes that have resulted in a positive influx 
of FDI.  Despite this ambiguity, there is a clear adherence to the principle that harmonized regulatory 
processes will eventually have a positive effect on the developing world, without regional distinction.  
The issue of energy insecurity in Africa and the reality that the continent’s development could 
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be linked to an environmentally sustainable path, has forced the United Nations, World Bank, and 
especially the WTO to reconsider the role of regulatory reforms as it relates to the issue of climate 
change in Africa.   The World Bank drew the connection between the problem of energy insecurity 
and development as intrinsically linked to the growth of the energy infrastructure in areas such as 
sub-Saharan Africa.209 Unfortunately, this connection between energy infrastructures and 
development has not been thoroughly explored in the literature on FDI and development.  In addition, 
in 2004 The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in noting that energy was a 
prerequisite to development, identified the need for “institutional infrastructures.”210  The majority 
of sub-Saharan African countries are on the cusp of immense industrial growth and development, 
and as such they have the ability to adopt a sustainable pathway.  In this regard, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the recognition of green technologies in mitigating 
the negative effects of climate change are particularly relevant to the development of sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The issue of flexibilities in international treaties and this conversation is at an infancy stage 
in the literature, and requires deep analysis and consideration.  
International agreements like TRIPS, TRIMS, SCM, and the GATT have not cured the 
reluctance of foreign investors to finance renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Moreover, the World Bank policies that encouraged transparent energy sector policies among 
developing nations have resulted in many nations like Ghana expanding their regulatory regime to 
include schemes like FIT.  While these regulatory changes were necessary, they were not sufficient 
to encourage foreign investments in the region.  This research will expand the scope of analysis of 
FDI to include local factors that act as barriers to foreign investments within the energy sector within 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Admittedly, this research will borrow from the vast body of literature on IPR 
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and development, and apply those lessons to the renewable energy sector and its ability to attract FDI 
to sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
 2.5.1 Contributions of this Research to Existing Literature  
 The literature review illustrates that industries and the type of technological investment may 
be equally important to FDI as national characteristics and policies.   The promises made via the 
pharmaceutical sector relating to IP protection and increased FDI did not materialize.  It is likely that 
these same promises of increased FDI through enhanced power regulations will also fall short of 
drawing foreign investors, especially in the high capital renewable energy sector.  Similarly, in 
additional to tacit externalities such as the human capital factor, FDI may be attractive to a particular 
nation because of factors beyond having an enabling regulatory framework.  Such additional factors 
include favourable investment policies and industrial policy organizations to oversee and assist in 
addressing some barriers to investing in the region.   
A number of studies have shown that there is no positive effect on joining the WTO and 
increase in trade and foreign investments.211  This means that despite joining the WTO and 
implementing harmonized regulatory frameworks, other local factors are present that still represent 
a barrier for investors.  There has been a myriad of scholarly approaches to assessing the relationship 
between IPR and sustainable development.  Some studies utilize empirical research employing 
differing measures including patent laws, surveys, statistics and interviews.  Despite the measure 
adopted, there are still little empirical studies on the impact creating enabling regulatory structure 
                                                 
211 Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects 
of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade” (2007) 61:1 International Organizations 37; Andrew Rose, “Do We Really 
Know That the WTO Increases Trade?” (2004) 94:1 American Economic Review 98; Michael Tomz, Judith L Goldstein, 
and Douglas Rivers, “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment” (2007) 97:5 American Economic 
Review 2005. 
  64
such as harmonized IPR on development in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the impact of these 
studies on sustainable economic development is also parsimonious in the literature.  Furthermore, 
the effect of creating enabling regulatory structures such as those undertaken by Ghana in its energy 
sector and its connection to climate change, has been virtually ignored in the literature. In all fairness, 
the absence of literary focus may be related to the fact that the WTO recently (in 2014) announced 
that climate control mitigation was a “public good”, making it an integral part of international trade.  
 The literature review demonstrates that the relationship between FDI and enabling regulatory 
environments differ depending on the industry. For example, the literature reveals that it may not be 
a correct conclusion to maintain that modernizing regulatory processes are important to FDI without 
identifying industry specific characteristics such as pharmaceuticals, computers, green technologies, 
and electronics.212   While scholars like Gervais,213 Maskus and Penubarti,214 and Mansfield,215 
recognize that IPR and development issues will require an infusion of policy and regulatory changes 
to lay the foundation in the host country, the literature is devoid of studies that demonstrate how a 
sub-Saharan African country progresses from implementing an enabling regulatory environment 
(especially in the renewable energy sector) to attracting FDI.   There is also a clear void in the 
literature in the area of FDI and local conditions that facilitate renewable energy projects in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Similarly, despite whether one concludes that a modernized regulatory infrastructure 
is important for FDI, the literature needs to more directly address other factors that may influence a 
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multinational company investing abroad.216   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE APPLICABILITY OF TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD IN GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS 
(2015) 15 Asper Review of International Business and Trade. 
 
 
L E S L Y N  L E W I S *  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 A view of the earth from space at night displays a peculiar phenomenon. While North-
America and Europe appear to be illuminated by flickers of light resembling one harmonious radiant 
bulb, the continent of Africa has few glimmers. This reality does not reflect a lack of energy potential 
on the continent, but rather a pool of untapped renewable resources. The result is low energy 
consumption, dependency on fossil fuels, and broken promises of investments and development.  The 
World Bank has recognized that no “country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose from a 
subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.”217 Energy is a 
precondition for development and, as fossil fuels are cheaper than renewable energy, poorer countries 
will likely gravitate towards the more affordable choices. Unfortunately, these choices result in high 
greenhouse gas emissions. Given the magnitude of developing countries undergoing economic 
growth and development, the potential exists for a colossal impact on the environment. While the 
responsibility for climate change mitigation belongs to developing as well as developed nations, the 
latter group is still able to choose a sustainable path towards development. In this regard, the 
fundamental issues are the transfer of green technologies to the developing world and the financial 
viability of the technologies themselves The transfer of green technology transfer is complicated by 
patents. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the international agreement 
recognizing the importance of technology transfer in development treaties like the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Discussions around the applicability of 
TRIPS to climate change have been limited, and numerous questions still need to be addressed about 
the intersection of TRIPS and climate change. Do TRIPS and intellectual property rights act as a 
barrier to green technology transfer? Can the flexibilities in TRIPS that were previously adopted for 
the global health care crisis be transplanted to the global public good of climate change mitigation? 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
he existential debate over climate change seems to be settled. What remains unresolved is how this 
global issue will be collectively addressed by individual nations. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) has identified that rising greenhouse gases continue to destabilize the 
environment, causing a rise in global temperatures, sea levels, weather extremes and climate 
disasters.218Developing countries have fewer resources to deal with this change and, as such, may be 
more negatively affected by climate change than other regions.219Moreover, the susceptibility to 
natural disasters arising from global warming is disproportionately high in developing countries 
owing to a lack of technology to offset such changes. This is especially true for those relying heavily 
on fossil fuels to meet their basic needs.220Considering that developing countries have so much to 
lose from climate change and that they can choose their path to development, substituting green 
technologies seems to be a pragmatic option. However, the costliness of green choices and the 
acquirement of renewable energy technology may prove to be serious impediments. 
 Historically, Western nations, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, have 
been identified as the main global polluters. It follows that they should bear their share of the burden 
associated with reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs). Industrialized nations also possess the “know 
how” to adopt environmentally sustainable choices, especially in the renewable energy sector. In that 
context, developing countries have argued that, given the necessity of climate change mitigation, 
intellectual property (IP) barriers should be removed to allow easy transfer of green technology that 
will reduce dependency on fossil fuels. The complexities associated with this global problem are 
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highlighted by scholars: “Reducing GHG emissions is a global public good that is difficult to achieve 
because there are extensive free-riding incentives, cross-border effects that are hard to value, and 
political failures to price the use of carbon appropriately.”221  Consequently, countries like India and 
Ecuador have argued that patented green technologies should be made available, via compulsory 
licensing, to the rest of the world as a means of achieving the public good of environmental 
sustainability and climate change mitigation through the use of environmentally sound practices and 
technologies.222 
As it would apply to climate change abatement technologies, a public good can be defined as 
a resource that belongs to everyone equally and without exclusion. Based on this definition, it may 
be posited that if such resource is abused, the effect will be on the entire globe, as each citizen would 
lose the benefit of that resource. If the resource is for the equal benefit of all, those who are 
responsible for diminishing it should bear the costs of any required abatement measures. In this 
regard, preserving the environment is for the benefit of the entire globe and the technologies that 
facilitate that may also be regarded as beneficial to all. 
Some scholars have found a paradoxical outcome in climate change abatement technologies 
and the public good of environmental preservation as it relates to industrialized and developing 
countries. In “Effects of Technology Transfer on the Provision of Public Goods,” Tae-Yeoun Lee 
found that “the advanced country, in spite of transfer, sees its economic welfare improved while the 
developing country sees it worsen.”223  This paradoxical outcome has been attributed to the fact that 
industrialized nations have been given the liberty to develop and grow without the imposition of 
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costly environmental and technological requirements. In Eco-Imperialism: Green Power, Black 
Death, Paul Driessen argues that Western nations have forcibly imposed environmental values on 
developing countries and have placed the well-being of the environment above that of human beings, 
a disproportionate number of whom are people of colour.224  In this conjecture, the WTO and its 
protectionist approach has also been blamed for keeping the developing world impoverished. The 
infusion of green technology may arguably change the negative outcome so that the developing 
country may benefit from the new technology, further development and make a contribution to the 
environmental public good. Naturally, those countries that have been affected by WTO policies 
aimed at strengthening IPRs without incorporating mechanisms to facilitate green technology transfer 
also argue that treaties like TRIPS should define objectives to address the indirect advantage that 
industrialized nations have over developing ones. 
This paper examines the impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)225 on the transfer of environmentally sustainable technology in the energy 
sector. It begins with a comprehensive exploration of the relevant provisions in TRIPS that may 
facilitate climate control. It questions whether TRIPS need to be modified to incorporate climate 
change principles or other policy initiatives and declarations (such as those obtained in the health 
care sector through the Doha Convention). It also addresses whether the unique international law 
TRIPS flexibilities that were conceded for the provision of “affordable medicines” can be utilized for 
climate change abatement strategies that treat climate change mitigation as a “public good.” 
Specifically, can climate change and the need for affordable, environmentally-sound technologies in 
the developing world be addressed through compulsory licensing? Alternatively, can it be responded 
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to as an issue of national urgency pursuant to Article 31 of TRIPS? Is the flexibility of compulsory 
licensing that was obtained for essential medicines plausible or efficacious for addressing climate 
change? This paper further considers the incorporation of affordable medicines concerns into TRIPS 
and the potential for such expansion to the climate change debate. The final segment of this chapter 
questions whether TRIPS needs to be modified or supplemented to address issues of climate change, 
or whether there are other, more viable solutions for addressing issues of development, climate 
change and the transfer of affordable green technologies to the developing world. 
 
1.1 Background to the Climate Change Debate 
 
 TRIPS is a WTO agreement that governs Member-States and their citizens in relation to not 
only consumer products, but the sale of equipment and processes as well. The legislation covers 
trademarks, copyright, industrial design, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated 
circuits, new plant varieties and patents.226The focus herein will be solely on patents and, in 
particular, green energy technologies. TRIPS’ engagement with the developing world has been 
largely confined to the HIV/AID affordable medicines crisis.227 This racialization of HIV/AID and 
its application to TRIPS and Africa have engulfed the debate of the application of the treatise to 
development issues.228 Environmental concern shave now shifted the focus of TRIPS to another 
“public good”—the environment and mitigating the effects of climate change. The global “public 
good” nature of both affordable medicines and climate change abatement should be an inherent 
feature of the debates. 
 The climate change question is as old as the industrial revolution. The discovery that fossil 
fuel usage may lead to the warming of the planet occurred in 1896 by Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish 
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scientist.229 Arrhenius connected the carbon dioxide emissions produced when fossil fuels are burned 
to consequential atmospheric changes. Almost a hundred years later, sustainable development was 
clearly defined as development “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of the future generation to meet their own needs.”230 This definition was reinforced through a similar 
concept central to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 
emerged from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.  
 The Stern Review on Economics and Climate Change,231 which was commissioned by the 
British government in 2006, calls for immediate action on climate change. It concludes that “[o]ur 
actions over the coming few decades could create risks of major disruption to economic and social 
activity, later in this century and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars 
and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.”232  By 2007, just one year after the 
Stern Review, the Bali Action Plan solidified the international commitment to mitigate climate 
change.233  Negotiations continued beyond Bali—in 2010, a conference held in Cancun resulted in 
the development of a new Technology Mechanism to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies to the developing world.234 The two main divisions of the Mechanism are the 
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Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTCN).235  The launch of the Green Fund was also hailed as “one of the significant decisions that 
nations reached in Cancun, which show that governments can take repeated steps forward.”236 The 
Green Fund attempts to “meet the financial needs and options for the mobilization of resources to 
address the needs of developing country Parties with regard to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation.”237 
 The 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report identified, as in previous years, 
the continued goal to keep climate change at a 2% level as compared to pre-industrial levels.238  The 
IPCC report highlighted the following global mitigation requirements: 
 
Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450ppm CO2eq 
by 2100 (consistent with a likely chance to keep temperature change below 2°C 
relative to pre-industrial levels) include substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG 
emissions by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and 
potentially land use (high confidence).239 
 
The IPCC report identified changes in our energy choices as a means of reducing 
anthropocentric GHG emissions. The report also recognized the need for industrialized nations to 
share the costs borne by developing nations to adopt a green path of development through technology 
transfer. The UNFCCC, through the Kyoto Protocol, attempted to incorporate the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies to the developing world by ensuring that the financial costs of 
acquiring these technologies do not act as a barrier to sustainable development. 
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1.1.1 The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
 
 The issue of whether TRIPS-flexibilities can be adapted to climate change calls for both an 
understanding of the UNFCCC and TRIPS. UNFCCC was enacted in 1994 and its Kyoto Protocol in 
2005.240  The transfer of environmentally sound technology to emerging markets is a cornerstone of 
the UNFCCC mandate on climate change. Specifically, Article 4.1(c) of the Convention references 
the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to mitigate climate change and is followed by 
Article 4.5, which stipulates that developed countries should “take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention.”241  In its report, the UNFCCC identified a number of barriers to 
the transfer of green technology to the developing world. Such barriers were identified as: 
 
(a) Institutional: lack of legal and regulatory frameworks, limited institutional 
capacity, and excessive bureaucratic procedures;  
(b) Political: instability, interventions in domestic markets (for example, 
subsidies),  corruption and lack of civil society;  
(c) Technological: lack of infrastructure, lack of technical standards and 
institutions for supporting the standards, low technical capabilities of firms and 
lack of a technology knowledge base; 
 (d) Economic: instability, inflation, poor macroeconomic conditions and disturbed 
and/or non-transparent markets; and, 
(e) Information: lack of technical and financial information and of a demonstrated track record 
for many ESTs.242 
 
Similar to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol has attempted to eliminate barriers to climate change, 
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and is an essential part of international climate control mitigation involving energy resources. The 
protocol contemplates Clean Development Measures that focus on the transfer of renewable energy 
technologies.243  This mechanism allows polluters in developed countries to obtain Certified 
Emission Reduction credits for projects carried out in the developing world that reduce emissions. 
The benefit of the Clean Development Mechanism is that developed countries can continue to engage 
in their activities and seek credits for projects in developing nations where it would be cheaper to 
implement these projects. Dechezleprêtre et al examine the prevalence and effectiveness of projects 
undertaken under the Clean Development Mechanism. The study found that while these projects were 
successful in the aim to reduce CO2 emissions, they were not as effective in transferring technology 
(with only forty-three percent of the project including technology transfer).244 This study also found 
the technology transfer was occurring among the same developing nations Brazil, India, China and 
Mexico leading to the conclusion that countries that benefit from CDM are usually at the more 
advanced stages of development.  
The Kyoto Protocol clearly identifies the role of the private sector as facilitating technology 
transfer. Article 10(c) of the Protocol specifically aims to create an “enabling environment for private 
sector.”245  Despite the Protocol’s good intentions, industrialized nations were not ready to commit 
to an international treaty that bound them to externally imposed targets. Three years post-adoption, 
a conference was held in Bali, Indonesia with the aim of creating a climate control treaty.246  Leading 
up to the conference, the United States of America opposed the mandate of the meeting and “regularly 
sought to eliminate or dilute proposals describing climate change as a serious threat and advocating 
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specific targets for reducing greenhouse gasses.”247 Despite America’s steady opposition, 192 
countries initially signed on to the UNFCCC and pledged to employ trade measures to mitigate 
climate change by reducing GHG emissions. The international community soon realized that 
development was intrinsically linked to carbon dioxide emissions which would only increase as 
developing countries grew their economies and industrialized nations maintained their standard of 
living.  
 
1.1.2 From Kyoto to Paris 2015 
 
 There are dozens of international agreements that address the issue of technology transfer,248 
yet a concise international treaty committed to by all WTO members has still not materialized.249 
Prior to 2014, environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol set top-down targets. This deterred 
some countries, like the United States, from signing on and caused Canada to pull out for fear of not 
meeting externally imposed targets. Since Kyoto, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP)250 
decided that a new voluntary approach should be adopted.  
As recently as December 2014, the “Lima Call to Action” decision implemented a voluntary 
outlook that recognizes differing contributions of nations, working collectively for the future of the 
environment. In Lima, nations recognized “common but differentiated responsibilities.”251 The 
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resulting 37-page document may embody the foundation for the first international environmental 
agreement ratified by all WTO members; the first international agreement on climate change is 
expected to emanate from the December 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. Each country was 
given until March 2015 to submit their “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDC)—a 
voluntary national pledge for climate change mitigation. 
 
2.0 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, CLIMATE CHANGE & 
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGY.  
 
 The impact of IPR on green technology transmission to the developing world fits into the 
larger theoretical debate on IPR and development— climate change and technology transfer are 
directly related to the issue of development in the energy sector. The provision of energy through 
alternative and renewable sources, such as solar energy, brings together governments, corporations, 
and individuals with the collective goal of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions through technology.  
Since the enshrinement of TRIPS in 1995, most of the scholarly debate has been confined to the 
explanatory realm of understanding its impact on development.252 Studies conducted after the 
enactment of TRIPS in 1995 tended to conclude that stronger IPR can encourage multinational 
corporations to invest253 by providing an incentive for multinationals to invest in developing 
economies.254  Other studies show no conclusive connector between TRIPS, strong national IPR and 
economic growth;255 the impact of strong IPR has been shown to vary across nations in relation to 
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economic development.256 Despite the various concatenations of IPR and development, the literature 
connecting the patent system with the promotion of green technologies to the developing world, is 
parsimonious at best257 and almost silent as it relates to climate change, TRIPS and green technologies 
specifically within the renewable energy sector in developing and least-developed economies. 
 
2.1 Green Technology, Environmentally Sound, Friendly, Sustainable Technology 
 
 The terms “green” technology and “environmentally sound technologies” (“EST”) refer to 
technologies that are “climate friendly,” “green” or that minimize environmental harm.258  They also 
consist of processes and varying innovative methods, such as energy storage, recycling and waste 
management, industrial processes, and greenhouse gas reduction methods.259 Clearly, as many 
technologies of this nature exist, it is difficult to adopt one holistic definition. The United Nations 
has defined environmentally sound technologies as follows: 
Environmentally sound technologies protect the environment, are less polluting, 
use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and 
products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the 
technologies for which they were substitutes… Environmentally sound 
technologies in the context of pollution are “process and product technologies” 
that generate low or no waste, for the prevention of pollution. They also cover 
“end of the pipe” technologies for treatment of pollution after it has been 
generated.260 
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Furthermore, the availability of “clean energy” technologies is hampered by the fact that, even after 
patents expire, they do not contain enough information to facilitate technology transfer.261Matthew 
Littleton concluded that: “Despite numerous international commitments to promote transfer of 
climate change related technologies to developing countries, such transfers are not occurring at a 
sufficient rate to aid these nations in mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change.”262 The 
virtual absence of EST transmission to Africa in general raises serious questions about TRIPS and 
technology transfer. 
 The ownership of green technologies by industrialized nations and the need to utilize such 
technologies within developing nations creates the inevitable outcome that technology transfer will 
occur from countries like the U.S. to emerging markets like those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Consequently, green technology transfer will involve the transfer of these technologies from 
industrialized countries that own the patent rights, like the U.S., to developing or lesser-developed 
nations. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a United Nations agency that 
mandates international standards for intellectual property rights. It governs the facilitation and 
“transfer of technology related to industrial property to the developing countries.”263  WIPO patent 
filings are evidence that corporations of the industrial world dominate patent ownership: the United 
States is the largest holder of green technology patents comprising wind and solar photovoltaic. Of 
the 215,000 “clean energy” patents filed between 2000 and 2008, the majority are concentrated in 
the hands of OECD nations.264 While not only are green patents controlled by OECD countries, 
                                                 
261 Matthew Littleton, “The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to Developing 
Countries” (2008) United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Working Paper No 71, online: 
<www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2008/wp71_2008.pdf>. 
262 Ibid at Abstract. 
263Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization, UNGAOR, 29th Sess, 
Annex, Agenda Item 12, UN Doc A/RES/3346(XXIX) 71.  
264 Third World Network (TWN), “WTO discusses intellectual property and green technologies transfer”(28 February 
2014),  online: Third World Network <www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2014/cc140201.htm> [TWN]; See also: 
  79
climate change technologies by virtue of their ownership would have to be primarily be transferred 
from developed countries to developing ones if such transfers were to occur at all.265 
 International disputes and the regulation of intellectual property rights are governed by the 
WTO under the TRIPS treaty. Thus, any inequities that arise from the implementation of TRIPS 
between industrialized, developing and least-developed nations must be brought before the TRIPS 
Council before they can be adequately addressed. The new problem of addressing the inequities 
arising from industrialized nations’ control of green technologies has once again brought TRIPS to 
the forefront of the debate on development and intellectual property rights. TRIPS’ role and impact 
on development has required developing countries to engage the WTO (as the governing body of 
TRIPS) in a discussion of intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change. The topic 
“Contribution of intellectual property to facilitate the transfer of environmentally rational 
technology” was included as an agenda item at the WTO TRIPS Council as requested by 
Ecuador.266Various Members chastised the evolution of TRIPS and its failure to address issues of 
development. India argued in support of Ecuador’s position, that: 
 
It is high time that the role of intellectual property is addressed in a constructive 
and balanced manner to address the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. Since any effort in this 
direction is dependent on the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies 
in the developing countries, it is essential that barriers in accessing these 
technologies are suitably addressed.267 
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Specifically, according to India and Ecuador, it is unlikely businesses will implement policies to 
ameliorate the purported negative effects of IPR on “green technologies.”268  As such, developing 
countries are looking to the WTO to address the problem of IPR and sustainable development, 
specifically as it relates to the transfer of “green technologies.” 
 On February 25th and 26th, 2014, a TRIPS Council meeting was held wherein a number of 
countries raised a connection between IPR and development. The issue of IPR as a barrier to 
environmentally sound technology transfer — initially brought before the WTO by Ecuador in 
2013— resurfaced. Ecuador advocated a position that considered “adopting at the Bali Ministerial 
Conference a declaration in which Members would enshrine the principle that ‘nothing in the TRIPS 
Agreement can minimize or impair the flexibilities provided for in the Agreement, nor prevent or 
limit Members from taking measures they consider necessary to protect their population from the 
effects of climate change and to make use of ‘environmentally sound technologies.’’”269 
 The WTO considered Ecuador’s position and, relying on Carlos Correa, a renowned TRIPS 
and public health scholar, arrived at the conclusion that, “in the case of environmentally sound 
technologies linked to adaptation and/or mitigation of climate change caused by CO2, we consider 
that these must be considered a ‘public good.’”270 The WTO found that if the goal of environmentally 
sound technologies is to “promote global social welfare through adaptation and/or mitigation of the 
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effects of climate change,” then an “evaluation and possible revision of the framework for the 
protection of intellectual property rights for technological applications would be one of the most 
important options for developing countries with regard to climate change.”271 The 2014 recognition 
of green technologies as “public goods” that are required to combat climate change may completely 
alter the landscape of sustainable development and the transfer of green technology to the developing 
world.272 The recognition of EST and efforts to mitigate climate change by designating green 
technologies as public goods will influence the scholarly focus on TRIPS to concentrate more on 
environmental issues. 
 Generally, pollution levels and environmental damage has been attributed to past decisions 
that affect present generations. For instance, Robert Stavins defines this polluting activity as “an 
unintended consequence of market decisions which affect individuals other than the decision 
maker.”273 A number of scholarly approaches have been adopted in the debate on development and 
climate change. Some connect the patent system with the promotion of green technologies.274Others 
highlight the merits of technology transfer as directly linked to the strength of patents in the importing 
country.275 The level of IPR enforcement is not the only variable affecting technology transfer; some 
authors, including Pamela J. Smith, have found that, particularly in relation to the United States 
exports, the importing country’s ability to imitate the invention also played an important role.276 
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 Another scholarly approach recognizes granting favourable tax incentives to companies that 
undertake research and development in developing countries as a means of transferring technological 
knowledge.277 In particular, William D. Nordhaus argued that environmentally sustainable practices 
can only be fostered if a global carbon tax, which is very difficult to implement, is pursued.278 
 In 1994, Edwin Mansfield drew the connection between FDI, IPR and technology transfer. The 
Mansfield study was seminal in its survey of almost 100 American multinational companies with 
branches worldwide. His research identified three essential intellectual property requirements of host 
nations to attract foreign investments: protecting imported technology, good legal infrastructure, and 
the equal treatment of foreign and domestic firms.279 The conclusion from the Mansfield studies 
demonstrates that FDI is closely connected to the perceived strength of intellectual property 
protection in the host country.280 It was recognized that some kind of incentive is required to entice 
to substitute cheaper energy options with more costly renewable energy solutions some kind of 
incentive is required to entice foreign investors. 
 Many scholars have connected the patent system with the transfer of green technologies.281 
Analyzing endogenous growth models, Acemoglu et al recognize the need for technology transfers 
to facilitate green choices.282  As far back as 1990, Robert Sherwood identified a positive relationship 
between IPR and economic development, and concluded: “it is now well understood that the 
introduction of new technology into an economy accounts for a great portion of the economic growth 
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of that economy and produces a very high social rate of return.”283  Juan Carlos Ginarte and Walter 
Park created an index that presented a strong statistical foundation for research in technology transfer 
and IPR.284  Park and Lippoldt expanded on the Ginarte-Park data and constructed a measure of IPR 
and technology transfer as it relates to inward FDI.285  According to Park and Lippoldt’s findings, a 
strong correlation between IPR and technology transfer was associated with high tech transfers, 
chemicals286 and pharmaceuticals. 
 In 2003, Kanwar and Evenson utilized the Ginarte and Park study to explore research and 
development (“R&D”) spending among a sample of thirty-two countries and found a positive 
correlation between stronger IPR regimes and increases in R&D spending.287  However, while an 
intuitive conclusion would be to increase incentives as the most viable way to promote diffusion of 
existing technology,288 scholars like Popp argue that the most efficient means of achieving 
technology transfer is through the implementation of favourable regulatory policies.289 
  
2.1.1 Technology Transfer and Climate Change Mitigation 
 
 Technology transfer is a necessary part of climate change mitigation. The patents associated 
with green technologies are owned by developed countries. In order to modify the dependency of 
developing nations on fossil fuels, environmentally friendly technologies must be substituted. The 
high cost of these technologies will require partnerships between developing and developed 
countries, including, but not limited to, foreign direct investments, joint ventures and licensing 
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agreements to facilitate green technology transfer. 
 Environmentally sound technology,290 environmentally friendly/sustainable technology and 
climate mitigating technology all fall within the scope of green technology. The Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer defines environmentally friendly equipment as “technologies 
or equipment the use of which makes it possible to reduce or effectively eliminate emissions of 
substances which have or are likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer.”291  The IPCC defines 
“technology transfer” as “a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as 
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/education 
institutions.”292  Developed countries’ commitment to transferring technologies to developing 
nations is contained in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC which states that: 
 
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex 
II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as 
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to 
enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the 
developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of 
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other 
Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the 
transfer of such technologies.293 
 
 The primary treaty governing environmentally sustainable technologies and IPR is the 
TRIPS Agreement. While patents must be filed in every local jurisdiction requiring protection, TRIPS 
creates mandatory minimum international standards for these patents which are followed by WTO 
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signatories. As the majority of WTO members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the 
treaty, multinationals were forced to submit to some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would recognize 
the right for countries to provide necessary health care for their citizens. This exception is found in 
Article 31 of TRIPS and is known as the compulsory licensing exception. 
  
2.1.2 Licensing As a Tool for Green Technology Transfer 
 
 Licensing green technology is perhaps the most commonly utilized method of technology 
transfer, especially in the renewable energy sector.  Arora and Ceccagnoli examined the relationship 
between firm licensing behaviour and patent protection by utilizing the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey 
on American manufacturing firms. They found that licensing practices depend on the extent to which 
the firm’s assets are specialized.294 Since there is a unidirectional transfer of green technologies from 
the industrialized world to the developing world, those with the patents and intellectual property will 
require some assurance that the receiving regimes will respect their proprietary interests. Some 
countries or companies may be reluctant to facilitate green technology transfer if they feel that their 
intellectual property may be infringed. Pamela Smith studied whether the level of service provided 
by American firms to foreign markets differs depending on the strength of the foreign patent regime 
and concluded that U.S. firms are more likely to license to countries with stronger patent laws and 
enforcement mechanisms.295  Smith’s conclusion supports the supposition that firms are more likely 
to transfer technologies through licenses to countries with stronger patent regimes. Lei Yang and 
Keith Maskus also found that stronger intellectual property regimes provide incentives to license 
technologies to developing nations.296 
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 In Keith Maskus and Ruth Okediji’s “Intellectual Property Rights and International 
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options,” the 
issue of climate change and IPR in relation to technology transfer was addressed from a legal, 
economic and technical perspective.297  The authors found that, despite commitments in the 
UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan calling for developed countries to take proactive steps to facilitate 
technology transfer, the multilateral, legal and economic frameworks are not sufficiently entrenched 
to operationalize the process. Several studies of the wind, solar and biofuels industries have examined 
the role of IPR in transferring technology to emerging markets.298  Many countries in the developing 
world have indicated that they experienced difficulty in obtaining technologies due to high licensing 
costs and the need to turn to off-patent alternatives.299  These off-patent technologies may not be as 
technologically advanced as the products under patent. 
 The literature review on IPR, climate change and technology transfer illustrates that the 
industrial sector and type of technological investment may be as important as national characteristics 
and policies. In addition to tacit externalities such as the human capital factor, investors may be 
attracted to a particular nation because of favourable investment policies. Relaxing the standards of 
patents under TRIPS for public policy reasons has been considered for green technology transfer.300  
Advocates such as Derclaye have argued that high CO2 emission technologies should be discouraged 
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by the patent system and that green technologies should receive more favourable treatment, including 
expedited patent examinations.301 
 The cost of adopting green technologies are increased owing to the protection of intellectual 
property rights under the TRIPS Agreement. However, TRIPS contains some flexibilities that could 
be adopted by Members to reduce the prohibitive cost of patent use. In particular, this could apply in 
situations where the patent is needed in furtherance of a public good: these include “public goods” 
such as public health and sustainable economic development. Since 1995, developing and least-
developed countries have achieved at least partial success in carving out declarations such as Doha 
Round, that bind TRIPS to a consideration of “public goods” issues associated with patents. This is 
evident in the copious literature on HIV/AIDS and the affordable medicines debate. The 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health laid the groundwork for the modification of 
Article 33 to include the compulsory license exception; the Bali WTO Ministerial Conference of 
December 2013 may have sparked a debate on TRIPS and climate change. 
 The issues regarding TRIPS and its flexibilities have inspired a new debate emerging out of 
the Bali Ministerial TRIPS Council Conference of 2013. The effect of patents on a particular industry, 
such as one attempting to address the negative impact of climate change, has been virtually ignored 
in the literature. In all fairness, the absence of commentary may be related to the fact that the WTO 
only recently (in announced that climate change mitigation was a “public good,” making it an integral 
part of international trade.302 While scholars like Gervais,303 Maskus and Penubarti,304 and 
Mansfield,305 recognize that IPR and development issues will require an infusion of policy and 
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regulatory changes to lay the foundation in the host country, the literature is devoid of studies on how 
IPR specifically affect green technologies and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
paper aims to enhance the literature on TRIPS, the role of IPR in development, and the transfer of 
green technologies for the mitigation of climate change within the renewable energy sector of 
emerging markets. 
 
3.0 TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR THE GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD 
 
 In 1986 a series of international trade negotiations known as the Uruguay Round on the 
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were held. The negotiations brought together 
international parties to discuss how intellectual property standards could be harmoniously maintained 
in the international forum. The negotiations commenced in September 1986 in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay and concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994. The WTO was created in 1995 
as a result of the eight-year Uruguay Round and Marrakesh negotiations. On January 1, 1995 the 
TRIPS Agreement came into effect to facilitate trade by creating international patents, trademarks 
and copyright standards. TRIPS aims to harmonize global intellectual property protection and access 
by securing the global rights of innovators while affording public access to the innovations. The 
WTO administers TRIPS through the TRIPS Council, comprised of WTO Members. The effect of 
TRIPS is not to negate national laws; rather, it provides procedures for complying with international 
intellectual property requirements and resolving disputes between nations and multinational 
corporations. Balancing the developing nations’ need for sustainable development against IPR and 
the promotion of further research and development is a growing concern for TRIPS, especially in 
light of the climate change debate. 
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3.1 General TRIPS Flexibilities for the “Public Good” 
 
 A number of TRIPS flexibilities can be applied to green technology transfer. As stated in 
Article 7, TRIPS requires a balance between the obligations and the promotion of social and economic 
welfare. It recognizes that the promotion of intellectual rights “should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.”306  This definitive 
right should be examined in conjunction with Article 8, which establishes Members’ rights to protect 
public interests (arguably against IPR abuses).  Specifically, Article 8 upholds the rights of all 
Members to act in a manner that advances the public interest and ensures the protection of public 
health in a way that is “consistent with the provisions” of TRIPS. This includes avoiding practices 
that would negatively impact on technology transfer.307 Article 40 also recognizes that patents may 
impede technology transfer.  
 TRIPS uniforms international patent protection by conferring, under Article 28, exclusive 
rights for both the patented “product” and the subject matter of a patent “process.”  Notwithstanding 
the right of the patent owner to “assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing 
contracts,” Article 28 prohibits third parties from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing”308 both the process by which the product is made and the product itself without the consent 
of the patent holder. There are limited exceptions to Article 28, found in Article 31 “limited 
exceptions.” 
Prior to TRIPS, laws protecting intellectual property were based on individual national 
initiatives. The dispute over exclusivity and the unfairness grew from the concern that universal 
patent rights could have a negative impact on “public goods.” In particular, this concern was that the 
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high cost of patented pharmaceuticals could pose a barrier to accessing life-saving medicines for 
citizens in developing and least-developed countries. Many developing nations with the 
technological know-how were producing generic patented medicines in their countries and refusing 
to grant a patent to multinationals for their products.309  Under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, a 
WTO Member-State could not refuse to grant a patent, and international patents were recognized “in 
all fields of technology.”310  This provision allows developing nations to import cheap generics from 
countries like India. 
As the majority of WTO members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the 
legislation, multinationals were forced to incorporate some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would 
recognize countries’ right to provide necessary health care for their citizens. Article 31 of TRIPS, 
known as the compulsory licensing exception, allows nations to restrict or override exclusive rights 
to patents. This restriction was obtained only with the concession that there must be “mutual 
advantage of producers and users”311 of the technology. Thus, exclusivity is checked by Article 7 of 
TRIPS: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.312 
 
These concessions were achieved by developing nations that promoted the need for a balance in the 
legislation to facilitate public health goals. Article 8 of the Agreement attempts to balance the 
potential for abuse of power by patent holders against the ability to promote the free trade in 
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technology: 
 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. Appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the 
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology.313 
 
Article 8 is the backdrop that permits TRIPS to create legislation that attempts to mitigate the 
potentially negative impact of patents on the preservation of public goods within developing nations. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the public health concern was addressed by allowing developing 
nations to produce their own medications or import these drugs from nations capable of producing 
them. Compulsory licenses were a trade-off that, under certain conditions, permit a nation to license 
local production of a product currently under an international patent. However, nations without the 
manufacturing capacity (least-developed nations) were precluded from taking advantage of this 
provision.  
 The HIV/AIDS crises highlighted the effect of patents on access to life-saving medicines. It 
required the WTO to respond in a compassionate manner or risk its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
developing world and least developed countries (“LDC”). International access to essential 
medications was addressed at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, from which emerged the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement. Developing nations that were members of the WTO 
decided to form an alliance on advancing issues aimed at balancing the inequities inherent in the 
international trade legislations.314 The reality of the global HIV/AIDS crises led to the 
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Implementation of Paragraph 6 Decision in the WTO General Council’s Decision of August 30, 
2003315 (Paragraph 6 Waiver) on the use of compulsory licensing for export to eligible countries. The 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 Decision on the use of compulsory licensing for export to eligible 
countries created a temporary “waiver” to the export requirement under Article 31(f).  The Paragraph 
6Waiver was reached and permitted those countries without manufacturing capacity to utilize 
compulsory licensing via countries that are able to produce the product for them. This practice is 
known as the “Waiver” provision and permitted countries to issue licenses in special circumstances 
under Article 31. 
 Developing and least-developed countries also raised concerns about the impact of TRIPS on 
trade and technology transfer at the 2001 General Council:316 
Technology is a key global resource for job and wealth creation and for shared 
prosperity in an interdependent world. The impact of technology on economic 
growth and development is well recognized. This impact results from a complex 
process involving the interaction of both national and international actors, 
including governments, businesses, academia and international institutions. 
Appropriate international arrangements particularly can facilitate the efficient 
and effective generation, application, transfer, and diffusion of technology. As 
knowledge increasingly becomes a key strategic resource for national economic 
development, there is a need to identify means to facilitate the transfer of 
technology to the presently technology-poor developing countries.317 
 
This commitment to technology transfer has infused concerns regarding TRIPS’ inequitable 
inhibition of technology transfer and its negative impact on the environment. In a manner very similar 
to that in which developing and least-developed countries raised concerns about the inequities 
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inherent in TRIPS and its impact on health care, such concerns were echoed a decade later in relation 
to climate change mitigation. 
 The negative impact of TRIPS on technology transfer was an issue at the forefront of the 2001 
Doha, Qatar Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference.318  As a result, the WTO General Council 
established the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (WGTTT). The Doha Round 
negotiations and the resulting flexibilities intended to address very serious problems that universal 
intellectual property rights impose upon developing and least- developed countries. Potentially, these 
flexibilities may be adopted by sectors other than the pharmaceutical sector to encompass clean 
energy and environmental initiatives. Whether flexibilities such as compulsory licensing and the 
Paragraph 6 Waiver that were created to address the affordable medicines issue could be adapted and 
applied to climate change, was previously uncharted. The fundamental problem raised by the 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology is the transfer of climate change abatement 
technology to the developing world at an affordable cost. This raises questions as to the applicability 
of compulsory licensing and, in particular, whether flexibilities could be applied to the export 
provision in Article 31(f) of TRIPS. 
 The classification of the environment and climate change mitigation as a “public good” 
invokes Article 27(2), which states that: 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment provided that 
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by 
their law.319 
 
Economic development that incorporates environmental sustainability must make a consideration of 
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climate change a requisite guiding principle.  TRIPS also attempts to balance the inequality that would 
result from requiring LDCs to adhere to patents where their economies were technologically delayed. 
The concessionary Article 66(2) created a positive obligation for developed countries to assist in the 
technological development of LDCs through technology transfer. Article 66(2) reads as follows: 
“Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed 
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”320 
The positive obligation imposed on developed countries was reaffirmed in 2003 by the WTO 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology which required developed countries to submit 
a detailed annual report on Article 66(2).321  The public good associated with climate change 
increases the obligation for technology transfer.  The problem arises because, while Article 66(2) is 
obligatory, the mechanisms that would facilitate, support and monitor its implementation have not 
been fully developed within the WTO. Although it is recognized that TRIPS and its requirements 
may impede the transfer of technology, there are no affirmative practices that WTO must abide by to 
comply with Article 66(2). Moreover, while TRIPS sets minimum national intellectual property 
requirements that each WTO Member must maintain, Article 66(2) provides no such minimum 
obligations. 
4.0 THE APPLICATION OF TRIPS TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREEN 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
A number of ambiguities, long identified in the context of affordable medicines, complicate 
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the interpretation of TRIPS.322 Terms and phrases such as “national emergency,”323 “circumstances 
of extreme urgency,”324 “adequate remuneration”325 and “authorized predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use”326 were not clearly defined. NGOs 
maintained that TRIPS should be interpreted judiciously to permit parallel imports and compulsory 
licensing.327 
The flexibilities in TRIPS should be equally applicable to all public goods irrespective of the 
category from which they originate (affordable medicines or climate change). The fundamental issue 
is ascertaining whether these flexibilities are transferable from health care to climate change. The 
precedent for a compulsory license in areas of public goods or national urgency was established in 
the affordable medicines conflict. The WTO responded to the HIV/AIDS crises in many developing 
and “least-developed” nations by addressing international access to essential medications. The issues 
pertaining to technology transfer were also contemplated in Doha; a number of developing and least-
developed countries initiated the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology.328 Since 
2002, the Working Group continues to meet about four times per year and submits annual reports to 
the General Council  “on the functioning in practice of the incentives provided to their enterprises 
for the transfer of technology” as required under Article 66(2) of TRIPS.329 
 The provisions of TRIPS, and the various “flexibilities” emanating from Ministerial 
Conferences like Doha, could be interpreted so as to apply to any “public good” in need of urgent 
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intervention. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “a treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”330  Much of the issue of green technology transfer depends 
on whether GHG emissions may constitute a “national urgency” under TRIPS. 
 
4.1 Affordable Medicines: The Doha Flexibilities 
 
 The fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar provided an opportunity for WTO nation-
states to negotiate issues concerning the interpretation and implementation of certain international 
trade agreements. The Doha Declaration received unanimous support by the WTO members in 
attendance.  Regarding the interpretation of TRIPS, it was emphatically confirmed that “the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health.”331  Developing nations who were members of the WTO decided to form an alliance intent 
on balancing the inequities inherent in the international trade legislations.332 
The 1995 TRIPS Agreement contained transition periods that granted developing countries 
(but still exempted LDCs) a grace period in which they were not compelled to adopt TRIPS’ standards 
for the production of patented products.333  Developing countries were given an extension that pushed 
the original compliance deadline from January 1, 2000 (Article 65, 2-3), back to January 1, 2006. 
Least-developed countries334 were originally given until January 1, 2010, a deadline that was later 
extended to 2016, to comply with TRIPS as it related to health care issues.335  The burden that 
                                                 
330 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 332, art 31.1, online: 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>. 
331 Doha Declaration, supra note 318 at para 4. 
332 Primo Braga, supra note 314. 
333 TRIPS, supra note 225, arts 2-3. 
334 For a list of Least-Developed Countries: See WTO, “Least-Developed Countries”, online: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm>. 
335Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members 
for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc IP/C/25 (2002), online: < 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm>. 
  97
intellectual property law compliance placed on least-developed countries was also recognized in the 
area of technology transfer and transitionary periods were extended from 2013 to 2021 under Article 
66(2) of TRIPS.336 
 
4.1.1 Compulsory License Exception (Article 31 of TRIPS) 
 The Doha Declaration emphasized that “each member has the right to grant compulsory 
licenses and the freedom to determine the right upon which such licenses are granted.”337 Paragraph 
5(b) also confirms the right of each member to determine the grounds on which compulsory licenses 
are granted. The risk of circumventing patents to access green technology is governed by Article 31 
of TRIPS, which stipulates when a compulsory license can be issued to a third-party/non-patent 
holder.  A compulsory license is the legal use of a patent by a third party, without the expressed 
consent of the patentee holder after the third party has unsuccessfully attempted to secure a voluntary 
license from the patent holder.  A compulsory license essentially allows a third party to copy a 
product or process that is currently patented and protected by exclusivity. This exception is only 
granted in very limited situations involving national urgency and public goods like affordable 
medicines and, potentially, climate change mitigation. Article 31 of TRIPS only permits each nation 
to authorize the use of compulsory licenses on grounds listed in (a) to (l) with the most pertinent 
items summarized below: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;  
(b) prior to use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right 
holder … [t]his requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was 
     authorized … 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be nonassignable; 
                                                 
336Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 For Least Developed Country Members, WTO Doc IP/C/64 
(2013), online: <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm>.  
337 Doha Declaration, supra note 328, at para 5(b). 
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(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of 
the Member authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate 
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances 
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur…; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration.338 
 
Note the significance in TRIPS’ recognition of exclusive rights —even if compulsory licensing is 
invoked, the patent holder must still be paid adequate remuneration (royalties to the patent holder), 
usually 0.5%.339 
Nations are required to begin the process of compulsory licensing by contacting the patent 
holder and negotiating usage terms. Article 31(b) clearly states “such use may only be permitted 
if…the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder.”340 However, 
the notification provision may be waived in cases of “a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.”341  In this case, the only stipulation is that, upon utilizing compulsory licensing 
on an emergency or urgency basis, the nation is required to notify the patent holder as “soon as 
reasonably practicable.”342  While TRIPS does not provide a definition of “national emergency,” the 
Doha Declaration confirmed that each country has the sovereign right to “determine what constitutes 
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”343 
 The Doha Declaration laid the foundation for discussions on technology transfer by 
pronouncing that countries are free to adopt measures for the “protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health, or of the environment.”344  Any such measures should be adopted with the genuine aim 
                                                 
338 TRIPS, supra note 225, art 31. Note that Article 31 lists requirements from (a) to(l). 
339 Ibid. 
340  Ibid. 
341  Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Doha Declaration, supra note 328 at para 5(c). 
344 WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (01-5859), (2001), online: 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> [Ministerial Declaration]; Doha Declaration, 
supra note 328 at Article 30. 
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of protecting these public goods and not to circumvent international trade laws. While compulsory 
licenses were a trade-off that permitted a nation to utilize a patent under certain conditions, those 
nations without the manufacturing capacity were precluded from taking advantage of this provision. 
Thus, another concession reached in this international treaty permitted countries without sufficient 
manufacturing capacity to utilize compulsory licensing via countries that are able to produce the 
product for them.345 This practice is known as the “Waiver” provision and permits countries to issue 
compulsory licenses for products produced locally or by another country for their benefit.  
 
4.1.2 The Limited Exception (Article 30 of TRIPS) 
 
While the Doha Declaration legitimized the rights of developing and LDC to utilize 
compulsory licensing, paragraph 6 sparked debate, particularly regarding which country could 
produce a drug for export to a developing or LDC nation under compulsory licensing. In 2003, the 
WTO Decision on the “Implementation of Paragraph 6” ruled that developing and LDC countries 
could import drugs produced elsewhere (such as India and even from developed countries such as 
Canada) under the “Waiver” provision of compulsory licensing.346There was a host of optimism 
that settling the debate over paragraph 6 would remove the “final patent obstacle to cheap drug 
imports.”347 
Article 30 of TRIPS provides “limited exceptions” that allow a Member to import a patented 
product from someone other than a patent holder; this provision was utilized by Rwanda, who enlisted 
Canada to produce HIV/AIDS drugs pursuant to the Waiver. This was a novel decision: not only was 
Rwanda the first nation to utilize the Waiver to import generics, but it represented the first time that 
                                                 
345 Ibid, Doha Declaration, at Article 30. 
346 Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 315. 
347 WTO, Press Release, Press/350/Rev.1, “Decision removes final patent obstacle to cheap drug imports” (30 
August 2003), online: <www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm>. 
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a developed nation (Canada) utilized the Waiver provision for the export of generic products. The 
Rwandan-Canadian experience is unique as the only known legal case utilizing the Article 30 
“limited exception” provision. Thus, Canada and Rwanda tested the applicability and functionality 
of the Waiver. The Director of Public & Government Affairs of Apotex Canada stated in a press 
release that the process "in its current form [is] not workable for us and, it appears, …doesn't work 
easily for developing countries."348 According to Apotex representatives, the requirement that a 
generic company must negotiate a voluntary license from the brand name manufacturer prior to 
issuing a compulsory license was a significant obstacle. In their case, it took one year to negotiate. 
Since the Waiver has been extended to 2016 for LDCs, it is unlikely that its application to climate 
change will be relevant, especially given the complexities of using it for affordable medicines. 
 
4.1.3 The Waiver Decision (Predominant Use for Domestic Markets Article 31(f)) 
 
 While the “Waiver” is available and has been utilized in the affordable medicines case 
involving Rwanda and Canada, its application to climate control may prove to be impractical. Since 
the Rwandan-Canadian case, there has not been another attempt to use the Waiver provision to export 
medicines for humanitarian purposes. Apotex, the generic company that exported HIV/AIDS 
medication to Rwanda, has commented on the process, stating that is extremely frustrating because 
the Canadian Patent Act349 was not crafted in a way to effectively operationalize TRIPS.350  By its 
very nature, green energy technology requires some local manufacturing or technological interaction. 
Moreover, unlike pharmaceutical products that can be imported and distributed, renewable energy 
products such as solar panels require continued cooperation of the patent holder and manufacturer 
                                                 
348 Apotex, Press Release, “CAMR Federal Law Needs to be Fixed if Life-Saving Drugs for Children are to be 
Developed” (14 May 2009), online: <www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp>. 
349 Patent Act, RSC, 1985, c P-4. 
350 Ibid. 
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for installation and maintenance.  Even in cases where the requisite local legislations are in place, 
developing nations endure immense pressures from wealthier governments to not utilize compulsory 
licensing. 
 The case of climate change technology differs substantially from affordable medicines in a 
number of ways. The technology has to be transplanted in the non-enabling country. The cost of this 
technology transfer is exorbitant and requires funding from foreign investors for various local energy 
projects. The royalty required to access a patent through compulsory licensing is not a viable option 
for green technology patents. Many climate control technologies are subject to multiple patents and 
processes, which would make the cost of accessing them prohibitive.  In addition, unlike health 
problems no one singular technology “will be necessary or sufficient on its own to solve climate 
change.”351 
 Meeting the test of “national” urgency may also pose a problem for green technology transfer 
pursuant to Article 31. Climate change may not quality as a national urgency such that it satisfies the 
urgency component under Article 31. Climate control mitigation is not confined to national urgency 
issues, but encompasses the concern and public good of the entire planet. The subject matter of 
climate control is more complexly tied to multinational rather than solely national concerns. 
Aside from the general application of TRIPS to climate change mitigation, the issue of green 
technology transfer through compulsory licensing remains unresolved. Consequently, even if a 
Declaration were invoked that relaxed Article 31(f)’s prohibition against issuing a compulsory 
license for an export market, the very nature of climate control technology necessitates that the 
product be produced and installed locally. Unlike pharmaceutical products that disclose the steps 
                                                 
351 Sidney A Rosenzweig, “Inside Views: PFF on Cooling the World By Misappropriating Patent Rights” (1 April 2009), 
online: Intellectual Property Watch <www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/01/cooling-the-world-by-misappropriating-
patent-rights/>. 
  102
required to make a medicine, green technologies like solar panels are often made in the country of 
origin and shipped for assembly. Many of these products are off-patent but have been improved via 
trade secrets that are retained by the inventing corporation. Thus, assembling green technologies like 
solar panels requires technical knowledge to accompany patents. This knowledge may not be within 
the public domain and may be protected by trade-secrets. Similar impediments encountered under 
the Waiver for pharmaceutical products will be present for green technology transfer. This includes 
proving that the need qualifies as a national urgency, requesting a voluntary license and, finally, 
obtaining a compulsory license. Even if a compulsory license is obtained, the solar panel patent may 
be so outdated that it would not be financially viable to utilize that product. Technologies change and 
improve so rapidly that, quite often, new patents are not filed and enhancements are contained in 
trade secrets.  A fundamental problem rests with the fact that neither TRIPS nor the patent regimes 
of industrialized nations require the disclosure of trade secrets.  
In order for TRIPS to facilitate the flow of environmentally sound technology, it needs to 
address the issue of licensing technology and also incorporate provisions on foreign direct 
investments that attempt to address the costs prohibitions inherent in green technology transfer. 
Green technologies can remain protected by maintaining technological knowledge within trade 
secrets which creates an “anti-commons” effect. The effect of this non-disclosure is to curtail 
innovation and technological diffusion.352  In 2007, Sierra Leone and Uganda addressed the 
disadvantages faced by developing and least-developed countries owing to low technology bases and 
human capital in the area of scientific technology at the TRIPS Council.353  Both nations raised issues 
                                                 
352 John J Barton & Keith E Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on a Multilateral Agreement on Open Access to Basic 
Science and Technology” in Simon J Evenett& Bernard M Hoekmaneds, Economic Development and Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation (Washington, DC: The World Bank & Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: 
How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Market, Stops Innovation, and Cost Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
353Priority Needs for Technical and Financial Co-operation: Communication from Sierra Leone, WTO Doc IP/C/W/523 
(2008), online: <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_2_ipcw523_e.pdf>. 
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relating to intellectual property policy, financial and technical support, along with suggested 
improvements to the legal frameworks and regulations that have hindered development and the 
diffusion of technology.354 These concerns were echoed throughout the continent and prompted 
questions about the efficacy of technology transfer as a standalone tool for change.355  Overcoming 
these barriers to development and technology transfer are essential for Article 66(2) of TRIPS to be 
put into full effect.  Authors like Daniel Gervais and Jerome Reichman have also recognized that 
even if technology transfer exists, it must be accompanied by an enabling technological base and 
localized knowledge for diffusion and innovation to follow.356 
By their very nature, technologies associated with solar panels—or clean energy technologies 
in general—may limit the applicability of the “Waiver” in providing these technologies to least-
developed countries. In the pharmaceutical sector, generic drug manufactures are already established 
and are often producing off-patent generics. Once the patent is revealed to these companies and the 
compulsory license secured, the rest is merely a matter of production and, in cases involving the 
Waiver, shipment. Solar panels and other green products have fewer producers able to mimic the 
product. In addition, since many of the improvements and enhancements are achieved via trade 
secrets, disclosure would be required to facilitate production. As stated earlier, even if a compulsory 
license is available, the license does not compel the disclosure of trade secrets. This problem is true 
for both compulsory licenses affected under Article 31 for developed countries and under the Waiver 
                                                 
354 Ibid. 
355 See also the submissions of Tanzania and Rwanda: Priority Needs for Technical and Financial Co-operation: 
Communication from Tanzania, WTO Doc IP/C/W/552 (2010), online: 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_2_ipcw552_e.pdf>; Priority Needs for Technical and Financial 
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<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_2_ipcw548_e.pdf>. 
356 Jerome H Reichman, “From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement” (2007) 
29:11 J Intl L & Politics 11, 
online:<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=faculty_scholarship>; 
Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade and Development, supra note 99. 
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for least-developed nations. 
 
4.2 Transfer of Green Technology and its distinction from Affordable Medicines 
 The primary method of accessing affordable medicines for critical illnesses under Article 31 
of TRIPS requires the filing of a voluntary license and negotiation with the patent holder. If a 
voluntary license is not approved, then a compulsory license can be requested. If the compulsory 
license is granted, royalties are still payable, but at a reduced rate.  In the case of national 
emergencies or cases of extreme urgency, a voluntary license is not required. Thus, medicines are 
transferred under Article 31 primarily through the right to utilize the patent in the form of a license. 
Green technology, on the other hand, is often transferred exclusively through the licensing process 
in a commercial setting. TRIPS promotes technology transfer pursuant to Article 7, which sets 
standards on the exclusivity of these rights.357 The phrase, “transfer and dissemination of 
technology” will be as important to the climate change debate as “national urgency” was to 
affordable medicines. Unfortunately, TRIPS is silent on the topic beyond Article 7 and the 
UNFCCC has not stipulated how this transfer will take place.  
There are other hurdles facing the transfer of green technologies through compulsory 
licenses. Firstly, many developing countries “lack the requisite institutional, regulatory and legal 
policies necessary to issue” a compulsory license.358  Secondly, while patented technologies are 
often licensed, the vast majority of them are off-patents and require “know-how” in order to 
replicate them. In this regard, some scholars have argued that renewable energy technologies differ 
tremendously from those in the pharmaceutical sector as the latter may have few substitutes, 
                                                 
357 TRIPS, supra note 225, art 7. 
358 Maskus & Okediji, supra note 171 at 31.  
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whereas green technologies have various off-patent alternatives.359  Barton studied the IPR and 
technology transfer in three renewable energy sectors (photovoltaic, biomass, and wind energy) and 
found the following regarding the pharmaceutical and renewable energy industries: 
In the politically-sensitive pharmaceutical sector, patents often have a 
substantial impact on price, as there may be no substitutes for a new product. 
In contrast, in the renewable energy sectors considered in this article, the basic 
technological solutions have long been off-patent. Usually, only specific 
improvements or features are patented. Thus, a number of competing patented 
products exist – and as a result of the competition, prices are usually brought 
down as compared to the royalties and the price increases that would be 
charged under a monopoly. In addition, there is competition not only between 
firms within a specific renewables sector, but also between the sectors and 
alternate sources of fuel or electricity. As a result, much of the benefit of the 
technologies is shared with the ultimate customers.360 
Even patented renewable energy products are often only enhancements on prior patents.361 Thirdly, 
the developing world needs the requisite knowledge to assemble the technologies, which is contained 
in the form of trade secrets. Whereas pharmaceutical patents contain the requisite information to 
reproduce a drug, the same cannot be said of green technology patents especially in the area of 
energy. In addition, the developing country would have to possess the requisite human capital that 
could enable domestic production. 
 
4.3.1 Trade Secrets and Green Technology Transfer: Article 39 and 40 
 
 While compulsory licensing is an option available under Article 31 of TRIPS to gain access 
to various technologies, the need for technological “know-how,” an existing technological base and 
sufficient human capital compromises its effectiveness as a practical alternative in the renewable 
energy sector. Blueprints, test protocols and various “know-hows” are required to actualize the 
                                                 
359 John H Barton, “Patenting and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries” (2007) 1:2 BioRes8, 
online: <www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bioresreview/biores1-2.pdf> [Barton, “Patenting and Access to Clean 
Energy Technologies”]. 
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technology. Recall that revealing trade secrets and “know-how” is not a requisite part of complying 
with the treaty. In general, TRIPS sets out a number of flexibilities that could be adopted in order to 
facilitate technology transfer in furtherance of climate control. Article 40 empowers countries to label 
certain practices as anti-competitive and invoke TRIPS as a means to “prevent and control” such 
practices.362 Article 40 is particularly important in the field of renewable energy as many of the 
patents have expired and what remains proprietary are the enhancements and technological “know-
how.” For this reason, trade secrets as discussed in Article 39 are an essential element in technology 
transfer and climate change mitigation. Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers’ article, “The Role of 
Patent Protection in (Clean/Green) Technology Transfer,” summarizes the reality of undisclosed 
improvements on off-patent technology:  
A large range of different technologies can achieve emission reductions, and for 
a significant share of these green technologies, the underlying technology is 
mature and in the public domain. Most technological progress is expected to 
come from incremental improvements of existing off-patent technologies. 
While such incremental innovation may be patentable, it leaves ample scope for 
competing technologies and therefore limits the role specific patents may play 
for technological progress in this area.363 
 
Thus, while many patents in renewable technology are in the public domain, the existence of trade 
secret data may make it difficult to utilize them.364 With a requirement to comply to minimum 
standards, and given the exorbitant cost of financing solar projects, TRIPS alone, without the infusion 
of foreign investments would not remove the impediment to technology transfer. 
 The very cost of utilizing some green technologies may be exorbitant and requires a foreign 
                                                 
362 TRIPS, supra note 225, art 40. 
363 Bronwyn Hall & Christian Helmers, “The Role of Patent Protection in (Clean/Green) Technology Transfer” (2009) 
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Working Paper No 2009-06.  
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infusion of capital.  A request for a compulsory license may be perceived as a lack of respect for 
intellectual property rights and may have a negative impact on foreign investments. Even for LDCs 
that may contemplate the “Waiver,” this option is not feasible as these technologies are expensive to 
manufacture and ship. In addition, owing to the costliness of renewable energy sources, some form 
of subsidy or financing is required in order to make the green choice more attractive. John Barton 
explains this cost dilemma: “Another characteristic of the PV, biomass and wind sectors is that some 
of the renewable energy technologies, particularly PV technologies, are not yet inexpensive enough 
to compete without some form of subsidy or regulation (such as a feed-in law requiring that a portion 
of the electricity on a grid be supplied from renewable sources).”365  Thus, local policies on how 
energy will be purchased from the grid, how a country adapts to foreign investment demands and 
general trade policies may be a greater impediment to development and the transfer of green 
technology than intellectual property rights. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change noted 
that “returning global energy-related CO2 emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 would require a large 
shift in the pattern of investment.”366  The UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice identified the most serious needs for technology transfer as stemming from 
“energy generation, dominated by renewable energy technologies.”367 
 Finally, even if products such as solar panels are manufactured abroad and shipped, they 
would be used solely for commercial purposes (the sale of energy). This use is prohibited under 
Article 31(b) of TRIPS. The “public non-commercial use” requirement in Article 31 may be 
problematic in the renewable energy sector. These contracts are tied to governments being the off-
                                                 
365 Barton, “Patenting and Access to Clean Energy Technologies”, supra note 359. 
366 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007 – Mitigation of Climate Change, Bert Metz et al, 
eds (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 13, online: <www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
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takers of the energy with a promise to purchase energy at the stipulated tariff rate.   
 
5.0. CONCLUSION 
 
At first glance, the TRIPS legislation appears capable of resolving much of the conflict over 
the global distribution and access to affordable medicines with the potential of transferring these 
flexibilities to climate change. However, far from being the great equalizer, the focus on TRIPS and 
compulsory licensing may prove to be illusory and an unnecessary distraction. The pharmaceutical 
case of compulsory licensing for affordable medicines revealed that while it is possible to obtain 
access, a host of problems have arisen in operationalizing the treaty within the legal structure of 
nation-states. The Waiver process available to LDCs—used for HIV/AIDS medicines in Rwanda—
is fraught with imperfections. Consequently, the Waiver cannot be practically applied to compulsory 
licensing of green technologies.  The potential of compulsory licensing has proven non-efficacious 
for other public goods such as the provision of affordable medicines to address health epidemics. 
Similarly, it will prove to be of limited value in the area of climate mitigation through technology 
transfer. 
This paper explored the relevant provisions of TRIPS in light of the potential that certain 
flexibilities adopted for affordable medicines could be transferable to climate change. Specifically, 
the issue of compulsory licensing and the possibility that climate change may be an issue of national 
“urgency” was also canvassed. It was found that the requirements that the product of a compulsory 
license be for “non-commercial” and domestic use would also eliminate many green technologies 
from consideration by their very nature. Even where the Waiver could be applied to export products 
that were approved under a compulsory license to LDCs, the limited number of companies able to 
produce these products as well as the undisclosed nature of trade secrets complicates the applicability 
of compulsory license to climate change abatement.  
  109
 Changes in international laws have created conflicts because of the increasing influence of 
these laws on national agendas. States are now forced to respond to national issues, including 
healthcare, sustainable development and climate change, from a global standpoint. Consequently, 
both the UNFCCC and the IPCC recognize that the “public good” aspect of green technologies may 
warrant different treatment under international patent law because they serve the interest of the global 
populous. While there has been an immense focus on patents and TRIPS in the area of the transfer of 
green technology to the developing world, this is by no means the only policy mechanism that 
facilitates this end. The literature on IPR strength and economic development demonstrates that there 
is very little impact of IPR on low income nations, especially in relation to technology transfer. In 
addition, this research has found that the parallels drawn between TRIPS flexibilities that were 
granted in the pharmaceutical sector and green technology transfer are unmerited; in fact, the 
application of pharmaceutical flexibilities to climate change would be non-efficacious. 
 The large investments required for clean energy products such as solar, wind and biofuels 
coupled with the fact that the technology is required to be locally transferred and operationalized, 
distinguishes this industry from the pharmaceutical industry. Whereas concessions could be 
implemented in TRIPS to address LDCs’ inability to produce a life-saving drug under compulsory 
licensing, similar concessions are not easily applied to the renewable energy industry or green 
technology transfer. The lessons from affordable medicines and TRIPS cannot effortlessly be 
transplanted to the energy industry, as the role of patents and intellectual property in the 
dissemination and diffusion of technologies varies from industry to industry. 
In the energy sector, technologies and financing required for large scale renewable energy 
projects create added complexities that require legal, economic and institutional solutions that are 
industry-specific. The lessons learnt from the affordable medicines dispute have taught that 
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flexibilities can be legally incorporated into TRIPS, however, the efficacy of those flexibilities is not 
guaranteed at the implementation stage. Since the financial cost of green technology transfer is 
clearly an impediment, perhaps financial flexibilities that operationalize the technology transfer 
provisions of TRIPS could be negotiated in a future international treaty on climate change or 
Ministerial declaration. In a manner similar to that of the Waiver created to address LDC’s inability 
to manufacture products and subsequently take advantage of compulsory licenses, a technology 
finance mechanism be created to enable developing nations to engage with technology transfer 
opportunities that would otherwise be financially unviable. Clearly, operationalizing the technology 
transfer goals of TRIPS requires the implementation of financial measures in the fight to mitigate 
climate change. TRIPS and IPRs are not inherent impediments to technology transfer or sustainable 
development if the financial mechanisms to facilitate technology diffusion are in place. While only 
a surface consideration of the financial elements relating to green technology transfer and climate 
change could be entertained in this paper, it is an area that requires considerable focus.  
 The UNFCCC identified the primary barrier to adopting renewable energy choices in the 
developing world as being intrinsically tied to infrastructural issues related to local political, 
technological and economic instability. While regulatory measures can be implemented to address 
the political and technological barriers, it is clear that the economic costs of technology transfer 
cannot be adequately addressed without some infusion of foreign capital in these costly renewable 
energy projects. Consequently, mechanisms related to foreign direct investment will need to be 
considered to create economic security to protect investments in these projects. Any shift from 
reliance on coal as a source of energy in the developing world must address other local factors of 
energy insecurity (political, legal and financial). Accordingly, the burning desire to adopt renewable 
energy substitutes in the developing world is intrinsically tied to creating secured environments for 
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technology transfer. The security goes far beyond intellectual property rights and TRIPS to energizing 
international economic policies that will facilitate technology transfer. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
The WTO Canada Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy 
Projects in the Developing World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement within Green Energy Conflicts. 
16 (2016) Asper Review of International Business and Trade 97 
 
ABSTRACT 
Climate change abatement strategies are intrinsically linked to policies that encourage the use 
of alternative energy sources such as renewable energies.  The importance of these strategies has 
been entrenched in various World Trade Organization (WTO) treaties including the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(“TRIMs”), as well as pre-WTO treaties like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).368  The issue of environmental subsides, specifically renewable energy subsidies, have 
resurfaced in a number of disputes before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body since its first green 
subsidy case, brought in 2010 by Japan against Canada’s Feed-In Tariff Program (“FIT Program”).369  
In the initial case, Japan alleged that the Ontario FIT Program’s local content requirement was 
discriminatory against foreign renewable energy products. Moreover, discrimination amounted to a 
prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement and was simultaneously contrary to the most-
favourable nation status (“MFN”) under the GATT. This decision raises concern about whether the 
SCM Agreement poses a barrier to governmental policies promoting FIT Programs to encourage 
renewable energy usage and its impact on the developing world.370   Specifically, do treaties like the 
SCM Agreement impede the development of government climate change abatement policies by 
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Measures, online: file:///C:/Users/llewis/Downloads/USA59.pdf.  
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requiring these programs to meet a minimum standard of trade compliance?  Should WTO treaties 
like the SCM Agreement be amended to include flexibilities to combat climate change, especially in 
light of the goals set in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change?  This paper will review the 
WTO subsidy rules and query whether flexibilities need to be entertained within the area of non-
actionable subsidies. This mode of inquiry questions whether FIT Programs be classified as subsidies 
under the SCM Agreement.  If FIT Programs are properly classified as subsidies, should these 
initiatives be granted an exemption under the SCM Agreement on the basis of public policy— with 
the goal of facilitating affordable renewable energy and climate change abatement in the developing 
world?  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Global interest in green energy subsidies continues to grow as governments attempt to 
implement policies that displace reliance upon high carbon-emitting fossil fuels and encourage 
environmentally sustainable consumption and industrial practices.  Green energy programs may 
adopt various forms ranging from taxes on carbon to subsidies and price incentives for using 
renewable energy services and products.  
A “green subsidy” has been defined as an “allocation of public resources for the purpose of 
improving sustainability over what would otherwise occur via the market.”371 The aim of green 
subsidies has been identified as developing “clean energy industries, phasing out fossil fuels, 
arresting climate change, and promoting sustainable production and consumption.”372  Green 
subsidies may also be viewed as an attempt to correct environmental market failures through fiscal 
policies.373 The issue of subsidizing renewable energy technologies are often considered in response 
to the reality that  many renewable energy alternatives are commercially inaccessible due to the high 
cost of production that cannot always be passed on to consumers.   
                                                 
371 Steve Charnovitz, “Green Subsidies and the WTO” World Bank Group: Office of the Chief Economist (2014) Policy 
Research Working Paper No 7060, online: www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/14/000158349_20141014095048/Rendere
d/PDF/WPS7060.pdf at 2. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid at 2. 
  114
Feed-In Tariffs (“FIT”), which fix the minimum price per kWh within a contract payable to 
generators of electricity for renewable energy, is a commonly selected policy method of encouraging 
renewable energy usage.374   
  FIT Programs are the most commonly used renewable energy policy mechanism by 
governments worldwide, and arguably the most important policy tool in addressing climate 
change.375   In 2012, renewable energy FIT programs were adopted in over 90 jurisdictions, 65 
countries, and 27 states around the world.376  By 2015, a total of 108 jurisdictions utilized FIT 
Programs.377   Photovoltaic solar plants are often governed by government-owned entities that act as 
industry regulators and purchase the energy from independent power producers.  Article XVII (the 
Most Favoured Nation Treatment) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 
regulates state-owned enterprises to ensure non-discrimination of Member States.  This paper will 
explore the impact of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (“SCM Agreement”) 
on the implementation of green energy initiatives like FIT Programs in the developing world in 
general, and on a country specific level by utilizing Ghana, West Africa as a case study.  It will assess 
the WTO decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariff case (“Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT case”) and its impact on renewable energy programs in sub-Saharan Africa, with specific 
focus on Ghana.  It is important to ascertain whether the issue of subsidies as addressed in the Canada 
                                                 
374 UNEP (2012), Feed-in Tariffs as Policy Instruments for Promoting Renewable Energies and Green Economies in 
Developing Countries, Geneva, online: www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_FIT_Report_2012F.pdf.   
375 Kenina Lee, “An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and Sustainable Future? Evaluating the Consistence of 
Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law” (2011) 24 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 57. 
376 REN21: Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century. 2012. Renewables 2012: Global Status Report  
(Paris: REN2 Secretariat), online: www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/Resources/GSR2012_low%20res_FINAL.pdf. 
Note: the distinction between regions arises because some FIT schemes are implemented nationally for independent 
power producers through the Public Utilities Commission (PURC) as in the case with Ghana (despite having a state-
owned utility scheme), others countries divide energy regulation by state or province (as in the case with Canada which 
adopts jurisdictional approach based on provincial region tariffs) or Nigeria where tariffs are implemented on a state 
level. 
377 REN21, ibid.  
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Renewable Energy/FIT case would be similarly applicable to developing countries like Ghana.  This 
analysis will be limited to the impact that the WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision would 
have on a photovoltaic solar plant projects that contain a feed-in tariff.   
 The current regulatory structure of the Ghanaian energy sector reflects significant influence 
from the World Bank’s goal, in the early 90s, to halt funding of power sectors in the developing 
countries until sector reforms were implemented.378  Reforms entailed changing the regulatory and 
legal framework in the power sector to improve transparency.  Ghana’s power industry is comprised 
of state-owned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority). 
However, independent power producers (IPP) also play a role in energy production in Ghana.  Energy 
that is produced by IPP is transmitted by the Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo), the Electricity 
Company of Ghana (ECG), and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) into the 
same grid as government produced energy. By 2011, the Ghanaian government adopted a renewable 
energy framework aimed at providing fiscal incentives to independent power producers through the 
FIT scheme.379   The Ghana Renewable Energy Act (2011) established both the FIT system and the 
Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (“RPO”).  The FIT rate is set by the Public Utilities and 
Regulatory Commission (“PURC”), which guarantees a tariff to the independent power producer for 
a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years.  This guarantee provides an assurance to independent power 
producers that they will be able to recoup the high cost of investments in renewable energy by having 
the purchase price of their energy fixed in the form of a tariff. The FIT system was developed from 
the “Ghanaian Sustainable Energy for All Action Plan,” which was born out of the Renewable Energy 
                                                 
378 World Bank, (1993) The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector, Washington D.C., World Bank. 
379 Renewable Energy Act, 2011, Act 832 of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, Dec 31, 2011 [“Ghana Renewable 
Energy Act”] online: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20(ACT%2083Ghana; The Ghana 
Renewable Energy Act should be read in conjunction with the Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541), online: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/ACT.pdf.  
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Act.380   
The Ghana Renewable Energy Act is similar in form and substance to Ontario’s Green Energy 
Act381, rendering Ghana a useful case study of the applicability of the WTO Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT decision on countries in the developing world that have adopted similar FIT programs. 
An assessment of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case is crucial to understanding the impact of 
subsidy classification on green energy projects in the developing world.  It will explore whether the 
Appellate Body decision is sufficient to guide international disputes arising from green energy 
initiatives, or if the SCM Agreement needs to be revised to provide legal parameters for defining the 
limits of green subsidies within the sphere of international trade.  It will look at the treatment of the 
term “subsidy” as it relates to the SCM Agreement and its application to FIT schemes, especially in 
light of the new requirements under the Paris Agreement on climate change.382   
 The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT cases raise questions about the viability of WTO treatise 
such as the SCM Agreement in addressing national environmental climate change goals similar to 
those arising from green energy initiatives.  While the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case is the 
first of its kind to be considered at the WTO, it gives rise to a number of Request for Consultations, 
some of which are still in the pipeline.  The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case raises concern over 
green energy initiatives that may be under attack383 and how this will impact developing nations.  
This is particularly relevant in sub-Saharan Africa, where sustainable development may be tied to 
                                                 
380 International Renewable Energy Agency, Ghana Renewables Readiness Assessment (2015) online:  
www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RRA_Ghana_Nov_2015.pdf.  
381 Green Energy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 12, Sched A. 
382UNFCCC, Paris Climate Change Conference – 2015, online: 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php.  
383 “World Trade Organization Attacks Successful Canadian Clean Energy Program: Sierra Club and Public Citizen 
Express Disappointment”, Public Citizen, Eyes of Trade, Public Citizen’s Blog on Globalization and Trade (21 November 
2012), online: www.citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2012/11/world-trade-organization-attacks-successful-canadian-
clean-energy-program-.html. 
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green initiatives like renewable energy FIT schemes.  Specifically, how will the Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT case impact on sub-Saharan nations like Ghana that have adopted energy policies that 
rely on FIT schemes to incorporate renewable energy alternatives in their development path? Does 
the climate change dilemma call for a resurrection of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement (non-actionable 
subsidies), which would protect subsidies associated with national environmental protection goals?   
These questions raise concerns about whether the treatment of climate change necessitates a 
modernization of the WTO SCM Agreement to account for environmental subsidies and development 
goals of disadvantaged regions. 
 The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case was the first WTO challenge of discriminatory 
subsidies in the renewable energy sector. The European Union requested consultation with Canada 
on August 11, 2011 regarding its FIT Program.  The European Union alleged that Canada’s FIT 
Program breached its obligations under Article III:4 and III:5 of the GATT 1994; Member States were 
not offered the same favourable trade terms on renewable energy equipment, suppliers, and services 
as Canadian companies.384  It was further alleged that the FIT Program constituted a trade-related 
investment measure and was therefore inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and 
with Article III of the GATT 1994.385   Finally, the request alleged that the FIT Program constituted 
a subsidy pursuant to Article 1 of the WTO SCM Agreement as a financial contribution was conferred 
to the energy producer, contrary to Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.386  
The Appellate Body in the Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT decision adjudicated on whether 
                                                 
384 The World Trade Organization, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector (2012) 
WT/DS412/AB/R, (Panel Report) Dispute DS412, online: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm 
[“Canada Renewable Energy/FIT (Panel Decision)”]; The World Trade Organization, Canada –Measures Relating to 
the Feed-in Tariff Program (2013) WTO Doc WT/DS426/AB/R (Appellate Body Report)  Dispute DS426, online: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm [“Canada Renewable Energy/FIT Case (Appellate Body 
Report)”].   
385Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, online: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm  
[“TRIMs”].  
386 Canada Renewable Energy/FIT Case (Appellate Body Report), supra note 369. 
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a FIT scheme that guaranteed payments to renewable energy producers while setting local content 
requirements for Canadian products was a subsidy under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and, thus, 
a violation of Article  III.4 of the GATT and 2.1 of the TRIMs.  Domestic content requirements are 
sometimes used to encourage communities to transition to more expensive green energy alternatives 
in exchange for more jobs and community economic growth. While the issue of local content 
requirements will not be directly addressed in this paper, the distinction between subsidies that do 
not address market failures, and may result in a discriminatory effect, from those subsidies that 
address specific societal concerns such as the environment will be explored within the broader 
context of climate change.   
 With the absence of a “non-actionable” subsidy provision in the SCM Agreement, a major 
concern for green energy developers is whether measures aimed at encouraging green technologies 
within the renewable energy sector can withstand the scrutiny of international trade laws.  A number 
of these programs, including the Ontario FIT Programs, have come under fire, primarily for local 
content requirements.387  The issue of subsidies and renewable energy arises in international law as 
national environmental strategies such as the solar energy feed-in tariff program may be inconsistent 
with WTO rules.  This inconsistency results from a failure to clearly distinguish distorting subsidies 
from correcting ones. Note that scholars have advocated for subsidies to be subject to one of two 
classifications: non-actionable, which have a public policy goal like environmental preservation, and 
actionable subsidies, which are designed to address protectionist measures.388  By failing to address 
such a distinction, the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision renders the viability of the FIT 
                                                 
387 Canada Renewable Energy/FIT (Panel Decision), supra note 369; The World Trade Organization, China – Measures 
Concerning World Power Equipment (2010) WTO Doc WT/DS419/1 Request for Consultations, online: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm; Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT Case (Appellate Body 
Report), supra note 369. 
388 Simon Lester, “The Problem of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC-Aircraft Case” 
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Program as a means of providing alternative energy and technology transfer to the developing world 
highly uncertain.  Furthermore, the growth in trade disputes has raised questions about whether the 
WTO Agreements and GATT are sufficient to address environmental issues while preserving the 
rights of least-developed and developing nations to pursue development.  This question is of even 
greater concern where countries can be penalized for promoting policies that replace traditional 
energy that emits higher GHG, with renewable energy programs that are subsidized by 
governments.389  
 
A. The Connection Between Climate Change and Subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 Climate change will have profound effects on continental Africa.390  The issue of energy 
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is clearly linked to regional development goals (such as 
infrastructural development, technology and knowledge transfer), and these initiatives can be 
combined with climate change abatement strategies.  This dual initiative which recognizes energy as 
a precondition for economic development is being addressed by a group of nations known as the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which is comprised of 15 sovereign 
nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cộte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mail, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 391  The combined population of 
ECOWAS exceeds 334.6 million people.392  Three Member States comprise more than two-thirds 
                                                 
389 Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, “Four Changes to Trade Rules to Facilitate Climate Change Action” (2013) 
13:10 Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief, online: www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-10.pdf. 
390 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa. Economic Report on Africa 2014. Dynamic Industrial Policy in 
Africa at xiv. 
391 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), ECOWAS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Status Report 2014 (Paris, Renewable 
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2014) 
online:www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/activites/Regional%20Reports/ECOWAS_EN.pdf [hereinafter “ECOWAS 
Renewable Energy Status Report”]. 
392 Ibid. 
  120
(67.5%) of the entire region’s population (Côte d’Ivoire 6.8%, Ghana 7.7%, and Nigeria 52.9%).393  
Of 346 million people, only 8 per cent of rural residents and 42 per cent of the total population have 
access to electricity.394  This number is severely reduced when one considers those whose access to 
electricity can be said to be reliable and consistent.   
 The volatility in energy may arguably be at the root of underdevelopment, poverty, and even 
health issues within the region.  Currently, cooking via wood and charcoal accounts for 85.7 per cent 
of the population’s solid fuel usage.  The inhalation effects of these methods of energy have a more 
profound impact on women and children, who are most often required to tend fires and prepare 
meals.395  A clear correlation has been established between “energy access and human economic 
development”, which heightens the priority for energy security in the ECOWAS region.396  In 
general, the sub-Saharan region has the highest concentration of peoples without access to electricity 
on the planet, totaling at 599 million (47.6%), followed by Asia at 309 million (24.6%) and India at 
306 million (24.3%).397   
 Lack of energy is also directly correlated to human health and the environment.  While more 
than 85.7% of the ECOWAS population currently use traditional biomass and solid fuels for cooking 
and heating.398  Reliance on high carbon dioxide emitting energy sources have had a negative health 
impact on the population in the region and it is estimated that “more than 257.8 million people [are] 
being affected by household air pollution from indoor smoke, small particle pollution, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen oxides” along with unnecessary burns and increased cancer threats.399  There 
                                                 
393 Ibid at 19 online: www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/e-paper/ECOWAS/epaper/ausgabe.pdf?rnd=54ca63edd2684.  
394 Ibid at 22-23.  Note the electricity rates in the region vary tremendously with some areas like Cabo Verde having full 
access, while others like Niger only have a 9 per cent electrification rate.    
395 Ibid at 26. 
396  Renewable Energy Global Status Report 2015, supra note 376 at 12. 
397  Ibid at 22. 
398  Ibid at 13. 
399  ECOWAS, supra note 391 at 13. 
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is also concern that this region may be less able to respond to the effects of climate change due to the 
lack of “resilience in energy planning.”400  
 Population growth projections of 2.5 per cent per year, and increased urbanization, also 
heighten the need to consider renewable energy sources within the region.  In fact, sub-Saharan 
Africa is optimally positioned to take advantage of renewable energy sources like solar photovoltaic 
energy production that can be optimized due to close proximity to the equator.  The region’s 
renewable energy potential has been identified as immense and reported as follows: 
An estimated 23,000 MW of hydroelectric potential is concentrated in 5 of the 15 member 
States, of which only about 16 per cent has been exploited.  According to preliminary 
estimates, small hydropower potential in the region amounts to around 6,000 MW.  There is 
good potential for all forms of bioenergy. There are considerable wind, tidal, ocean, thermal 
and wave energy resources available in some ECOWAS countries. The region also has vast 
solar energy potential with very high radiation averages of 5 to 6 kWh/m throughout the 
year.401 
 
The vastness of the renewable energy resources in the region makes green energy options a viable 
and logical inclusion in development goals.  In addition, the region has also set renewable energy 
goals as a part of the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP) that aims for an “overall electricity 
mix to 35 per cent by 2020 and 48 per cent by 2030.”402 
 
II. TRADE, THE GATT, SCM AGREEMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 Governments are increasingly attempting to incorporate environmental targets in their 
economic strategies.  With new nationally determined pledges emerging from the Paris 2015 World 
                                                 
400 Ibid at 13. 
401Karin Reiss, “Developing Renewable Energy Sectors and Technologies in West Africa” (2015) 3 UN Chronicles 33 
at 33-34. 
402Ibid.  
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Environmental Summit,403 countries must be free to implement policies that will encourage 
investment in renewable energy projects.  This means that flexibilities, like those previously included 
for non-actionable subsided in the SCM Agreement and national urgency and economic development 
flexibilities in TRIPS, must be considered not only as a national strategy, but also as a contribution 
to the global policy goal for climate change abatement. The costliness of green energy alternatives 
such as photovoltaic solar plants may require some form of government assistance to entice energy 
producers to invest, especially in developing nations.  This raises question of whether public policy 
concern for climate change abatement could also warrant similar flexibilities as emerged from other 
social debates like the affordable medicines conflict?404   
There are a number of flexibilities that can be extracted from the GATT that would affect 
green energy projects.   Specifically, Article XX(b) of the GATT creates exceptions allowing a 
Member State to introduce measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”.405  A specific exception also exists for the environment relating “to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption”.406  Thus, where Articles XX(b) and (g) of the GATT appear 
to support environmental subsidies, the SCM Agreement no longer contains exceptions for such 
flexibilities.    
 There are a number of flexibilities in several international agreements, including the GATT 
1994, that would support national environment and climate change goals.  These climate change 
abatement initiatives have been contemplated for decades and were raised at the Doha Round 
                                                 
403UNFCCC, Paris Climate Change Conference – 2015, online: 
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404 Leslyn A Lewis, “The Applicability of TRIPS Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change Mitigation 
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negotiations.407  These negotiations essentially stalled and were not resuscitated, failing to result in 
an international agreement on renewable energy or WTO policy on the issue.408 As such, the SCM 
Agreement is the most relevant document governing renewable energy subsidies and trade. The 
flexibilities that pertained to the SCM Agreement expired on January 1, 2000 and have not been 
renewed.409  Under Part IV of the SCM Agreement, a number of subsidies were previously deemed 
“non-actionable”, including certain programs for adopting new governmental environmental 
requirements as well as programs for disadvantaged regions.410   
 A. Actionable and Non-Actionable Subsidies 
 The SCM Agreement is the primary international agreement on how a “subsidy” should be 
defined and it recognizes two types of subsidies: prohibited, which, if successfully challenged, must 
be removed,411 and actionable, which, if successfully challenged, may require an amendment to the 
infringing portion.412  Further, there are two types of prohibited subsidies: export subsidies and local 
content subsidies.413  Even if a subsidy is not prohibited, it can be actionable if it is “specific to an 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority”414 and adversely affects another Member.  This raises questions about whether FITs, which 
are specific to the renewable energy industry, constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  FIT 
schemes are usually long term, fixed price contracts between renewable energy producers and 
                                                 
407 WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting, Ministerial Declaration November 2001, adopted on 14 November 2001, WTO Doc 
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governmental or quasi-governmental entities to provide energy in exchange for feeding into the grid 
system that is usually operated and maintained by another government or quasi-government entity. 
The question is couched in the notion that FITs create a dual pricing scheme which discounts 
renewable energy sources by setting fixed tariffs, a form of “government support” deemed to be a 
subsidy.  In this regard, WTO rules and the SCM Agreement do not distinguish between subsidies 
that attempt to correct environmental distortions and those that distort trade.  A country that objects 
to a Member’s practice can either challenge the activity, as in the case of actionable subsidies like 
FITs, or request countervailing measures be imposed on imports for other actionable subsidies.  In 
cases of prohibited subsidies like local content or export subsidies, infringing provisions must be 
removed.415 In contrast, only the adverse effects need to be removed from an actionable subsidy.416  
Failure to remedy the infringing portion can result in countermeasures by the Complainant against 
the offender pursuant to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement.417  
 As most subsidies fall under the actionable category, rectification is often limited to an 
amendment of the practice bearing the adverse impact.  While the SCM Agreement does not 
specifically define a “prohibited” or “actionable” subsidy,  Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum, 
and Petros Mavroidis recognize a catch-all classification of an actionable subsidy—“by default: all 
government schemes which qualify as subsidies, and which are neither prohibited nor non-actionable, 
are, in principle, actionable subsidies.”418  It has been argued that the original purpose of the SCM 
Agreement was to provide assistance for the cost of adapting to new environmental requirements and 
for costs associated with upgrading old facilities to environmentally friendly ones.419  The very 
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existence of the now lapsed third class of a non-actionable subsidy, is evidence of the original intent 
of the SCM as it relate to having a separate category for subsidized environmental and development 
activities.  However, in light of the Canada Renewable Energy case, the SCM’s impact on FITs as a 
policy tool is yet to be tested among the ECOWAS Members and many regions in the developing 
world and sub-Saharan Africa.  Specifically, it is uncertain whether the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body would interpret the Canada Renewable Energy case in the same manner for a developing nation 
as it did for a developed economy like Canada.  Essentially, a strict interpretation of the domestic 
content restrictions and other prohibitions could potentially be in conflict with the flexibilities within 
governing Agreements like the SCM and GATT which encourages regional development by 
recognizing the unique circumstances surrounding underdevelopment and trade.  This raises 
questions about whether environmental subsidies should be deemed as actionable, prohibited or 
whether the third class of non-actionable subsidy should be resurrected.  
 The SCM Agreement also provided for “non-actionable” subsidies existed between 1995 and 
1999.420 As noted above, there are now only two categories of subsidies.  Prior to 1999, Article 8 of 
the SCM Agreement provided that no actions could be taken against subsidies that promoted research 
and development, technology, industrial policies like technology transfer and facility upgrades, as 
well as environmental protection and regional aid.421  Provisions pertaining to “non-actionable” 
subsidies also permitted “assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member given 
pursuant to the framework of regional development”.422  The SCM Agreement also recognized 
subsidies that further environmental adaptation pursuant to Article 8.2(c), which required it to 
“promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or 
                                                 
420 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Articles 8 and 31. 
421 Ibid at Article 8.2(b) 
422 Ibid at Article 8.2(c). 
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regulations”.423   
The SCM Agreement was preceded by the 1979 Subsidies Code, which recognized subsidies 
as “important instruments” in the promotion of “social and economic policy objectives”.424  The 
Subsidies Code listed the following important objectives of non-actionable subsidies: 
“(a) the elimination of industrial, economic and social disadvantages of specific regions,  
 
(b) to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of  certain sectors, 
especially where this has become necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic 
policies, including international agreements  resulting in lower barriers to trade,  
 
(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage re-training and change in employment,  
 
(d) to encourage research and development programmes, especially in the  field of high-
technology industries,  
 
(e) the implementation of economic programmes and policies to promote the economic and 
social development of developing countries. 
 
  (f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion and environmental 
 problems.”425  
 
The Subsidies Code was also the predecessor to the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement and 
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.  During the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
the United States strongly opposed the inclusion of non-actionable subsidies related to research and 
development, environmental and also regional aid policies.426  Opposition to the non-actionable class 
was based on the potential abuse that could result where no action could be taken for discriminatory 
practices.  In response, it was agreed that the provision would be reviewed five years after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994.  Instead of conducting a review in 1999, the non-
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https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_385/Module_1594/ModuleDocuments/SCM-L2-R1-E.pdf [“Subsidies 
Code”]. 
425 Ibid.  
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actionable subsidies category was not addressed and therefore lapsed.  It should be noted that during 
the five years of its existence, it was never invoked or relied on by a Party.427  It is not clear that it 
was the intention of the SCM Agreement to completely remove the non-actionable subsidy category 
under Article 8, and there was concern among States that its removal sent the wrong signals in relation 
to international environmental law.428  
 The original Article 8.2(c) set limits on environmental subsidies by limiting them to the 
following:   
“assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements 
imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on 
firms, provided that the assistance: 
  
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and  
 
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and  
 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must 
be fully borne by firms; and  
 
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and 
pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; 
and  
 
(v) (v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production 
processes.”429 
 
The restrictive nature of Article 8.2(c) may explain why it was not invoked during the five 
year period over which it existed.   However, despite its non-use, the spirit of this lapsed section was 
incorporated in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision.   The requirement of a “one-time non-
recurring measure” in Article 8.2(c)(i) is similar in reasoning to the “new industry” approach that 
                                                 
427 Rios Herran and Pietro Poretti, 'WTO - Trade Remedies'. in Rudiger Wolfrum, Peter Tobias Stoll and Michael Koebele 
(eds), WTO - Trade Remedies: Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008) vol. 4, 545-552 at 552. 
428 Bigdeli (2011), supra note 409. 
429 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Article 8.2(c) (notes deleted).   
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was adopted by the Appellate Body decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case and which 
will be reviewed later in this paper.   
 
 B. Subsidies and Green Energy Programs 
 Globally, the energy sector is one of the most heavily subsidized, with an estimated annual 
subsidy of US $ 100 billion in 2012;430 it is arguably one of the most heavily subsidized industries in 
the world.431  The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) has estimated that removing fossil fuel 
subsidies could lower greenhouse gas emissions by the 2 degrees Celsius climate change targets.432  
Whereas it is estimated that global fossil fuel subsides totaled $ 523 billion in 2011, renewable energy 
subsidies only amounted to $ 88 billion in the same year.433  An energy subsidy is defined as “any 
government action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy 
production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by energy 
consumers.”434  The IEA recognizes the need to form a comprehensive global energy strategy that 
will address transition to renewable energy sources and the irreplaceable role of subsidies in this 
endeavor.  The IEA does, however, caution the use of subsidies by governments, noting the: 
following Governments need, though, to be attentive to the design of their subsidies to 
renewables, which surpassed $100 billion in 2012 and expand to $220 billion in 2035. As 
renewables become increasingly competitive on their own merits, it is important that subsidy 
schemes allow for the multiple benefits of low carbon energy sources without placing 
                                                 
430IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013), available at 
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publication/seo-2013/. 
431 United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, Resilient People, Resilient Planet: A 
Future Worth Choosing (New York: United Nations, 2012) at 52. 
432 Duncan Clark, “Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies could provide half of global carbon target” The Guardian, January 
19, 2012; See also IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012 1, online: 
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/.  
433 Ibid, World Energy Outlook at 6.  For a detailed assessment of green energy policy instruments. See also: Pablo 
Benitez, “Policy Instruments for Renewable: An Introduction” ESMAP/IFC Renewable Energy Training Program, World 
Bank (18 September 2012), online: World Bank Institute 
www.esmap.org/site/esmap.org/files/ESMAP%201FC%20Training%20World%20Bank%20Benitez.pdf. 
434 IEA, World Energy Outlook 1999: Looking at Energy Subsidies: Getting the Price Right (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1999).  
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excessive burdens on those that cover the additional costs. A carefully conceived international 
climate change agreement can help to ensure that the energy-intensive industries in countries 
that act decisively to limit emissions do not face unequal competition from countries that do 
not.435 
The issue of subsidies is still contentious when weighed against the merits of the Polluter Pays 
Principle.  The Polluter Pays Principle was adopted by the OECD in 1972 and has been argued to 
stand for a no subsidy principle,436 wherein the cost of the externality is borne by the polluter.  With 
respect to feed-in tariffs, changes to the local regulatory framework, and the adoption of the FIT 
system, may not necessarily constitute a subsidy. Robert Howse, among other scholars, argue that 
renewable energy schemes like feed-in tariffs are not “financial contributions” under Article 1.1(a) 
of the SCM Agreement.437   
 International law has no singular treatise to regulate energy law.438  Moreover, the tools 
utilized by various countries to promote renewable energy technologies differ in scope and breadth.  
The GATT and several WTO439 treaties are particularly relevant in governing international energy 
law. The issue of subsidies and renewable energy is closely connected to how the Most Favoured 
Nation (“MFN”) Principle of the GATT applies to local environmental policies and projects.   This 
principle ensures that countries offer the same treatment to foreign industries as they offer to local 
businesses.   The MFN Principle stipulates that all trading partners must be treated equally and free 
of discrimination. Article III:4 of GATT stipulates the following: 
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
                                                 
435 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013: Executive Summary, online: www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2013SUM.pdf. 
at 3. 
436 Charles S Pearson, “Testing the System: GATT + PPP = ?”, (1994) 27 Cornell International Law Journal 553.  
437 Robert Howse, “Post-Hearing Submission to the International Trade Commission: World Trade Law and Renewable 
Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Measures” (2005) 3(2) Oil, Gas & Energy L Intelligence 2.  
438 Cottier et al, supra note 409.   
439 There are a number of WTO Agreements that apply to international energy law: General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade; the General Agreement on Trade in Services; the Trade Related Investment Measures; the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement; the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement; and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement. 
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products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements.…”440 
 
An exception exists under III:8(a) of GATT, which exempts government procurement initiatives from 
the effects of Article III:4.441  Accordingly, the primary issue in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT 
Appeal was whether government procurement programs such as the FIT could be exempt from the 
MFN requirement under Article III:8(a) of GATT.  Article III:8(a) of the GATT may be applicable to 
subsidies that are specific to the public good they are attempting to uphold, if they contain the 
minimal trade distortion. 
 Several scholars in the area of subsidies have argued that Article XX of the GATT actually 
permits non-actionable subsidies where the goal is environmental sustainability.442 The SCM 
Agreement was contemplated in the GATT Council Meeting, 1991 Secretariat documents on Trade 
and the Environment.443  The reference in the GATT document reads: 
The text of the draft Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under negotiation 
in the Uruguay Round contains some modifications to the subsidy rules. The draft has 
attempted to define "non-actionable" subsidies as those related, under certain conditions, to 
research and development, structural adjustment assistance, environmental protection and 
regional aids.444 
 
While the above Article 8(b) and (c) provisions of the SCM Agreement, referenced in the GATT 
document, have expired, these flexibilities, if operable, could act as a means to promote green 
subsidies.  Arguably, the framers of the SCM Agreement may not have intended to have non-
                                                 
440 GATT, supra note 368. 
441 Ibid, Article III:8(a) and III:4. 
442 Robert Howse, “Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense? The Case for 
Legalizing Some Subsidies”, in Kyle W Bagwell, George A Bermann, and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), Law and Economics 
of Contingent Protection in International Trade (New York City, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 85-102; Luca 
Rubini, The Definition of Subsidies and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 2012; Alan O Sykes, “The Economics of the WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures”, in Patrick F J Macrory, Arthur E Appleton, Michael G Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, vol I (Springer Verlag: New York City, New York, 2005).  
443 GATT Council Meeting, 1991 Secretariat Documents on Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. L/6896 of 18 
September 1991 at 4, online: www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91530963.pdf [“GATT Council Meeting”]. 
444 Ibid at 16.  
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actionable subsidies aimed at addressing environmental distortions and development issues to be 
permanently removed from the SCM Agreement. 
 
I. Climate Change Abatement Subsidies 
The 1947 GATT was the first international treaty to explicitly prohibit subsidies that distort 
trade.  After the creation of the WTO in 1995, the possibility of encouraging positive behavior 
through the subsidization of renewable energy technologies was vigorously entertained.445 The 
United Nations Environment Program also acknowledged the role of green subsidies as necessary, 
“justified by the positive externalities expected from a green economy and … important for 
leveraging private investments”.446  As it has already been acknowledged, subsidies are required, as 
renewable energy projects are often not suitable capital ventures and investors are often cautious 
about the riskiness of their return on investment.447  While subsidies attempt to create an incentive 
for the investor or energy producer, local content requirements aim to stabilize and enhance 
development in the local economy.  While these requirements may amount to a subsidy to an 
industrialized country, the same may not be true in the developing world that struggles with 
industrialization.   
 The ban on subsidies that distort trade was initiated by the GATT in 1947 and was specified 
by the WTO in its SCM Agreement.448  The current legal landscape may not fully account for the role 
                                                 
445 Philippe Menanteau, Dominique Finon, and Marie-Laure Lamy. "Prices versus quantities: choosing policies for 
promoting the development of renewable energy"  (2003) 31:8 Energy Policy 799; M L Weitzman, “Prices vs Quantities”  
(1974) 41:4 The Review of Economic Studies 477;  R Wiser, S Pickle, “Green marketing, Renewables, and Free Riders: 
Increasing Customer Demand for a Public Good) Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1997, online: 
www.eren.doe.gov/greenpower/wiser-free.pdf; N Wohlgemuth, Renewable Energy Promotion in Competitive Electricity 
Markets (Solar Energy Society, London, 1999). 
446 United Nations Environmental Programme  2011, Towards A Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Eradication, UNEP, 2011, online: 
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of subsidies in correcting market failures like those caused by environmental externalities such as 
pollution.  The WTO and its Dispute Body has been the main international regulator on subsidy 
disputes.  The problem arises from the SCM Agreement’s failure to clearly distinguish between 
distorting and correcting subsidies.  This quagmire obscures the role of the WTO as a regulator of 
trade and questions its assistance in redefining trade laws to incorporate climate change objectives.449  
In this regard, it has been maintained that the WTO Dispute Body should not be a regulator of trade, 
but should be expected to form a global “consensus on renewable energy support measures”.450  
Consequently, international trade law recognizes the public good value associated with climate 
change abatement strategies, despite this, the solution of recapturing environmental externalities by 
subsidizing practices that minimize pollution continues to be at odds with the definition of what 
traditionally constitutes a subsidy.  As Sykes argues, WTO law and international trade treatise, in 
particular, do not engage the question of “whether the ostensible ‘subsidy’ addresses some legitimate 
problem.”451  Essentially, this brings into question the applicability of current international trade laws 
to the current day problem of climate change.  Thus, for Sykes, the competitive “disadvantage” that 
governmental measures confer should also be calculated in the determination of a subsidy.452 
Measures that relieve the polluter of the cost of pollution are said to be distorting irrespective of 
whether they are targeted environmental abatement initiatives (recognizing that not all abatement 
initiatives are pollution free), owing to a violation of the Polluter Pays Principle.453  
There are two schools of thought as to whether a WTO exception should be meted out for 
                                                 
449 Sykes (2003) supra note 442; Howse, supra note 437. 
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climate change abatement strategies.  Some economists view climate change abatement trade 
strategies as fundamentally “protectionist” and are unsupportive of creating exceptions under the 
WTO.454  Alternatively, national policies and strategies are also touted for promoting environmental 
goals associated with climate change.455  The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body clearly recognizes 
that protectionism constitutes any domestic law and regulation favouring national industries over 
foreign ones.  The role of international environmental law includes the facilitation of environmental 
protection and global sustainable development while upholding the rights of States to pursue trade 
free of arbitrary and discriminatory trade practices, and where policy imposes a minimal trade 
distortion. 
 There is clear recognition in the literature that international trade treatise need to be 
reconceived to account for climate change abatement goals.  In this regard, it has also been argued 
that there should be some sort of “environmental goods” legislation that eliminates environmental 
tariffs.456  Similarly, there is support for WTO treaties that balance environmental needs with 
international trade law.457  Other scholars propose a solution that creates international environmental 
governance administered through the United Nations, replacing the existing “toothless treaties” 
currently in existence.458  Authors like James Speth view the past environmental treaties, such as 
Kyoto, as lacking substance and devoid of enforcement and implementation provisions.  Instead, 
Speth advocates for movement away from voluntary environmental treaties towards more substantive 
                                                 
454Aaron Cosbey & Petros C Mavroidis, A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable 
Energy: the Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO (2014) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
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agreements with strong economic implementation measures.459 This transition requires assistance for 
local governments to address global environmental problems.  In opposition to an international 
governance structure under the United Nations, some pundits argue that such a structure gives rise to 
splinters of interest groups that will further complicate the regulatory process. The issue of energy 
has been viewed as so crucial to development that some scholars advocate for a separate international 
agreement that addresses global energy issues.460 
 The issue of pricing environmental externalities in trade raises questions about the 
classification of subsidies.  Cosbey and Mavroidis extrapolate on the problem of full costing in their 
example of wind production, and note the following: 
 The price paid to the conventional producers typically does not factor in the environmental 
damage done by their production, and the price paid to the  wind  power producer would not factor 
in the social benefits of avoided environmental damage.  As such, from society’s perspective the free 
market solution would see a sub-optimal level of wind power production.  Subsidies such as FITs 
can remedy this by working to equate the social benefits derived from wind power to the private 
returns going to the producer.461  Thus, to determine whether a true subsidy exists, and whether there 
is a trade distorting effect, the environmental cost of production must be considered.  This means 
accounting for the environmental damage caused by traditional high fossil fuel production, as well 
as the damage avoided by green energy products.  There is also a body of literature suggesting that a 
subsidy is an effective instrument to address market failures associated with environmental 
externalities.462   
                                                 
459Ibid. 
460 Thomas Cottier et al, 2009. Energy in WTO and Policy (Geneva, Switzerland: NCCR Trade Regulation), online: 
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 Further, subsidies could be analyzed from a micro level, examining each national project and 
incentive, or from a macro level which explores the overall global impact of pollution.  Nobel laureate 
economist Joseph Stiglitz suggests that countries that fail to price the cost of pollution in their 
products are effectually subsidizing producers and their products.463  According to Stiglitz, a subsidy 
may result from a failure to tax externalities.  He explains this omission as follows: 
Except in certain limited situations (like agriculture), the WTO does not allow subsidies 
obviously, if some country subsidizes its firms, the playing field is not level.  A subsidy means 
that a firm does not pay the full costs of production.  Not paying the cost of damage to the 
environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full costs of workers would be.464 
 
Stiglitz argues that the issue of costing externalities is so serious that charges should be brought by 
signatories of the Kyoto Protocol against the US for unfair subsidies emanating from subsidizing 
pollution.465   
 The efficacy of environmental subsidies has also been brought into question by several 
governmental authorities.466  Prior to the WTO and its dispute settlement system, environmental 
sustainability was often addressed through the Polluter Pays Principle which maintains that the 
polluter should internalize the cost of pollution in their product and production costs. 467  Thus, the 
1970s focused on governmental policies that discouraged government intervention in assisting with 
the cost of pollution prevention.  Under the GATT, the focus was more on taxing the bad behavior as 
a form of punishing the cost of environmental externalities.468  The Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) also supported the principle that the government should 
not bear the cost of environmental externalities by invoking tax incentives and subsidies.469  The 
view that governments should not attempt to intervene in the market, in a way to offset the costs of 
environmental pollution, was prevalent for decades until the early 1990s.470 
 Fossil fuels remain the cheaper alternative and the environmental externalities caused by this 
choice are not factored into the price.  It has been argued that the difference in pricing of renewable 
energy and fossil fuels is attributable to the “the lack of internalization of these positives and negative 
externalities”, causing renewable energy to become “less competitive than fossil fuel”.471  Subsidies, 
therefore, act as a correction for the distortion causing renewable energy to be priced higher than 
fossil fuels; in this regard, subsidies merely “level the playing field.”472  However, projects that 
support the income of profits that green energy producers make from high capital investments like 
photovoltaic solar energy plants could be under attack.  Without a specific reference to the non-
actionable subsidy, the SCM Agreement would likely classify a FIT Program as an “income price 
support” or as a financial contribution giving rise to a subsidy.  Since this matter was not addressed 
by the Appellate Body in the Canada – Renewable Energy case, the future of feed-in tariffs and the 
prices set to encourage renewable energy usage may be subject to future WTO challenges.   
 In December 2015, the Paris Climate Change Conference (COP21) was held and participating 
States were required to submit their own voluntary pledges, known as Intended Nationally 
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Determined Contributions (INDC). These pledges later formed the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDC) that countries would be bound to under the Agreement.  These voluntary targets 
emerged out of the “Lima Call to Action,” wherein “common but differentiated responsibilities” were 
recognized over the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol.473 The Paris Agreement goes beyond 
previous international climate change regimes in its recognition of both mitigation and adaptation 
mechanisms.  Article 7.2 recognizes the that developing nations are “particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change”474 and therefore encourages the enhancement of “adaptive 
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change”.475   Given the 
financial challenges that developing countries currently face under existing climate regimes, 
additional requirements may exacerbate already pre-existing pressures.  
 The Paris Agreement also contains flexibilities that respond to the hardship that developing 
countries may encounter in meeting their climate change commitments.  These hardship provisions 
include: a finance mechanism (Article 9), technology transfer mechanism (Article 10), capacity 
building (Article 11), education and knowledge transfer (Article 12), and an enhanced transparency 
provision (Article 13).  Specifically, the language of the Paris Agreement includes references to 
“incentives”, which may also raise questions about whether environmental initiatives constitute a 
“subsidy” under international law.  For example, the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (“REDD”) initiatives in Article 5 of the Agreement, explicitly states the following: 
Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-
based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already 
agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role  of 
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https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/application/pdf/auv_cop20_lima_call_for_climate_action.pdf  
474 UNFCCC (COP21), Paris Agreement, www.unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php, Article 7.2 [“Paris 
Agreement”] 
475 Ibid.  
  138
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon.…476  
 
Despite the specific reference to REDD in Article 5.2, renewable energy projects easily fit into the 
REDD scheme in their aim to alter reliance upon fossil fuels that deplete forest resources by 
encouraging the use of alternative energy sources.  Therefore, the Paris Agreement does not resolve 
issues around whether programs like FIT will be deemed a subsidy, especially if they are addressing 
regional disparity issues that are exacerbated by international climate change regimes. 
 The Paris Agreement is also replete with language that may be interpreted as supportive of 
subsidies; such terms include references to “contributions,” “incentives,” and “support” mechanisms 
not yet tested against the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994.  For example, Article 2 of the Paris 
Agreement establishes the goal of holding “the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 
°C above pre-industrial levels”.477   There are several mechanisms, incentives and supports that are 
touted as means of achieving this objective.  Some of the provisions under consideration are 
highlighted below in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of the Paris Agreement Subsidies Reference 
Paris 
Agreement Provision 
Article 5.2 
 “Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including 
through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related 
guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy 
approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint 
mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable 
management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as 
appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.”  
                                                 
476 Ibid at Article 5.2, emphasis added.  
477 Ibid Article 2. 
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 Article 4.6 
 “A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
support sustainable development is hereby established… to the Paris 
Agreement, and shall aim: (a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions while fostering sustainable development; (b) To incentivize and 
facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public 
and private entities authorized by a Party;” 
 Article 7.6 
 “Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation 
on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of 
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change.” 
 Article 9.1  
 “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist 
developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in 
continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”  
 Article 9.3 
 “As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take 
the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, 
instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through 
a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and 
taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such 
mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous 
efforts.” 
 Article 10.6  
 “Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing 
country Parties for the implementation of this Article, including for 
strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at 
different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance 
between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to 
in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to 
support on technology development and transfer for developing country 
Parties.”  
 
These provisions raise questions regarding the applicability of the Paris Agreement to existing WTO 
obligations.  Under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, a scheme that is deemed to be a “financial 
contribution by a government or a public body within the territory of a Member”, or “any form or 
income or price support”, is deemed to be a subsidy if (1) a “benefit is conferred” and (2) it bears the 
following attributes:  
“(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,  loans, and equity  
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);  
 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected  (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
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(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases 
goods;  
 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or  directs a private 
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which 
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from 
practices normally followed by governments;”478 
 
Thus, while the Paris Agreement incentivizes cooperation, financial supports, contributions from 
developed nations to developing ones, as well as from governments, in furtherance of mitigation and 
adaptation policies, there are no guarantees that these provisions will not be challenged under the 
GATT and the SCM Agreement.  
 
III. THE CANADA RENEWABLE ENERGY/FIT CASE STUDY 
 The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT Case is the only WTO dispute that has adjudicated the 
issue of green energy subsidies within the context of the SCM Agreement and international trade 
laws.  While the conditions that give rise to an industrialized nation’s reliance on subsidies to 
facilitate renewable energy production differ from those of the developing world, the Canada 
Renewable Energy/FIT case has far reaching implications for international law.   
The dispute in this case arose from regulatory changes facilitating a FIT scheme in Ontario, 
Canada.  The Ontario Green Energy and Green Economy Act established the FIT Program in 2009 
under the auspices of the Ontario Power Authority.479  The energy policy was created pursuant to the 
Electricity Act of 1998, as amended by the Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009.480  The 
Ontario FIT Program guaranteed the price in kWh at which the Ontario government would purchase 
power under a 20 to 40 year Power Purchase Agreement.  The issue for the Panel and the Appellate 
                                                 
478 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Article 1.1.  
479Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c12, Sch B II 7 (1), online: 
www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/s09012. 
480 Ibid. 
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Body was whether the feed-in tariff constituted a subsidy pursuant to Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement, which defines subsidies within the context of requiring a “financial contribution by a 
government or by any public body” that includes “any form of income support or price support” and 
where a “benefit is conferred”.481  Accordingly, the Panel explored whether the FIT Program was 
discriminatory in regards to its local content requirements and, consequently, in contravention of the 
SCM Agreement, TRIMs and the GATT 1994.482 
The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case was initiated by Japan’s complaint against Canada, 
which was later supported by the United States and the European Union in September 2010.  The 
WTO conveyed a Panel to adjudicate the complaint in June 2011, and the European Union made a 
similar request in August 2011, resulting in two panels hearing the disputes.483 Canada maintained 
that the FIT Program should be exempt from SCM Agreement requirements on the basis of its 
intended purpose as a government procurement program to facilitate affordable renewable energy 
usage in Ontario.484    Both panels found Canada in contravention of the GATT and TRIMs on grounds 
that the FIT Program’s local content requirements were discriminatory. However, they were 
inconclusive on the issue of subsidy.  As discussed below, the Appellate Body later found that the 
local content requirements infringed the MFN status of the GATT, but entirely omitted a decision as 
to whether the FIT Program, in general, constituted a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  The finding 
of fact that the local content requirements contained in the FIT scheme constituted a subsidy contrary 
to the SCM Agreement posed little legal controversy.   
Canada appealed the decision in February 2013. On May 6, 2013, the Appellate Body held 
                                                 
481 SCM Agreement, supra note 368, at Article 1. 
482 Canada Feed-in Tariff Program (Panel Report), supra note 369 at paras 3.2, 3.4. 
483 Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT Cases, supra note 369; Note also that the European Union also requested 
consultation resulting in a second Panel in 2012.  Third Party status was also filed by Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese 
Taipei, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States.  
484 Ibid, Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT Cases. 
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that Ontario’s FIT Program was inconsistent with two international treaties to which Canada was a 
signatory (the TRIMs Agreement and Article III of the GATT).485  The Canada-Renewable 
Energy/FIT cases are the only decisions to date that have been rendered at the Appellate level.486   
 The Appellate Body considered two primary issues. First, it questioned whether the local 
content requirements of the FIT scheme constituted a subsidy. Second, it considered whether the FIT 
program conferred a “benefit” to electricity producers within the meaning of the various WTO 
Agreements.   In Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, the WTO Panel found 
that a benefit is conferred by a country “when it confers an advantage on the recipient relative to 
applicable commercial benchmarks, i.e., when it is provided on terms that are more advantageous 
than those that would be available to the recipient on the market.”487  This definition brings into 
question renewable energy FIT programs that guarantee premium prices for renewable energy.  
While the Appellate Body in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case upheld the decision to prohibit 
local content requirements, it reversed the finding that FITs conferred a “benefit” to electricity 
producers.488  Despite this finding, the Appellate Body did not explicitly state that FITs were a legal 
subsidy.  In fact, the WTO decision does not give any future guidance for the future of government-
supported renewable energy projects.   
 That the more contentious issue of subsides was left undecided by the Appellate Body has 
                                                 
485WTO, Appellate Body Issues Reports on Renewable Energy Dispute, (2013), Online: 
www.wto.org/English/news_e/news13_e/412_426abr_e.htm>, two reports were issued on the same day, namely, 
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, (2013) WTO Doc WT/DS412/AB.R, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) 
adopted May 23, 2013). 
486Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector (WT/DS412/AB/R), online: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm.  China – Measures Concerning World Power Equipment 
(2010) WTO DOC WT/DS419/1, DS/419 online: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm, online: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm; Canada – Measure Relating to Feed-in Tariff Program 
(WT/DS426/AB/R), (Appellate Body Report) online: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm. 
487 WTO, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, (1999) WTO DOC  ¶ 9.120, WT/DS70/R (Panel 
Report). 
488 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Article 14.  
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led to criticism among trade and environment scholars.  Authors Aaron Cosbey and Petros Mavroidis 
argue that the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT WTO decision has created a very murky outcome: 
“[t]he reader of the reports is left with the impression that the WTO adjudicating bodies felt that it 
was necessary to engage in legal acrobatics in order to avoid finding that a scheme aimed at 
promoting a public good – the underlying feed-in tariff for renewable energy – was in fact a 
subsidy.”489  Cosbey and Mavroidis express criticism that the WTO judges were possibly guilty of 
inventing the law, rather than administering the treaties.  This criticism seems to only be partly 
accurate since the first issue of the MFN status was clearly decided within the context of the GATT 
and TRIMs.   In this regard, Cosbey and Mavroidis’ concern as to whether the “WTO courts have 
behaved as agents called to apply a law decided by their principals, or whether they re-invented 
themselves as principals and decided what the law should be” does not seem to be applicable to the 
non-determination of the FIT scheme as a subsidy. Cosbey and Mavroidis also argue that “the WTO 
SCM Agreement must be redrafted to account for the rationale of subsidies”.490   They note that the 
current problems of ambiguous subsidies need to be fixed and call for the “WTO Membership to 
stand up and respond to the call of duty.”491  Cosbey and Mavroidis are correct in that the WTO 
courts have not clarified whether FIT would remain an actionable subsidy or if the SCM Agreement 
should consider the two classes of subsidies within the context of the environment.492    
 The problem with the WTO’s failure to render a decision on whether the FIT Program is a 
subsidy may not have as far reaching implications on industrialized nations like Canada that have an 
oversupply of energy.493  However, where developing nations, like those in sub-Saharan Africa, have 
                                                 
489 Cosbey & Mavroidis (2014), supra note 454 at 12.  
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid. 
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chosen a green energy path to development, unclear international laws may impact on the ability to 
commit financiers to a project.  The balance of this paper will be dedicated to exploring the potential 
impact on the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision on the developing world.  The fact that green 
energy subsidies will likely meet the requirement of a subsidy within the meaning of the WTO (since 
they are specific and may have adverse effects), may call for a specific legal principle separate from 
traditional subsidies.  An examination of the three requirements to an actionable subsidy actually 
highlights the very reason why flexibilities may need to be carved out from environmental subsidies 
to facilitate a green path to regional development.  These flexibilities will clearly demark the non-
actionability of subsidies aimed at correcting environmental distortions typically considered 
discriminatory under the GATT.  The reasoning in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision lays 
the foundation to assess whether green energy programs may be at risk of being attacked through a 
WTO challenge.    
There is some support for the incorporation of the GATT XX provisions in the SCM 
Agreement.494  While it is highly possible that the SCM Agreement can acknowledge the GATT 
exceptions, it is counterintuitive that the main international treaty on subsidies should leave the 
subject matter of renewable energy to be governed by another agreement.   
 A. Creating the Local Regulatory Infrastructure for Green Energy   
  Initiatives 
 
 Usually, the regulatory framework for energy is radically transformed in a developing country 
before a green energy project can be introduced.  For example, in Ghana, this process began in 2011 
                                                 
494 Luca Rubini, “Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, 
and Law Reform”, (2012) 15 J Int’l Eco L 525; Aaron Cosbey, Renewable Energy Subsidies and the WTO: The Wrong 
Law and the Wrong Venue, Subsidy Watch (Global Subsidies Initiative, Int’l Inst. For Sustainable Dev, Geneva, Switz) 
June 2011; Robert Howse, “Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis” (2010) 
International Institute for Sustainable Development; Mark Wu and James Salzman, "Next Generation of Trade and 
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy” (2013) 108 Nw. UL Rev. 401 
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with the enactment of Ghana’s Renewable Energy Act (2011).495  The Bill itself, and the 
implementation of a feed-in-tariff system, were largely modeled on the hydro system in Ontario 
Canada.  This was a part of a wider policy that the World Bank and the IMF maintained would make 
Ghana more attractive to foreign investors.  Recall that, in 2009, Ontario enacted the Green Energy 
and Green Economy Act which created the regulatory framework for the FIT Program.496  The 
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) was designated as the agency that would set tariffs and assign energy 
contracts.497  The FIT scheme arrangement whereby governments traditionally pay a fixed price—
potentially a premium cost in order to “support” the usage of renewable energy—has been classified 
as a “price support” and arguably a subsidy. The Appellate Body clearly sanctions subsidies that arise 
from domestic content requirements, and, while there are issues to be raised about how that decision 
will impact developing nations (for example in relation to the domestic content requirements), such 
analysis will not be entertained herein.498  Instead, this section of the paper will explore the narrow 
issue of subsidies as they relate specifically to FITs.   
 Under the Ghana FIT program, energy generated through renewable energy sources like solar 
photovoltaic (PV) electricity are guaranteed a price per KWh for electricity delivered to a local grid.  
These terms are usually outlined in a Power Purchase Agreement.  Contracts of this nature are often 
                                                 
495 Ghana Renewable Energy Act, supra note 379.   
496 Green Energy and Green Economy Act, supra note 479.  
497Ibid.  
498 There are a number of Request for Consultations that address the issue of domestic content requirements, see: Canada 
Renewable Energy/FIT (Appellate Body Report) supra note 369; Request for Consultations, United States – 
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China (US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures), WTO DOC (2013) WT/DS449/1, G/L/1001, G/SCM/D92/1,G/ADP/D95/1, panel composed 4 March 2013; 
Request for Consultations, European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector (EU – Renewable Energy), WTO (2012) DOC WT/DS452/1, G/L/1008, 
G/SCM/D95/1,G/TRIMS/D/34, online: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds452_e.htm; Request for 
Consultations, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (India – Solar Cells and Modules), 
(2013) WTO DOC WT/DS456/1, G/L/1023, G/TRIMS/D35, G/SCM/D96/1; India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules (India – Solar Cells and Modules), (2016) DS/456 Panel Report (under appeal), online: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm. 
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entered into by the Electricity Commission of Ghana and independent power producers.499  Ghana 
currently has a number of mechanisms that could be challenged as financial supports or a subsidy 
under the SCM Agreement.  This includes subsidies, favorable tax incentives and policies, pricing 
mechanisms such as the FIT Programs, and other rewards and local content requirements that may 
be introduced by local governments.   
The financial support is not concentrated in one industry or sector, but can be found in reduced 
value added taxes, research and development incentives, and incentives to develop local projects.   
The Ghana Renewable Energy Act, 2011500 for example, promotes the development of renewable 
energy technologies501 and funds research and project construction in the renewable energy sector.502  
The Act designates the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission as the overseer and issuer of rates 
and “charges for grid connection” along with rates for “electricity from renewable energy sources.”503  
The Energy Commission Act, 1997 gives authority to the Energy Commission to “regulate and 
manage the utilization of energy resources in Ghana and co-ordinate policies in relation to them.”  504   
This includes issuing energy licenses and formulating national policies for the development and 
utilization of energy resources including renewable energy, solar, wind and biomass.505  The Ghana 
Public Utilities Regulatory commission (“PURC”) is an independent body responsible for “charges 
for the supply, transportation and distribution of natural gas services.”506 PURC operated under the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Act, 1997 (Act 538) and sets the tariff rates for energy pursuant to section 
                                                 
499 Electricity Company of Ghana, online: www.ecgonline.info/index.php/about-the-power-sector-in-ghana.html.  
500 Ghana Renewable Energy Act, supra note 379;   See also the Energy Commission Act, supra note 12.  
501 Ibid. 
502  Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541), online: www.energycom.gov.gh/files/ACT.pdf.  
503  Ghana Renewable Energy Act, supra note 379 at section 5. 
504  Energy Commission Act, 1997, supra note 379.  
505 Ghana Energy Commission, Mandate and Functions, online: www.energycom.gov.gh/index.php/mandate-and-
functions. 
506  Ghana Public Utilities Commission, online: www.purc.com.gh/  
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16 of the Act.507   GRIDCo, which was established under the Energy Commission Act, 1997, is a 
private limited liability company that is responsible for the equitable dispatch and transmission of 
electricity generated by wholesale suppliers to the Grid.508  These new regulatory bodies were enacted 
to facilitate relative energy to the Ghanaian public. 
 Whether the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case will inhibit the implementation of a FIT 
scheme in a developing nation like Ghana, is still to be tested.  In assessing whether the feed-in tariff 
program would constitute a subsidy in accordance with the WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT 
decision, three criteria must be met.  The three-part test under the SCM Agreement is summarized as 
follows: 
1. Does the subsidy produce a “financial contribution by a government or any public body”509 
 
2. Is the subsidy specific to a particular industry510 
 
3. Does the subsidy have an adverse effect…511 
 
If the tripartite test above is answered affirmatively, then the subsidy is actionable and could invoke 
a challenge by a Member State within the WTO.  Currently, there is no specific mechanism to protect 
green energy programs within international law.  If the FIT Program were to be challenged, the 
complainant would have to first establish that the newly created PURC, the entity that fixes the tariff, 
is a government entity under Article a.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.  A government entity is defined 
as a “public body” which “exercises authority vested in it by a government”.512  The WTO Appellate 
Body has defined a public body as: 
                                                 
507 Public Utilities Regulatory Act, 1997 (Act 538), online: www.purc.com.gh/purc/purc/Legislation/PURCAct538.  
508 GRIDCo, online: www.gridcogh.com/en/about-us/overview.php 
509 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Art. 1.1(a)(1). 
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“…an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.  Yet, just as 
no two governments are exactly alike, the precise contours and characteristics of a public 
body are bound to differ from entity to entity, State to State, and case to case.”513 
 
Thus, for the SCM Agreement to apply, a public body must be the subject of the complaint.  Green 
subsidies not procured by government agencies would not be subject to attack. However, pursuant to 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, an entity may still be deemed a subsidizer if it promotes 
renewable energy products and was directed by a government to do so.514   
B. The Application of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case to Green  Energy Projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are beginning to implement energy solutions.  These 
solutions include low-carbon policies that may subsidize, through FITs, the cost of renewable energy 
alternatives.  Among the ECOWAS region, Ghana has the second largest number of inhabitants, 
exceeded only by Nigeria.  While Nigeria’s energy system and needs would produce a unique case 
study, their system is based on a more complex interaction between federal regulations and state and 
traditional entities.   Ghana implemented the regulatory framework, similar to that of Ontario, 
Canada, to facilitate renewable energy investments and projects.  For the transition to renewable 
energy to occur, the regulatory framework must lay a suitable foundation—this has already been 
achieved in Ghana. Note that, prior to the implementation of Ontario’s FIT Program, the province 
adopted new renewable energy laws that facilitated green energy projects.  Thus, aside from any 
infringing local content requirement, FITs must be preceded by a regulatory framework that 
establishes an alternative renewable energy supply-mix as an alternative to fossil fuels.   
I. Does the FIT Program Confer a Financial Contribution: Relevant Market 
Considerations? 
 
                                                 
513United States – Definitive Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (2011) WTO 
DOC (Appellate Body Report) EY/FD379/SB/R at para 317.  
514 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
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 The first requirement to challenge a green energy subsidy is that the initiative must produce 
a financial contribution.  In assessing whether there is a financial contribution by a government or 
public body which benefits the recipient within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement, the following four criteria must be met: 
“ (i)  a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,  loans,  and 
equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan  guarantees);  
(ii)  government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii)  a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases 
goods;  
(iv)  a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private 
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which 
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from 
practices normally followed by governments”.515 
Financial Contribution refers to not only the direct transfer of funds, but also an income or price 
support, as in the case with a FIT.  The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case clarifies that energy 
products, and specifically renewable energy supply, fall within the definition of goods under the SCM 
Agreement. The purchase of the energy by a government for redistribution to the public in a FIT 
system would usually constitute a financial contribution, especially if it is purchased below market 
value and for a fixed price. Thus, while the Panel concluded that the FIT Program was designed “with 
a view of commercial resale”, it still falls outside of Article III:8(a).516   
 The test for financial contribution requires a market analysis and evidence that those 
favourable terms were not available in the “relevant market”.  The Panel decision was upheld by the 
Appellate Body which created a distinction between government intervention that creates markets 
                                                 
515 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 Article 1.1(a)(1) online: www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf; See also: 
Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT (Appellate Body Report), supra note 369 at paras 2.86-2.93 and 5.116-5.139. 
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and one that intervenes in pre-existing markets.517 
Most renewable energy projects are creating a market rather than competing in an existing 
market and, therefore, may avoid the finding of an adverse effect for the initial project.  However, 
where the market has been already created, future projects run the risk of contravening Article 1.1 of 
the SCM Agreement.   
 The issue of pre-existing markets was addressed in response to the European Union and Japan 
argument that, as the wind and solar photovoltaic electricity market would not have existed without 
the FIT Program, the Canadian government conferred a benefit energy suppliers. However, the 
Appellate Body found that the FIT did not constitute a benefit, as no comparable market existed to 
confer an advantage.  A benefit could not be conferred to a new producer where there was no 
prejudice to an existing producer.  One Panelist dissented in favour of the “but-for” test, claiming 
that the standard should be that the renewable energy market would not have existed without the FIT 
scheme.  The majority found that the relevant market must be wind and solar PV electricity 
specifically, rather than the entire electricity market.518 Furthermore, the fact that the FIT Program 
created the market is not sufficient to find a subsidy.  
Other cases like the Canada Aircraft case that consider how the term “benefits” should be 
applied to the local conditions would also likely stand for the proposition that implementing a FIT in 
developing region like Ghana would not confer a “benefit” to beneficiaries like Independent Power 
Producers under such programs.  The complainant’s industry must suffer serious prejudice.519   A 
benefits analysis would clearly demonstrate that no “advantage on the recipient relative to applicable 
                                                 
517 Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT (Appellate Body Report), supra note 369 at para 5.188. 
518 Ibid para 5.178. 
519 Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft ¶ 9.120, WT/DS70/R (Apr 14, 1999) 
[“Canada – Aircraft”].   
  151
commercial benchmarks” would be conferred on the independent energy producer.520  This finding 
is also based on the fact that the region is plagued with energy insecurity issues and, as such, the FIT 
Program could not provide “terms that are more advantageous than those that would be available to 
the recipient on the market.”521  
 The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision is important to environmental strategies, as it 
would permit the setting of national targets as promoted at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (Paris COP 21), and would allow governments to create markets to meet these 
objectives.522  In addition, new markets can be defined to attach to certain environmental targets. 
This could include, for instance, a market aimed at reducing CO2 emissions for fossil fuel reliance 
based on certain targets.  Currently, if renewable energy subsidies like those potentially arising from 
FIT schemes are challenged at the WTO, a panel would have to decide on public policy grounds if 
the project is of benefit to the local environment.  This analysis would require an assessment of the 
“relevant markets” which, in the developing world, is usually an undeveloped renewable energy 
market.  The panel with expertise in international issues may not have the specific knowledge to 
address particularities within local environments including which benefits are justified within a 
particular country.  For example, will a local content requirement, or the need for subsidy, in a 
developing nation like Canada differ from a local content requirement in a country undergoing 
development and battling high rates of unemployment, like Ghana?  The Appellate Body also 
identified a policy reason to support renewable energy programs and justify their inclusion as non-
actionable subsidies: “fossil fuel resources are exhaustible and thus fossil energy needs to be replaced 
progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the long term.”523  Despite numerous findings 
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that green energy subsidies arising from FIT Programs should not be actionable, the WTO Appellate 
Body did not explicitly state that Article 8 of the SCM Agreement should be reconsidered for 
reinstatement.  
 There is definitely a need for concrete laws on what constitutes non-actionable subsidies 
rather than reliance on unclear adjudicated outcomes.  Despite this reality, the Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT case only makes exception for a new market.  While an infancy industry will be 
protected, but this may not be the case for an already established industry.   The distinction “seems 
to have opened the door wide to infant industry protection” while rendering arguably disadvantaging 
existing industries.524   The Appellate Body clearly distinguished between a new market created by 
renewable energy sources and existing energy products procured by the government; it concludes 
that “where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the government intervention distorts 
the market, as there would not be a market if the government had not created it.”525  Essentially the 
Appellate Body concluded that the relevant market would be the one that wind and solar market 
created on the supply-side by the government.  Consequently, without the creation of this market by 
the government, it would not have existed.526  While the issue of discrimination pursuant to Article 
1 of the GATT has not been challenged within the context of the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT 
decision, the Appellate Body clearly created a distinction between government initiatives aimed at 
new industries as compared to existing ones.  This distinction may create grounds for a WTO 
challenge where an existing industry is not afforded the same kind of concession as a new one, 
especially in cases where both industries have initiatives aimed at correcting market or environmental 
distortions.  There is no bar on government policies that seem to protect the environment through the 
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purchase of renewable energy technologies.  However, if products are being used in such projects, 
the suppliers of those products must be treated equally irrespective of whether they are local 
producers or foreign manufacturers.   Thus, green energy projects in the developing world may be 
able to rely on the exemption as outline in the Canada RE FIT case of “government interventions” 
that actually “create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of 
government interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist or to correct 
distortions therein.”527  There is also concern that the decision is vague and opens the door to 
dangerous reasoning beyond the clean energy sector but may impact on other government 
initiatives.528 
 While the argument could be made that the FIT Program for green energy projects is in direct 
competition with traditional electricity, it would be sold as an alternative to traditional electricity, 
making it very difficult to establish distortion of an existing market.  Despite this reality, the threat 
of a WTO challenge still looms for investors in renewable energy projects.  This impending threat 
may pose a deterrent to nations lacking the financial means to withstand a WTO challenge.   
Developing nations may shy away from environmental policies vulnerable to WTO challenges.  
There is evidence to suggest that a nation’s legal capacity, which is connected to wealth and 
industrialization, determines its ability to commence and withstand a WTO challenge.529  WTO 
statistical data reveals an under-representation of developing nations in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
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System.  Specifically, two main theories have attempted to explain the presence of wealthier nations 
and absence of poorer nations from the Dispute Settlement System.  The first theory highlights that 
larger, richer economies have more complex trade relations and necessarily “gravitate” to the WTO 
to settle disputes.  The second explanation is that richer nations will retaliate against poorer ones 
advancing a complaint, thereby reducing the number of cases brought to the WTO by poorer nations.  
This second approach assumes that there is some level of discrimination arising from disparate legal 
capacities of larger economies litigating against smaller ones.530  These theories may help to predict 
how developing nations may react to WTO challenges regarding environmental policy initiatives like 
FIT schemes.  
 The ambiguity of the SCM Agreement and the WTO Appellate Body’s reluctance to classify 
FIT as subsidies may not be in line with international climate change goals.  In this regard, the SCM 
Agreement needs to be aligned with global climate change abatement goals.   Specifically, Article 8 
of the SCM Agreement could be reinstated in order to create certainty for renewable energy investors.  
The current standard is set by the Appellate Body’s decision in Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case, 
which offers mere policy considerations but fails to entrench the intent of non-actionable renewable 
energy subsidies into law.  A Power Purchase Agreement that contemplates fixed purchase price of 
energy per kWh higher than conventional prices may be deemed a subsidy.   In the case with Ghana, 
there are very few photovoltaic solar plants and where these plants exist, they are usually under the 
FIT Program.  As such, even if the FIT Program in developing nations is classified as a subsidy, the 
impact could be limited to local production so as to not offend other Member’s market (assuming 
that the Member does not have markets in that jurisdiction).531   
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 Further, the prohibition against government support in the SCM Agreement is counterintuitive 
to the goal of climate change abatement.  Renewable energy alternatives are far more costly to 
implement than traditional high CO2 emitting sources.532  Consequently, government support is 
always needed to encourage alternative choices and to provide incentives for developers to invest in 
costly renewable energy projects.  Thus, government support is an essential part of implementing 
these measures and has been argued to be the primary reason why environmental programs are 
initiated.533  The type of government support that is needed is not merely financial, but also 
legislative. There must be regulatory framework to facilitate renewable energy production, providing 
tax incentives and guaranteeing the rates that energy will be purchased back at.  
 
 2. Is the FIT Program Specific? 
 The second requirement for an actionable subsidy is that it limits access to “specific” groups, 
enterprises or industries, pursuant to Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.534  In the case of a FIT 
program, the subsidy would always be specific to a renewable energy sector.  Consequently, the 
second part of the test will usually be met, absent a more concrete definition of “specific”.535   This 
requirement can be interpreted, not as solely referring to a specific industrial activity, but rather to 
whether the policy is neutral and non-discriminatory.  The issue of neutrality cannot be averted where 
a government commits to a Power Purchase Agreement with a guaranteed term and fixed tariffs.  
This raises questions about how the SCM Agreement addresses not only climate change issues, but 
also policies aimed at development.  The Appellate Body’s analysis of the “specific” criterion 
                                                 
532 David Popp, Ivan Hascic, and Neelakshi Medhi, “Technology and the Diffusion of Renewable Energy” (2011) 33 
Energy Eco 648. 
533 Ibid at 649.   
534 SCM Agreement, supra note 368 at Article 2. 
535 Ibid at Article 2.1(a), 2.2 and 2.3.  
  156
highlights the need for a clear concrete law establishing a non-actionable subsidy category for green 
energy projects.  The purpose of the non-actionable subsidy exception is to allow specific subsidies 
to exist without the threat of countervailing measures.  Hence, the requirement that an actionable 
subsidy be specific is counter-intuitive to climate change abatement strategies, as green subsidies are 
by their very nature specific to addressing environmental issues.   
 The “specific” requirement gives rise to numerous paradoxes as it relates to non-actionable 
studies and the environment.  The social utility of green energy programs was also highlighted in the 
Appellate Body decision: “governments might provide monetary incentives to a few enterprises 
(specific contributions) in order for the society at large to enjoy clean air; they do not have to provide 
monetary incentives to the whole society (non-specific) to achieve this goal.”536  
The Appellate Body appears to have created policy regarding non-actionable subsidies that 
should be dealt with by means of amending the SCM Agreement.  In the Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT decision the Appellate body highlighted the need to create new environmental markets: 
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources and promoting the 
generation of electricity from renewable energy resources to ensure the sustainability of 
electricity markets in the long term.  Fossil energy  resources are exhaustible, and thus 
fossil energy needs to be replaced progressively if electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the 
long term. Government intervention in favour of the substitution of fossil energy with 
renewable energy today is meant to ensure the proper functioning or the existence of an 
electricity market with a constant and reliable supply of electricity in the long term.537 
 
The specific nature of environmental subsidies requires a clear distinction between those that distort, 
like green energy subsidies, and those that do not.  In this regard, a test needs to be developed which 
will enable adjudicators to separate the treatment of these subsidies. It would not be inconsistent with 
the SCM Agreement to call for a reinstatement of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement as the legal 
provision in support of environmental subsidies.  Beyond reviving Article 8, there is the possibility 
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that flexibilities could be created in existing treatise to accommodate environmental subsidies.  
Relaxing the GATT to contemplate green energy subsidies has been argued as more pragmatic than 
reviving Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, which may contravene the Polluter Pays Principle.538   This 
would require that subsidies be renegotiated with a new rationale where the negotiators “distinguish 
wheat from chaff,” recognizing that “subsidies can distort, as they can address distortions.”539   
The initial classification of subsidies as distorting or correcting seems to be in line with the 
original provisions in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. Essentially, non-actionable subsidies are those 
subsidies that correct a pre-existing market distortion.  Therefore, a subsidy that is non-distorting and 
also correcting, such as those intended by the FIT Programs in the developing world, are the exact 
initiative that should be protected under the non-actionable class of the SCM Agreement. The 
rationale of Article 8 of SCM Agreement was for the exact purpose of “allowing specific subsidies to 
stay in place without the risk of facing countermeasures.”540  The problem with the absence of 
flexibilities in the SCM Agreement is that there is no consideration for government policy initiatives 
aiming to promote renewable energy alternatives.  While Article 25 of the SCM Agreement requires 
Member States to file annual notification of subsidies, and to disclose the policy objectives for the 
subsidies, no provision or classification for non-actionable subsidies are provided.541 Government 
policies aimed at climate change abatement require the implementation of “specific” national green 
energy measures, which may run afoul of the SCM Agreement. 
 
 3. Does the FIT Program Have an Adverse Effect? 
 The final part of the test for determining whether action can be taken against a country for 
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supporting a FIT Program is whether the subsidy has a negative effect.  Thus, a subsidy may not be 
actionable if, although a financial contribution and specific effect exists, it is not found to have a 
negative effect.542   An “adverse effect” is defined in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement; both Articles 
5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement recognize that a subsidy may have adverse effects if it causes injury 
to the domestic industry of another Member, or displaces or impeded imports, or significantly 
undercuts prices of a like product of a Member.543   
In the Canada Renewable Energy Case/FIT case, the Panel and Appellate Body assessed 
whether the FIT Program constituted a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  The Appellate Body 
confirmed that governments may intervene in markets to encourage use of renewable energy 
alternatives “if, on the one hand, higher prices for renewable electricity have certain positive 
externalities, such as guaranteeing long-term supply and addressing environmental concerns”.544  
Similarly, it was recognized that government intervention is warranted where cheap energy products 
create a negative externality such as adverse “impact on human health and the environment”, 
resulting from fossil fuel energy emissions and nuclear waste disposal.545  Cosbey and Mavroidis 
argue that “payment to firms that create public goods is simply payment of the full benefits conferred 
by the firm’s actions – an internalization of external environmental costs.”546  This assessment 
requires redefining the “appropriate market against which to benchmark” the government 
intervention and clarifying to whom the benefit accrues.547  For example, is it solely the company 
that is granted a contract based on guaranteed FIT rates that is benefiting, or is the beneficiary the 
entire society that gains from reduced pollution?  Cosbey and Mavroidis further question whether the 
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actual recipient of a benefit is the company that creates an externality by polluting or the company 
that is internalizing the cost of pollution by receiving a subsidy?548  The issue of adverse effects 
cannot be adequately assessed without an analysis of the whole cost of production, including the cost 
borne for the externalities.   
 Similarly, the application of the adverse effect principle to environmental subsidies may also 
produce peculiar results where environmental costs are not considered.  If Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement were still effective, an adverse effect may not be found in situations where the subsidy 
was aimed at creating the public good of environmental protection or climate change abatement.  The 
issue of adverse effect is quite muddled when one includes the cost of a negative externality like high 
carbon fossil fuels as compared to low CO2 emitting renewable energy sources.  
 
C. The Reinstatement of Non-Actionable Subsidies in the SCM Agreement 
 
 Under the WTO, a subsidy must contain a financial contribution, confer a specific benefit and 
have an adverse effect to be considered “actionable.” The increase in green energy Request for 
Consultations have led some scholars to argue for the need to create applicable trade rules or, at the 
very least, modify existing ones.549  Andrew Green, in as early as 2006, advocated for the replacement 
of the non-actionable subsidy removed from the SCM Agreement with a more precise category that 
covered environmental subsidies.550  These subsidies would be directly related to environmental 
protection and would still be subject to the exception treatment in the GATT XX.551  Some scholars 
argue that the SCM Agreement should contain provisions to address various aspects of subsidies that 
are aimed at fostering a “shift toward cleaner production alternatives” and also “environmental 
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services”.552  The specific subsidies employed by FIT Programs, whether they are for the payment of 
renewable energy or the use of local content requirements, would be protected under this 
recommendation. 
 It is very likely that the FIT Programs in the ECOWAS region, and specifically countries like 
Ghana, would survive a WTO challenge by invoking the GATT chapeau clause.  Firstly, absent local 
content requirements, the program does not arbitrarily discriminate against Member States.  
Secondly, the program focuses on domestic energy and as such does not compete with an 
international energy market (in applying the “relevant market” test).  Consequently, FIT Programs 
that focus on genuine environmental goals would satisfy the exception as set out in Article XX(g) of 
the GATT, if the Member’s intent is proven purely environmental.  The intent must be justifiable 
beyond the legitimacy of the policy.  Countries like China and India, for example, that have advanced 
solar panel industries may not pass the “specific” threshold if it is found that the environmental 
policies are directly connected to the promotion of industrial policies.  As such, the environmental 
intent contained in Article XX(g) should not be disguised or altered by economic and industrial goals.   
This requirement may pose some difficulty for developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
in demonstrating that renewable energy goals are not necessarily tied to the development of an 
ancillary local industry.  The analysis of whether flexibilities in international trade agreements could 
be applied to FIT programs that promote regional development among least-developed and 
developing nations is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an issue well worth exploring.  
 There has also been some support for creating an independent agreement to govern renewable 
energy.  This agreement would set permissible subsidies in the renewable energy sector and could 
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distinguish between regional development needs through a tri-tier box system.553  The system 
advocated by Virginia Hildreth would take into consideration the uniqueness of developing nations 
and the financial challenges that they face in meeting climate change abatement goals.  Hildreth 
proposes that developing nations could fit into a different tier than, for example, a developed nation, 
“because of both the incredibly high need for low-cost energy and their limited existing energy 
infrastructure.”554  Other scholars have also argued that effective pollution control should be 
maintained through tight international laws that create an economic disincentive to pollute.555   
 Clearly, for the WTO to seriously consider environmental subsidies, two classifications need 
to emerge: the first recognizing subsidies that distort, and the second acknowledging environmental 
subsidies that correct distortions.  The WTO should set guidelines in agreements to address the real 
problem, subsidies that do not address market failures, but create trade distortions. The failure to 
distinguish between distorting and non-distorting subsidies may impede the effective implementation 
of other WTO treaty provisions aimed at addressing global public concerns like climate change.  
Moreover, a distorting effect may differ when factors such as economic development are accounted 
for.   
 Prior to the elimination of Article 8 in 1999, the GATT Council Meeting of 1999 contemplated 
the operability of the SCM Agreement.  In that document, the GATT referenced Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement and the category of “non-actionable” subsidies as relating to “research and development, 
structural adjustment assistance, and environmental protection and regional aid.”556  Therefore, at 
that time, the non-actionable subsidy category appeared to be acceptable—it may not have been 
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thought that this provision would one day be eliminated.  While it is unclear whether the framers of 
Article 8 of the SCM Agreement contemplated its future removal, it is indisputable that there still 
exists a major international treaty (the GATT) with provisions in Article XX(b) for environmental 
flexibilities.   While the GATT does not prohibit green energy initiatives, the risk of having these 
practices labeled a subsidy under the SCM Agreement remains.   What is needed is a clear provision 
within the SCM Agreement that will explicitly permit green energy projects to meet environmental 
goals and regional development objectives.   
 The WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision supports the premise that nations are 
encouraged to undertake “new” programs to create “new markets” aimed at protecting the 
environment.  This is in line with severed international treaties that recognize the goal of 
environmental protection.  Specifically, Article XX(b) of the GATT contains an exception where it 
is “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”.557  Additionally,  Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement confirmed a “non-actionable” subsidies provision similar with a goal of environmental 
protection as contained in the GATT.558  With the elimination of Article 8 from the SCM Agreement, 
environmental public policy exceptions need to rely on flexibilities contained in Agreements like  
Article XX(b)559 including a chapeau clause that protects legitimate environmental objectives within 
the context of trade.560  The chapeau clause must be used in a manner that does “not result in arbitrary 
or unjustifiable trade discrimination or serve as a disguised restriction on trade.”561  The Appellate 
Body’s definition of the environment includes “exhaustible natural resources”562 and “living 
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resources”.563 The chapeau clause permits environmental measures while prohibiting any trade 
abuses that affect environmental policies. Specifically, the chapeau clause cautions that unilateral 
trade measures “may not be used where necessary to protect human health or to promote conservation 
of natural resources, provided that the measures do not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable trade 
discrimination or serve as a disguised restriction on trade.”564   
In the United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (“United States 
– Gasoline”), the Appellate Body concluded that the chapeau clause must be applied in a manner 
treating all trade partners equally.565  With respect to the environment, the Appellate Body held that 
“clean air” amounts to an “exhaustible natural resource”.566  The application standard as set out in 
United States – Gasoline was applied in the United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products.567 In that case it was found that, regardless of the good intentions of the US 
ban on shrimp obtained with technology harmful to sea turtles, the mechanism was not equitably 
applied to all Member States. In reaching their conclusion, the Appellate Body assessed whether the 
measure was being “abused so as to frustrate or defeat the substantive rights of the appellees under 
the GATT 1994.”568  Despite the environmental concerns associated with the shrimp ban, the United 
States had applied the provision in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, failing to treat all trading 
partners the same—an environmental objective cannot save a regulation where the requirements are 
not equitably applied to trade Members.  Regardless, the Appellate Body recognized the legitimacy 
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of the environmental objective pursuant to Article XX(g) of the GATT.569 Furthermore, the United 
States Shrimp/Turtle case clarifies the concept of environmental goods in international law by 
recognizing “exhaustible natural resources” as including “living resources.”570  The Appellate Body 
emphasized that “Article XX(g) was not limited to conservation of “mineral” or “non-living” natural 
resources.”571  The United States Shrimp/Turtle case clarifies that “[w]e do not believe that 
“exhaustible” natural resources and “renewable” natural resources are mutually exclusive.”572   
The WTO Appellate Body decision in United States – Gasoline, and the United States – 
Shrimp cases reveals that a well-meaning environmental program may not be upheld if it is found to 
be discriminatory.  An application of this principle to the SCM Agreement could prompt the 
conclusion that green energy subsidies still need to avoid application “in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”573  In the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres 
case, the Appellate Body concluded that a measure should be “necessary” and minimally restrictive 
to be saved under the GATT Article XX provision.574  The Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body considered whether an “import ban” on tyres can be upheld under 
Article XX of the GATT.575  An import ban is arguably far more restrictive than a subsidy, yet the 
Appellate Body concluded that certain “environmental problems may be tackled only with a 
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures”.576  Even a cost benefit 
analysis must be cautious because the Appellate Body notes the passage of time as a requirement to 
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assess the effectiveness of some measures.577 In this regard, the Appellate Body concluded that 
“measures adopted in order to attenuate global warming and climate change” fall into the category 
of initiatives that “can only be evaluated with the benefit of time.”578  
  The problem with utilizing the chapeau clause is that, if the government initiative does not 
meet the lesser restrictive and necessary requirement as per United States Shrimp and United States 
Gasoline, the measure may be held in violation of the GATT.  Even where a measure is deemed to be 
in furtherance of a legitimate environmental goal, the Appellate Body ruled in the Canada Renewable 
Energy/FIT case that such measures cannot amount to a subsidy where there was no pre-existing 
industry.  This decision recognizes infancy industries and may legitimize a one- time subsidy.  This 
would mean that the same company utilizing a FIT Program may not be granted a Power Purchase 
Agreement guaranteeing a feed-in tariff on the second project.  Further, if a Power Purchase 
Agreement were obtained in this case, the project may not pass the adverse effect component, as it 
would no longer be a subsidy for the creation of a new market.   
The nature of feed-in tariffs is such that they are often arranged by a government enterprise 
that also regulates the industry.  These enterprises set the energy purchase price which, in the case of 
solar, may not be driven by market principles and is typically subsidized.  In the case with the Ontario 
FIT system, it was alleged that these policies were discriminatory and distorted trade.  Under Article 
XVII of the GATT, government enterprises must be non-discriminatory in their practices.579  The 
paradox exists because, while the MFN rationale guides fair trade between nations, it does not overtly 
sanction or condone non-distorting subsidies like those aimed at meeting national climate change 
abatement goals. The reluctance to entertain the issue of non-actionable subsidies in the Canada 
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Renewable energy/FIT case may be linked to the fear that if this section were reinstated, it could 
bring abuses.  Some scholars have contemplated the negative outcome of reinstating Article 8 of the 
SCM Agreement and have concluded that the provision could be built into existing trade regimes 
without “inviting misuse of the exception.”580   
The notion that WTO treaties may be modified to include environmental public policy 
considerations is not new to green energy projects.  The pharmaceutical industry also dealt with the 
issue of affordable medicines after it was found that TRIPS had an adverse effect on access to life-
saving medicines in impoverished nations.581 In the past, the WTO has made exceptions to 
international laws in order to promote public policy objectives such as affordable health care.582  As 
per Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, a WTO Member State cannot refuse to grant a patent, and 
international patents are recognized “in all fields of technology.”583 As the majority of WTO 
members were required to support TRIPS in order to ratify the legislation, multinationals were forced 
to incorporate some exceptions to Article 27(2) that would recognize countries’ right to provide 
necessary health care for their citizens.  This exception is found in Article 31 of TRIPS and is known 
as the compulsory licensing exception.584   
Under the TRIPS Agreement, nations may restrict exclusive rights and the rights to grant 
pharmaceutical patents.  This achievement on the part of multinational corporations was only 
obtained by virtue of the concession that there must be “mutual advantage of producers and users” 
of the technology as contained in Article 7 of the TRIPS.585   Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
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attempts to balance the prospect of an abuse of power by patent holders against the ability to promote 
the free trade in technology which may affect the ability to provide of the health care needs of citizens 
in developing and least-developed countries. This concern was addressed by granting developing 
nations the ability to produce their own medications, or import these drugs from another nation with 
the ability to produce them, in special circumstances under Article 30 and 31.  Arguably, if exceptions 
of this nature can be granted to deal with the global health care crises, then flexibilities may also be 
implemented to combat climate change.  
 The reinstatement of non-actionable subsidies in the SCM Agreement prompts consideration 
as to how flexibilities addressing critical societal problems should be incorporated in WTO treaties. 
Just as TRIPS flexibilities recognize the importance of patented medicines in the lives of indigent 
global citizens, the SCM Agreement should recognize the importance of “non-actionable” subsidies 
related to green energy projects.  The global environmental policy goal of addressing climate change 
can be said to be a goal that recognizes environmental subsidies aimed at offsetting the costs and 
risks of renewable energy projects.  The issue of what constitutes a subsidy is not settled; whether 
initiatives like the FIT program are actually subsidies is still in dispute when contrasted with 
externalities caused by tradition energy sources like coal, which are arguably subsidized because the 
producer does not pay the full cost of the externality.586   
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 This paper explored whether the decision in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case 
impacted Ghana’s ability (as a developing nation) to enhance and support renewable energy projects 
under the SCM Agreements. Currently, renewable energy policies that reward investments by 
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subsidizing the higher cost of green technologies, are at conflict with international laws like TRIMs, 
the SCM Agreement and the GATT.   The current state of renewable energy policy is guided largely 
by Article XX of the GATT.  Based on current WTO decisions on the issue of environmental 
subsidies, it is likely that green energy subsidies would be upheld pursuant to Article XX(b) of the 
GATT. They are supported by several WTO Appellate Body decisions as well as the flexibilities 
contained in the Paris Agreement.  However, this prediction is not based on any international 
agreement that addresses the issue of subsidies, since non-actionable subsidies are omitted from the 
SCM Agreement.   In this regard, the WTO needs to entertain a specific agreement to address the 
growing number of disputes on renewable energy and the uniqueness of objectives related to green 
energy.  In order to meet the national goals of lowering CO2 emissions, the reinstatement of 
flexibilities like SCM Agreement Article 8 may need to be reconsidered.587   COP 21 and the ensuing 
Paris Agreement references the ability to meet environmental and climate change abatement goals 
by utilizing government incentives and supports along with other forms of subsidies.  This expressed 
approval is a signal to Member-States that the SCM Agreement needs to be re-negotiated to consider 
a re-instatement of non-actionable subsidies.  WTO law needs to take into consideration the policy 
goal of climate change abatement and green subsidies as a tool to meet this objective.  
 This study found that the international law on non-actionable subsidies is muddled.  On one 
hand, the WTO Appellate Body recognizes non-actionable subsidies within the green energy sector, 
but does not go as far as approving or sanctioning them.   The lack of clarity creates uncertainty for 
countries and foreign investors in environmental projects, especially in the developing world, where 
such projects would not exist but for the infusion of foreign capital.  The WTO Appellate Body in 
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the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case laid the foundation for dialogue on the modernization of the 
WTO SCM Agreement.  However, this forum has no ability to legislate consensus.  Instead, a 
Ministerial Conference may need to be held, and a consensus obtained from the WTO Subsidies 
Committee, to consider the reinstatement of Article 8 for environmental subsidies and regional 
development objectives.   
Developed and least-developed countries can carve a green path to development.  While this 
goal will reduce the global effects of climate change, it is a costly endeavour.  FIT Programs in the 
developing world attempt to create some level of financial certainty for investors who have expended 
10s of millions on costly green energy projects.  Without some assurance that these projects will not 
be a target of WTO challenges, foreign investors will be reluctant to invest in developing nations.  
The end result is that these countries will be forced to adopt the cheaper, carbon intensive method of 
burning fossil fuels to achieve regional development.  This outcome in contrary to the regional 
development and environmental goals in Articles XX(b) of the GATT.   
 The WTO Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case has resulted in the WTO deciding the future 
of non-actionable environmental subsidies, rather than it being addressed by the SCM Agreement.  
The notion that green energy subsidies should be incorporated in an international agreement that 
deals with the issue is not novel, but evokes reluctance on the part of some WTO Members.  The 
reality is that, even without a concrete agreement governing international trade within the energy 
sector, government subsidies in the energy sector will continue to influence foreign investments, 
especially in the developing world.  The paradox is that, while fossil fuel subsidies (that is the failure 
to account for environmental externalities in the cost of the fuel) evade WTO scrutiny, renewable 
energy subsidies are under attack.   
 The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case recognizes that environmental subsidies, like those 
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contained in FIT schemes, may be necessary to meet national climate change abatement goals.  
Despite this recognition, there are no international agreements that expressly address the issue of 
renewable energy and green technologies.  The current international trade environment leaves the 
application of FIT Programs to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to interpret the legitimacy of these 
programs on a case-by-case basis. The current process is most disadvantageous to developing nations 
which rely on foreign investments to develop infancy industries like renewable energy.  Without 
clear policy on which measures may be actionable as subsidies, foreign investors may shy away from 
costly projects like solar photovoltaic plants, and the presence of a FIT that is mired in uncertainty 
may not allay precarious investment concerns.  The WTO Members need to debate the serious issue 
of environmental subsidies and set clear guidelines as to how they are to be incorporated and 
addressed by the primary Agreement that deals with the issue of subsidies.  It is paradoxical that the 
SCM Agreement does not address the issue of environmental subsidies, especially at a time when the 
WTO was called upon to essentially overstep its function by crafting policies on the matter.  The 
Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decisions are ambiguous on the issue of the legitimacy of FIT 
subsidies because there are no existing rules within the SCM Agreement to guide decisions on non-
actionable subsidies. This approach does not lend certainty when the Dispute Settlement Body is 
bestowed with the dual task of setting and applying policy.   However, it is unclear whether these 
subsidy provisions, as espoused in the Canada Renewable Energy/FIT decision, will make their way 
into multilateral trade negotiations and agreements.  The issue is not whether non-actionable 
subsidies should exist, but rather the need to clarify whether national climate change abatement 
targets will be subject to complaints by other Members.  The precarious climate created by the 
absence of green energy issues from the WTO Agreements puts the legitimacy of the SCM Agreement 
into question when it abdicates that which it was enacted to govern. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as an Impediment to 
Green Technology Transfer to the Developing World 
(2018) 18 Asper Review of International Business and Trade 23 
L E S L Y N  L E W I S   
 
ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property law was constructed to facilitate innovation and development by granting a 
limited monopoly in exchange for the public’s right to use an invention after the period of exclusivity 
expires. The trade-off of granting intellectual property protections in reward for the investment in an 
invention is intended to be a temporary benefit. Trade secrets have been thought of as the weakest 
form of intellectual property, because non-disclosure is the only form of protection. In other words, 
infringement of a trade secret occurs upon the unauthorized disclosure of the secret. However, absent 
reverse engineering and/or legitimate disclosure, protection over trade secrets may arguably extend 
the exclusivity rights in perpetuity. The debate on “evergreening” has focused largely on extending 
the life cycle of pharmaceutical patents to the omission of other forms of intellectual property, like 
trade secrets. The concept has also been widely ignored in relation to climate change abatement 
technologies. In this regard, considerations around evergreening and trade secrets have been 
substantially neglected. The loophole in international intellectual property treaties, like Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), may lead to inequalities between industrial 
nations and developing ones, especially for products like photovoltaic solar panels that rely heavily 
on trade-secret protection. In addition, this non-disclosure may also impact on green technology 
transfer and may impede climate change abatement strategies in the developing world. This paper 
will explore the practice of evergreening as it relates to the prospect that trade secret protection may 
extend beyond the 20-year limit, as prescribed in TRIPS, and the implications of this practice for 
developing countries that seek to meet climate change commitments as outlined in the 2016 Paris 
Climate Change Agreement (the “Paris Agreement”). Arguably, the absence of a fixed statutory 
period for trade secrets may enable patent owners to participate in creative ways to “evergreen” their 
products or processes, with the result of extending the life-cycle. The practice of evergreening 
through trade secrets may have a negative impact on the ability of developing nations to meet their 
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national climate change objectives. Specifically, international treaties like TRIPS, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (“GATT”), the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (the “UNFCCC”), and the Paris Agreement, have attempted to incorporate climate 
change flexibilities that assist developing countries in meeting their climate change goals. The 
efficacy of technology transfer provisions in international law will be examined within the context 
of how the lack of a fixed term for trade secrets impacts on actual green technology transfer. It will 
canvass whether trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies acts as an inadvertent barrier 
to technology transfer within the developing world. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a global phenomenon that creates new legal and practical challenges. One such 
issue is the costliness of climate abatement technologies and the problems that intellectual property 
protection poses in exacerbating inequities between industrialized and developing nations. It has been 
argued that these intellectual property systems often prefer the interests of industrialized nations over 
developing ones.588 Specifically, developing nations have been asked to adopt stricter environmental 
standards than were present during industrial growth of western nations, such as the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Japan. Some scholars have referenced this environmental “burden” as a form 
of environmental imperialism that aims to further impoverish nations where the inhabitants are 
predominantly people of colour.589 The imposition of strict environmental standards have been said 
to be a means of imperialistic control over these countries’ development path.590 One instrument of 
control that has been used, and has arguably increased the cost of development, is intellectual 
property protection. While a number of studies have focussed on the role that patents play in 
development, the concentration on trade secrets has been sparing. The question of whether trade 
secrets should be given a fixed term of protection like other forms of intellectual property still remains 
unanswered. Essentially, while other forms of intellectual property such as patents enjoy a 20-year 
                                                 
588 Cameron Hutchinson, “Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing 
Countries” (2006) 3 U Ottawa L & Tech J 517. 
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exclusivity period, trade secrets are not subject to any such fixed terms. Instead, a trade secret is lost 
through disclosure, reverse engineering, appropriation (usually from a breach of a commercial or 
employment contract, or misappropriation). Absent these elements a trade secret can remain 
protected intellectual property in perpetuity. This paper will explore trade secrets within the context 
of “evergreening” and query whether the lack of fixed-term periods for trade secrets is justifiable in 
light of global climate change mitigation and adaptation goals. 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first portion of the paper addresses the absence of a 
fixed statutory period for trade secrets both in the international law and under Canadian and American 
common law. The second portion of the paper addresses the impact of the lack of a fixed statutory 
period for trade secrets on commercial practices and argues that the practice of “evergreening” is 
enabled by the lack of a fixed term. The final section of this paper addresses the impact of the practice 
of evergreening through trade secrets on the developing world’s ability to choose a sustainable path 
of development.  
Arguably, the potential to maintain a trade secret for an indefinite period may have a negative 
impact on the transfer of green technologies like solar panels to the developing world. Furthermore, 
the absence of a fixed statutory period in trade secrets may have a chilling effect on national climate 
change abatement strategies, especially in emerging economies. In this regard, this paper queries 
whether trade secrets of green technologies can be interpreted as “evergreening” through product 
life-extension strategies. It recognizes the importance of intellectual property rights and explores 
whether the current state of the law on trade secrets (i.e. the lack of fixed terms) is justifiable within 
the context of TRIPS. 
The paper draws upon the example of photovoltaic (PV) solar panel technology and examines 
the practice of enhancements used by industries after a patent has already been granted. It queries 
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whether the practice of technology owners legally modifying their products through trade secret 
enhancements, which extend beyond the 20-year limitation period, is a form of evergreening 
negatively impacting green technology transfer to the developing world. If trade secrets are 
maintained beyond the standard 20-year period, this may have a negative impact on innovation and 
development, especially in developing regions.  
There are three main ways that a trade secret can be lost: disclosure (direct or inadvertent), reverse 
engineering, or misappropriation. In the latter case, the court has ruled that misappropriation is 
prohibited and the violator is forever enjoined from benefitting from the misappropriated 
information. The rights to a trade secret may be statutorily based or arise from a contractual right to 
keep the particular secret. However, cases involving employee disclosure, or breaches of contract, 
may see to the general prohibition of using trade secrets for a fixed utility period, unlike those secrets 
based on a statutory right of secrecy. Therefore, if there is no disclosure, reverse engineering or 
misappropriation (by breach of contract), then a trade secret has the potential of remaining a secret 
in perpetuity. Cases where injunctions have been ordered to remedy misappropriation that is achieved 
through some aspect of criminality (as distinguished from mere breach of contract) are especially 
instructive in highlighting the possibility for a trade secret to last for an indefinite period of time. 
Consequently, this paper is primarily concerned with the inability to legislate a 20-year fixed 
statutory term for a trade secret and the courts treatment of trade secret cases involving criminality 
(where a permanent injunction is granted). In this regard, the claim of perpetuity does not relate to 
situations involving a mere civil breach of contract, voluntary or involuntary disclosure, or other 
breach of contract situations. Therefore, absent a breach of contract, should trade secrets be subject 
to fixed statutory periods similar to other intellectual property rights? Additionally, does the absence 
of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets impact the ability of developing nations to meet their 
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global climate change obligations under international agreements, like the Paris Agreement? In this 
regard, the utility of trade secrets are inherently recognized, however, it will be argued in this paper 
that the current system of not having statutory fixed terms for trade secrets is arguably unjustifiable, 
especially in light of universal intellectual property regimes like TRIPS and global climate change 
commitments like the Paris Agreement. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF TRADE SECRETS AND EVERGREENING 
Balancing intellectual property rights and issues of public interest gives rise to complex legal, 
financial, and regulatory arrangements, often involving local and international agreements.591 
Similarly, while much debate has been raised over the impact of environmental standards and 
intellectual property rights (like patents) on the developing world, very little scholarly debate has 
surfaced around the impact of practices that extend a technology’s intellectual property life cycle. 
When one explores the commitments concerning technology transfer and its importance to the 
developing world, made in international treaties like TRIPS, GATT, and the Kyoto Protocol, questions 
arise about whether there are impediments to achieving these goals within international intellectual 
property rights treaties.592 Specifically, the practice of evergreening and its impact on environmental 
protection has not received wide scholarly attention. When one considers the balance that is often 
struck between the disclosure of a patent in exchange for a fixed period of exclusive rights, it 
                                                 
591 Adam B Jaffe et al, “Energy-efficient Technologies and Climate Change Policies: Issues and Evidence” (1999) 19 
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592 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
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confounds why more scholarly debate is not focused on the social impact of practices that extend 
these rights, especially in the context of public goods and climate change abatement. 
Patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets are the four main areas of intellectual 
property.593 The domain of trade secrets is unique, as it is the only area that does not have fixed 
statutory terms. In addition, the case law on trade secrets does not stipulate a minimum or maximum 
amount of time that a trade secret may last, that is, if the owner continues to maintain its secrecy. 
Cases where injunctions have been ordered to remedy misappropriation are especially instructive in 
highlighting the possibility for a trade secret to last for an indefinite period of time. 
A. THE STATUTORY TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Prior to the United States advocating for international intellectual property laws that mirror their 
jurisdictional rights, there was “no mention of trade secrets in any multilateral or bilateral 
agreements.”594 In fact, any attempt to regulate trade secrets would negate the very essence of the 
practice which relies on keeping information confidential as the only means of protection. With the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations TRIPS enshrined traded secrets in Article 39, with a specific focus 
on commercial practices under Article 39.2. Article 39 of TRIPS attempts to balance intellectual 
property rights and prevent against unfair competition. Article 39.2 of TRIPS recognizes a trade secret 
within the realm of “honest commercial practices”, so long as the information: 
(a) is secret… 
 (b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in 
control of the information, to keep it secret.595 
                                                 
593 Robert A Choate & William H Francis, Cases and Materials on Patent Law; Also Including Trade Secrets, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, 2nd ed (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Company, 1981) at 5. 
594 Sharon K Sandeen, “The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement and the Uniform Trade 
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Consequently, information that has already been disclosed (“prior art”) is not subject to any form 
of intellectual property protection under trade secrets or patents.  
Scholars like Sharon Sandeen have argued that the enshrinement of Article 39(2) in TRIPS is 
“modeled after the definition of “trade secret” that is contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA)”.596 Sandeen argues that U.S. industrial leaders “advocated for an international system for 
the protection of international property rights (“IPRs”) that was based upon the laws of the United 
States.”597  
The traditional grant of a limited monopoly for intellectual property does not apply to trade 
secrets. In fact, the law aids and abets the holder of a trade secret to keep it secret for as long as 
possible and disclosure nullifies its protection. In other words, an obligation to utilize trade secret 
protection requires non-disclosure and secrecy, and laws in various jurisdictions reference the rights 
that a holder of a secret have under the law. 
In international law, a requirement of a trade secret under Article 39(c) of TRIPS is that it must 
be shown that the owner of the secret took “reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”598 Moreover, unlike all other forms of 
intellectual property including trademarks, copyrights and patents, no one common law jurisdiction 
or American jurisprudence sets limits to how long the holder of a trade secret has before that 
knowledge must be placed in the public domain. The ability to hold a trade secret in perpetuity has 
not been statutorily or judicially prohibited. The argument may exist that trade secrets are then 
counterintuitive to the public policy principle adopted in patents that requires eventual disclosure to 
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foster innovation. However, in the US, the courts have ruled that limitless trade secret protection and 
fixed term patent protection are not incompatible.599  
Some scholars have identified that patent terms could correspond with research and development 
expenditures, thus giving short terms to enhancements.600 In “The Role of Patent Protection in 
(Clean/Green) Technology Transfer”, Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmer highlight the problem of 
enhancements, which are often protected as trade-secrets:  
A large range of different technologies can achieve emission reductions, and for a significant 
share of these technologies, the underlying technology is mature and in the public domain. 
Most technological progress is expected to come from incremental improvements of existing 
off-patent technologies. While such incremental innovation may be patentable, it leaves 
ample scope for competing technologies and therefore limits the role specific patents may 
play for technological progress in this area.601 
This issue of limiting or fixing terms has not been substantially explored within the context of 
international agreements on technology transfer, and more specifically, the impact on the 
evergreening of intellectual property that affects global environmental abatement initiatives.  
 
1. Evergreening in International IP Law and its Impact on Global Climate Change Goals 
Evergreening is technically, but not expressly, prohibited under several World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) treaties. The general understanding is that industrialized nations should not 
erect any impediments to economic growth for developing nations. This affirmation includes an 
obligation to assist through transferring technologies to these growing regions. The role of 
international treaties like TRIPS, GATT, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, in facilitating 
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fair trade practices that encourage economic growth of all WTO Members, cannot be understated. A 
number of international agreements contemplate the necessity of developed nations to assist 
developing nations in meeting their environmental goals. Specifically, Article 4.5 of the Kyoto 
Protocol highlights the need for developed countries to “take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention.”602 Articles 10(c) and 12 of the Protocol encourage technology 
transfer by focussing on creating an “enabling environment”603 that assists developing nations in their 
goal of sustainable development while “achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments.”604 Even with the support of the UNFCCC, programs are 
sometimes implemented with disparate outcomes. For example, the well-intended Clean 
Development Mechanisms (“CDM”s) under the Protocol allow polluters in developed countries to 
claim certified emissions reduction credits from green investments in developing countries, resulting 
in only a few developing nations being beneficiaries of this initiative (Brazil, India, China and 
Mexico). To demonstrate this, of the 7,828 CDM projects in 2015, only 2.51% were in Africa.605 The 
Paris Agreement attempts to balance mitigation and adaptation measures with the local development 
needs by its commitment to reduce “vulnerability to climate change”,606 particularly the conditions 
experienced by developing nations who are facing “the adverse effects of climate change.”607 
Commitments in the Paris Agreement also recognize “a country-driven, gender-responsive, 
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participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, 
communities and ecosystems”608 that include “traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous 
peoples and local knowledge systems” in the decision making process.609 
The main body that regulates trade and intellectual property is the WTO which was created in 
1995 after eight years of negotiations, beginning in September of 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
and ending in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994. On January 1, 1995 the TRIPS Agreement 
came into effect with the aim of harmonizing global intellectual property protection. TRIPS is 
administered through the WTO TRIPS Council which holds annual Members’ meetings. In 2001 the 
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference created the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology 
(“WGTTT”).610 Since its creation, the Working Group meets on average 4 times per year and submits 
annual reports to the General Council on the success of technology transfer under Article 66.2 of 
TRIPS.611 UNFCCC was created in 1994 and the Kyoto Protocol enshrined in 2005.612 Article 4.1(c) 
of the Convention underscores the importance of environmentally sound technology transfer and 
Article 4.5 references the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies and the goals of climate 
change mitigation. Specifically, Article 4.5 encourages developed countries to “take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally 
sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly developing country parties to enable 
them to implement the provisions of the Convention.”613 The UNFCCC report identified a number 
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of barriers to the transfer of green technology to the developing world, including institutional, 
political, technological, economic and informational.614 
The role of the private sector in facilitating technology transfer is also captured in Article 10(c) 
of the Kyoto Protocol which promotes removing any legal, administrative and regulatory barriers to 
“create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer.”615 Despite the 
perceived failure of Kyoto, the Protocol was a signal from the international community that the issue 
of increasing carbon dioxide emissions would be compounded with the growth of developing 
economies. Three years after adoption, a conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, with the aim of 
creating a climate change treaty.616 
While the Kyoto Protocol creates a mechanism for technology transfer, there are no affirmative, 
proscriptive measures that a developing country could rely on in order to access environmentally 
sound technology.  
2. TRIPS and Technology Transfer 
In 2003 the WGTTT reaffirmed the positive obligation of developed nations to assist in 
technology transfer by incorporating the requirement under Article 66.2 to submit detailed annual 
reports.617 This reporting requirement, while creating positive obligations under Article 66.2, the 
mechanisms to facilitate and monitor its successful implementation have not been put into effect. 
Unlike TRIPS and the minimum standards for intellectual property, the technology transfer provision 
sets no fixed level that WTO Members must implement or engage in order to comply with Article 
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(September 2002) at 25–27, online: <iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf>. 
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66.2. The “public good” associated with climate change abatement increases the obligation for 
technology transfer. The problem arises because Article 66.2 is obligatory and would require 
mechanisms to support and monitor its effective implementation. Another problem with international 
treaties relating to technology transfer is that these agreements, while they address minimum 
standards, they fail to set enforceable practice directions for patent abuses like evergreening that may 
hinder technological progress and advancement.  
Economic development and the commitment to transfer technology must consider green 
technologies as a tool to abate climate change while simultaneously assisting with the development 
of a nation. TRIPS also attempts to balance the inequality that would result from least developed 
countries requirement to adhere to patents where their economies were technologically delayed. The 
concessionary Article 66.2 attempted to create a legal obligation for developed countries to assist in 
the technological development of LDC through technology transfer. Article 66.2 reads as follows: 
 Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and  institutions 
 in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least 
developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological 
base.618 
Recognizing the disadvantage that costly patents may render to developing and least-developed 
countries, TRIPS attempts to address this inequality by creating a legal obligation for developed 
countries to engage in technology transfer with least-developed countries. Accordingly, Article 66.2 
recognizes that developed countries need to provide incentives for technology transfer to developing 
nations.619 Technically, Member States can also label certain practices including evergreening as 
anti-competitive under Article 40 of TRIPS as a means to “prevent and control” such activities that 
may have an “adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”620 Article 40.2 has been 
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criticized for being too general and not explicitly addressing how to minimize such abuses. Correa 
addresses shortcomings within Article 40 by highlighting the fact that “[i]nstead, while expressly 
allowing Members to adopt measures to control or prevent such practices, it takes pains to establish 
limits to national action in this field.”621 Thus, the issue of whether term extensions should even apply 
to clean technologies in the area of patents is still unsettled. The issue is even more complex when 
one considers that trade secrets have no fixed IP term and as such, there is limited discussion about 
trade secrets that extend beyond 20 years. Even without this clarification, however, developing 
nations still call for the temporary removal of licenses on environmentally-sound technologies to 
abate the effects of climate change.622 Other measures proposed by developing countries include 
patent pooling, royalty-free compulsory licensing of green technology, and the revoking of patent 
rights on existing green patents.623 It should be noted that even if developing nations succeed in 
labelling such practices as anti-competitive, there is still no mechanism for imposing penalties on 
Member States engaging in such practices. 
The issue of technology transfer is addressed under Article XX of the GATT, as well as Articles 
7, 8, 40 and 66.2 of TRIPS. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) has heard five cases 
pertaining to the General Exceptions provision under Article XX of the GATT, one case under Article 
7 and a companion case under Article 8 of TRIPS, while no cases have been brought forth under 
Articles 40 or 66.2 of TRIPS.624 While Article 66.2 of TRIPS is most directly related to the issue of 
                                                 
621 Carlos M Correa, “Can TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?” in Keith E Maskus 
& Jerome H Reichman, eds, International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology: Under A Globalized Intellectual 
Property Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 237. 
622 Jason R Weiner, “Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as a Legal and Economic 
Modality for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology” (2006) 18:2 Geo Intl Envtl L Rev 277. 
623 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperation Action under the Convention on its eighth session, 
held in Copenhagen from 7 to 15 December 2009, UNFCCCOR, 2010, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17, online: 
<unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/17.pdf>. 
624 See “Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” 
(1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401, online: 
<wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26>. 
  184
technology transfer, the absence of request for consultations hinders any meaningful assessment of 
how this provision could be implemented in international law. The issue of whether a generic 
manufacturer can stockpile a product prior to the expiry of a patent was considered by the DSB in 
DS114. The decision may be instructive in assessing the scope of TRIPS exceptions under Article 30 
as they relate to various aspects of evergreening. The DSU case of Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products (DS114) (“Canada Pharmaceutical Case”)625 addressed the prospect of 
generic manufacturers stockpiling products six months prior to patent expiry. 
The Canada Pharmaceutical Case differs from the subject matter herein, because it related to the 
challenge of Article 28 (during the life of a patent), which is not relevant to the issue of evergreening 
(which deals with the extension of the product’s exclusivity period). In addition, Canada is an 
industrialized nation and its invocation of the Article 30 exception would be on entirely different 
grounds than that of a developing nation. The challenge in the Canada Pharmaceutical Case 
pertained to section 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act, specifically, the regulatory review process 
that allowed generic manufacturers to stockpile products in contravention of Article 28 of TRIPS 
which conferred exclusive rights on patent holders. While Canada agreed that the stockpiling 
provision violated Article 28.1 of TRIPS, it argued that the measure could be justified under the 
Article 30 exception. The Panel found that the measure could not be justified because there were no 
limits on the quantity of product produced for stockpiling and as such constituted a “substantial 
curtailment of the exclusionary rights” granted by Article 28.1.626  
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While this case addresses the issue of how an exception to the non-discrimination provision in 
TRIPS arose, it is not entirely analogous to the issue of trade secrets addressed herein, which is 
primarily concerned with the intellectual property protection conferred without a fixed period 
regarding when those exclusive rights will expire. In the Canadian Pharmaceutical Case, the issue 
pertained to the infringement of rights, via stockpiling, during the period of exclusivity (prior to 
patent expiry). While the fact that there is no fixed expiry term for trade secrets makes the application 
of this case difficult within a general context, the Panel’s decision that the European Union failed to 
demonstrate that the Canadian regulatory review provision was discriminatory under Article 27.1, is 
somewhat supportive of the principle that Member States may enact laws that promote the 
development of their local economies once they are non-discriminatory pursuant to Article 30. In this 
regard, the Canada Pharmaceutical Case decision supports the principle of Article 8 once the 
measure or exception meets the minimum tripartite requirements of 1) being limited, 2) it does not 
“unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent”, and 3) it does not “unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner”.627 These requirements also take into 
consideration the “legitimate interests” of third parties. Article 7 (promotion of technological 
innovation and transfer) and Article 8 (promotion of public health and unreasonable restraint on 
trade) were not invoked by Canada, which is an industrialized nation, but could potentially be relied 
upon in future disputes involving developing nations within the context of the Article 30 exception. 
The issue of technology transfer is also directly linked to the promotion of social and economic 
welfare as contained in Article 7 of TRIPS. This provision recognizes that the promotion of 
intellectual rights “should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology.”628 Article 8 of TRIPS also upholds each Member State’s right to 
                                                 
627 TRIPS, supra note 592, art 30. 
628 Ibid, art 7. 
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protect the public’s interests and this would arguably include alleged intellectual property abuses 
such as evergreening. Article 8 recognizes the right of Member States to “adopt measures necessary 
to protect and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development”. In addition, Members are encouraged to adopt measures that are 
“consistent” with TRIPS and to “prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or 
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology”.629 Thus, practices such as evergreening may be viewed by some Member States as 
not being in the public interest and consequently inconsistent “with the provisions” of TRIPS. Article 
8 could therefore be used to challenge practices such as evergreening that could negatively impact 
on green technology transfer. A total of two related cases (DS408 and DS409) have been brought 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body under Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. In DS408 “European 
Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit”, India initiated a request for 
consultation with the European Union and the Netherlands, alleging that the two countries were 
repeatedly seizing their generic drugs that were on route to third party countries through ports and 
airports in the Netherlands. On May 28, 2010 Brazil, Canada and Ecuador requested to join the 
consultations and were followed on May 31, 2010 by China, Japan and Turkey.630 The consultations 
have not been concluded to date and no determination has been reached. It is unclear whether aspects 
of Article 7 referencing the “mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge” 
will be advanced, or if the consultations will focus more on Article 8 and the right of members to 
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health.”631 
                                                 
629 Ibid, art 8. 
630 European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Complaint by India) (2010), WTO Doc 
WT/DS408/1–8, online: <wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm>; European Union and a Member 
State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Complaint by Brazil) (2010), WTO Doc WT/DS409/1–8, online: 
<wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm>.  
631 TRIPS, supra note 592, arts 7–8. 
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3.  The GATT and Technology Transfer 
The GATT contains perhaps one of the strongest provisions for implementing trade exceptions 
relating to environmental protection. Article XX of the GATT contains a chapeau provision that could 
potentially facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technology to the developing world. A 
total of five Requests of Consultations were considered under Article XX of the GATT by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body.632 These five cases largely addressed food issues related to livestock and 
shrimp importation. Moreover, these cases did not consider patents or more specifically, trade secrets. 
Despite the lack of direct connection to the subject matter of trade secrets, these cases may be 
instructive in understanding how exceptions that pertain to the environment and technological 
advancement may be addressed by the WTO. 
On October 8, 1996, a request for consultation was initiated by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
China against the United States regarding the US’ ban on the importation of shrimp products from 
these countries. The complainants alleged that the shrimp ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of 
the GATT. It was also alleged that the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT could not be used to justify 
this inconsistency. The panel found that the shrimp ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the 
GATT and could not be justified under Article XX of the GATT. The Appellate Body reversed the 
panel’s decision and essentially concluded that the shrimp ban was within the scope of measures 
permitted by the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, but that the US measures did not meet the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. The Appellate Body found that in spite of this failure, 
the US qualified for provisional justifications under Article XX(g) of the GATT. Consequently, 
Article XX(g) of the GATT may be used to justify conservation measures, even where those practices 
conflict with a Member’s obligations under the GATT. This decision raises concerns about whether 
                                                 
632 GATT, supra note 592, art XX. 
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Article XX(g) could be used to support climate change abatement strategies that may be initially 
deemed inconsistent with international trade obligations. 
B. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS (CANADA AND THE U.S.)  
It has long been established in Anglo-American jurisprudence that the main quality of a trade 
secret is the confidence that one party holds about the particular secret that enhances trade or provides 
a competitive advantage.633 As such, the proprietary nature is not contained in the main feature of 
this intellectual property per se, but is instead the non-disclosure of the trade secret.634 Therefore, the 
protection of a trade secret traditionally only lasts as long as the trade remains a secret.635 The 
problem of secrecy is inherently connected to the uncertainty that exists regarding how long trade 
secret protection lasts. While all forms of intellectual property other than trade secrets provide for 
fixed statutory term limits, trade secrets have no such provision and have been determined largely by 
case law involving injunctions. In cases where the trade secret remains secret, an injunction may 
protect the duration of the secret, which may persist in perpetuity.636 Most countries indirectly 
provide protection for trade secrets in their federal or state/provincial laws by combining a number 
of areas of law including tort law (trespass)637 and contract law (theories of breach of confidence638 
                                                 
633 E I Du Pont de Nemours Power Co v Massland, 244 US 100 (1917) [Massland]. 
634 Ibid at 102 (where Holmes J commented, in obiter, that the fact that something may be property is separate from 
whether it may be protected as in the case with a “valuable secret” or where facts are obtained “through a special 
confidence”. 
635 US Restatement of Torts §757 (1939). 
636 E J Khan, The Big Drink: The Story of Coca-Cola (New York: Random House, 1960). 
637 The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that negligence claims must be derived from independent and actionable 
wrongs, separate from contractual relationships; see J Nunes Diamonds Ltd v Dominion Electric Protection Co, [1972] 
SCR 769 at 777–778, 26 DLR (3d) 699 at 727–728. 
638 Canadian and American case law has generally followed the decision in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd, [1968] 
FSR 415 at 415, [1969] RPC 41 (Ch) [Coco cited to FSR]. For a general overview of the principle of breach of confidence 
in Coco, see page 425, whereat it was concluded that courts “…must be ready to make those implications upon which 
the sane and fair conduct of business is likely to depend”); see also P North, “Breach of Confidence: Is There a New 
Tort?” (1972) 12 J Soc'y Pub Teachers L 149. 
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that are founded in equity,639 unfair competition,640 which has been classified also as a tort of 
conversion,641 and unjust enrichment),642 criminal law,643 and the most robustly litigated area of 
employee/employer law and fiduciary obligations emanating there from.644 In this regard, the 
accidental loss of a trade secret (absent misappropriation or breach of contract) will not be 
protected.645 Similarly, trade secrets that are lost by reverse engineering are also not protected.646 
The lack of uniformity in trade secret law has led to disaccorded judicial outcomes,647 not only 
in commonwealth nations,648 but also under American jurisprudence. The main jurisprudence in trade 
                                                 
639 Woodhouse J found that claims, in equity, of breach of confidence can be pursued independently from contract and 
tort claims; see Consolidated Ltd v European Strength Food Co Pty Ltd, [1978] 2 NZLR 515 (CA) at 520; see also 
Consolidated Textiles Ltd v Central Dynamics Ltd (1974), 18 CPR (2d) 1 at 11–13, [1974] 2 FC 814 at 827–829 (TD). 
640 This cause of action is usually attached to nondisclosure agreements (NDA), non-compete agreements (NCA), non-
solicitation or non-circumvention agreements, or breach of licensing agreements; see Atlantic Business Interiors Ltd v 
Hipson et al, 2005 NSCA 16 at para 38, 230 NSR (2d). See e.g. South African cases on unfair competition: Prok Africa 
(Pty) Ltd. v NTH (Pty) Ltd, [1980] 3 SALR 687 at 697. 
641 MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd, [1977] 2 SCR 134, 22 CPR (2d) 1, 66 DLR (3d) 1 at 13. 
642 There is a general principle at common law, articulated by Lord Denning in Seager v Copydex Ltd, [1967] 1 WLR 
923 (CA) at 931, that “…he who received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it.” See e.g. the 
predecessor cases of Canada and the US: Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd, [1943] AC 
32 HL at 61; Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co of Canada, [1954] 3 DLR 785 at 788, [1954] SCR 725. 
643 F Kaufman, “Industrial Espionage and the Criminal Law: in Studies in Criminal Law Procedure (Toronto: Canada 
Law Book Ltd, 1972) 101. 
644 Jennifer Brant & Sebastian Lohse, “Trade Secrets: Tools for Innovation and Collaboration” (2014), International 
Chamber of Commerce, Innovation and Intellectual Property Series, at 7; see also M A Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues 
of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” (2008) 61 Stan L Rev 311; Griffin M Barnett, “Combatting Trade Secret Theft 
By Foreign State-Owned Entities: An International Law Approach” (2015) 5:2 J Intl and Comparative L 46; World 
Intellectual Property Organization, “What is a Trade Secret?”, online: 
<wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm> [WIPO, Trade Secret?]; for fiduciary-employee 
relations, see P Y Atkinson and R A Spence, “Fiduciary Duties Owed by Departing Employees – The Emerging 
‘Unfairness Principle’” (1984) 8:4 Can Bus LJ 501; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler, [1986] 3 WLR 288, [1986] 1 All 
ER 617 at 731 (for the principle that all information of a confidential nature can bind employees in post-employment 
covenants); see Gates Rubber Company v Bando Chemical Industries Ltd et al, 9 F (3d) 823 at 848 (10th Cir 1993), for 
the principle that a breach of confidentiality in trade secret cases provides an additional element over copyrights which 
“qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of action from claims for copyright infringement that are based solely 
on copying.” 
645 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Trade Secret Act (1989), online: <ulcc.ca/en/home/537-josetta-1-en-
gb/uniform-actsa/trade-secrets-act/730-uniform-trade-secrets-act-1989> [Uniform Trade Secret Act]. 
646 Ibid, s 6.2. 
647 See Greenberg v Croydon Plastics Co, 378 F Supp 806 (ED Pa 1974) at 812, where it was admitted that the “concept 
of a trade secret is extraordinarily difficult to define.” Note that prior to 1989 in Canada, there was no precise definition 
of a trade secret, and Canadian courts largely relied upon the now repealed section 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act by 
applying a standard which prohibited conduct “contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage in Canada.” See Trade-
Mark Act, RSC 1985, c T–13, s 7(e), which was repealed in 2014. For an analogous statute which is similar to the current 
treatment of trade secrets in Canada, see Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 ULA 537, 541 (1985). 
648 HG Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1972); S Ricketson 
“Confidential Information – A New Proprietary Interest? Part I” (1977) 11 Melbourne UL Rev 223; W R Cornish 
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secret law has been concentrated in the area of breach of confidentiality arising from employment 
obligations.649 In the United States, the divergent theories and legal outcomes on trade secret 
litigation that arose from the application of the US Restatement of Torts §757.650 The US Restatement 
of Torts §757 (1939) defines trade secrets in the following way: 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information 
which is used in one’s business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage 
over competitors who do not know or use it.651 
The judicial definitions of trade secrets and its legal applications have led to immense 
disagreement in the area of trade secret law and has been said to raise “more questions than it 
answers.”652 It has also been found that the operational definition is also unclear and consists “of 
little more than an enumeration of the factors which courts utilize in deciding what kinds of 
information are protectable trade secrets.”653 The uncertainty that arose from a common-law 
interpretation of the US Restatement of Torts eventually led to a codification of federal and state level 
common-law trade secret decisions into the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.654 The reality of trade secret 
law around the globe is no different than in Canada where there is also no singular statutory protection 
for undisclosed commercial information.655 
                                                 
“Protection of Confidential Information in English Law” (1975) 6 Intl Rev Industrial Property and Copyright L 43; David 
Vaver “Civil Liabilities for Taking or Using Trade Secrets in Canada” (1981) 5 Can Bus LJ 253. 
649 The common law has, on public policy ground, frowned upon contracts that restrict employee mobility; see Nordenfelt 
v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd (1984), [1894] AC 535 (HL). 
650 US Restatement of Torts, supra note 635; see also a number of secondary sources: R M Milgrim, Trade Secrets (New 
York: Matthew Bender, 1978); Aaron N Wise, Trade Secrets & Know-How Throughout the World (New York: Clark 
Boardman, 1974); R Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, 3rd ed (Illinois: Callaghan, 
1969).  
651 Ibid, US Restatement of Torts at §757. Note: Comment B of the Restatement of Torts admits to the difficulty that 
arises in defining a trade secret and adds that an “exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.” 
652 Robert A Spanner, Who Owns Innovation, 1st ed (Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1984) at 7. 
653 Ibid. 
654 Uniform Trade Secret Act, supra note 645; Richard F Dole Jr, “Permanent Injunctive Relief for Trade Secret 
Misappropriation Without an Express Limit upon Its Duration: The Uniform Trade Secret Act Reconsidered” (2011) 17 
BUJ Sci & Tech L 173. 
655 Alberta Law Reform Institute, “Trade Secrets Report No 46” (1986), online: <alri.ualberta.ca/docs/fr046.pdf>; John 
T Ramsay and François Grenier, Trade Secrets Throughout the World, Canada (Toronto: Thomson/West, 2005); James 
D Kokonis, “Confidential Information” in Gordon F Henderson et al, eds, Copyright and Confidential Information Law 
of Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994) 325 at 327. 
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4. Unlimited Term Protection for Trade Secrets 
Unlike other forms of intellectual property like patents, trademarks, and copyrights that have 
fixed terms prescribed by statutory limits, trade secret protection can be unlimited.656 While patents 
protect information is filed in a patent, the only protection for trade secrets is non-disclosure. Thus, 
the protection exists until the rights holder voluntarily discloses that information. Similarly, while 
patents grant an exclusive right for a limited period, trade secrets contain no requirement to eventually 
make an invention or know-how public. The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co recognized that there 
may be overlaps in patent and trade secret protection, with trade secret enjoying an extended 
protection which does not require eventual public disclosure. 657 Thus, it is not inconceivable for 
many firms to forego patenting enhancements achieved after the expiry of a patent, and instead, 
choosing choose to retain protection of these enhancements as trade secrets in perpetuity. Thus, while 
trade secrets may have infinite protection under the law (especially for undisclosed information), the 
protection is more closely tied with the length of time that a trade secret has utility,658 which has been 
estimated by one scholar as “a mere three years.”659 While this argument appears to contradict the 
within thesis which maintains that absent a fixed statutory period for trade secrets, the holder of this 
IP has a perpetual right to operate (absent a legitimate disclosure), it does not consider the issue of 
enhancements. For example, as will be argued below, PV solar panels and other environmental 
products are often improved through enhancements based on the original IP. Therefore, the estimated 
utility of a trade secret that has been subject to an enhancement can extend well beyond three years 
as putatively projected by certain scholars.  
                                                 
656 Lemley (2008), supra note 644; Karl F Jorda, “The Rights of the First Inventor—Trade Secret User as Against Those 
of the Second Inventor Patentee (Part II)” (1979), 61 J Pat Trademark Off Soc’y 593. 
657 Kewanee Oil, supra note 599. 
658 Nelson Burns & Co Ltd et al v Gratham Industries Ltd et al (1983), 150 DLR (3d) 692 (H Ct J), aff’d (1986), 55 OR 
(2d) 426 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused (1986), 56 OR (2d) 604.  
659 P W Leuzzi, Process Inventions: Trade Secrets or Patents Protection (1984) 66 J Pat Trademark Off Soc’y 159 at 168. 
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Contrary to the above argument that the utility of a trade secret is three years, case law in the area 
of trade secrets has granted permanent injunctions, which suggests that the duration or a trade secret 
can be infinite, or else there would be no need to permanently enjoin the infringer.660 In Allen-Qualley 
Co v Shellmar (“Shellmar”),661 the plaintiff Allen-Qualley was negotiating a license from Shellmar 
for a candy-wrapping machine. Shellmar obtained confidential information and used it to conduct a 
patent search that revealed much of the secret candy-making machine. Shellmar purchased the patent 
and the issue was whether it breached the oral agreement to hold the confidential information in trust 
until the licensing contract was duly executed. A perpetual injunction was issued against Shellmar, 
which prohibited the use of the candy-machine; a reassignment of the patent, to Allen-Qualley, was 
also ordered. The issue of perpetual injunctions raised in Shellmar goes beyond protecting trade 
secrets (which remains secret), to contemplating the length of punishment an infringer ought to face. 
In the companion case of Shellmar Products Co v Allen-Qualley Co,662 several third parties were 
granted patents on the candy-machine which divulged the secret that was in dispute in the initial 
Shellmar case. Shellmar sought to set aside the earlier injunction on the basis that the trade secret 
was disclosed in patents that were filed subsequent to the order. The court found that Shellmar’s 
breach of confidence prohibits it from benefiting from the use of the candy-machine and that by its 
conduct it “…had taken itself outside the pale of the general public to which the disclosure of that 
patent was made.”663 The logic of the court rests on the fact that should a trade secret be misused, the 
abuser should never benefit from the breach once it has gone public. This prevents the deliberate 
breach that would thereafter result in public knowledge, and the abuser subsequently claiming the 
                                                 
660 The term “perpetual” injunction has been used in the case law to suggest a permanent or ongoing injunction with no 
fixed duration; see Shellmar Products Co v Allen-Qualley Co 87 F (2d) 104 (7th Cir 1936); see also Shellmar Products 
Co v Allen-Qualley Co 301 US 695 (1937).  
661 Allen-Qualley Co v Shellmar Prods Co, 31 F (2d) 293 (ND Ill 1929), aff’d 36 F (2d) 623 (7th Cir 1929). 
662 Ibid (cited to 36 F (2d) 623 (7th Cir 1929)).  
663 Ibid at 107. 
  193
right to use the public information that he pillaged. The breach of confidence forever enjoins the 
abuser from using the information that was gained in confidence. Thus, Shellmar stands for the 
proposition that an infringer who has received knowledge and has acted to breach confidence shall 
not benefit from his/her actions. However, where the information has not been disclosed through 
unscrupulous means, then an injunction should only be granted up until the time where that 
information legitimately becomes public.664 
There are essentially two lines of reasoning in trade secret injunction cases: that of Shellmar, 
which champions the protection of undisclosed trade secrets in perpetuity, but only against violators; 
and that of Conmar Products Corp v Universal Slide Fastener Co (“Conmar”), which recognizes, 
where trade secrets have already been legitimately disclosed, with only limited protection.  In 
Conmar trade secrets were disclosed through a zipper patent that was later deemed invalid. Judge 
Learned Hand found that since the secret had already been disclosed through the issuance of a patent, 
Universal Slide Fastener could not rely on trade secret doctrine. It was clearly stipulated that the 
intellectual property is not the confidential information, but is instead the trade secret. As such, if no 
secret exists because of legitimate disclosure, then there is no legal protection extended to the 
confidential relationship.665 The line of cases that follow Conmar focus on freedom of employment 
where the trade secret had already been divulged.666 Thus, Comar does not undermine the reasoning 
in Shellmar which continues to protect trade secrets that have not been divulged or that have been 
disclosed through breach of confidence. The perpetual protection of trade secrets offered under 
Shellmar gives rise to the potential that companies may use this form of intellectual property to 
evergreen their products. 
                                                 
664 Conmar Products Corp v Universal Slide Fastener Co, 172 F (2d) 150, 156 (2d Cir 1949). 
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid; see also Winston Research Corp v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co, 350 F (2d) 134 (9th Cir 1965). 
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Another seminal American case considered a particular factual situation, which traditionally 
gives rise to questions of evergreening, wherein – after the expiry of a patent – a patent-holder 
improves on the product through an enhancement kept as a trade secret.667 In Franke v Wiltscheck, 
the defendant argued that the enhancement should not be subject to protection, as it was based on an 
expired patent. The court made a clear distinction between cases involving enhancements protected 
as trade secrets, and those based on expired patents: 
Plaintiffs do not assert, indeed cannot assert, a property right in their development such as 
would entitle them to exclusive enjoyment against world. There is not a patent, but a trade 
secret. The essence of their action is not infringement, but breach of faith. It matters not that 
defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study of the expired patent and the 
plaintiffs’ publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did not. Instead they gained it from 
plaintiffs via their confidential relationship, and in so doing incurred a duty not to use it to 
plaintiffs’ detriment. This duty they have breached.668 
The notion that enhancements of a patent can be protected via trade secrets, as advanced in 
Franke, coupled with case law and statutory principles that fail to limit the duration of a trade secret, 
is the current basis for a doctrine of evergreening in trade secrets. However, the court in Franke found 
that if the defendant had gained knowledge of the trade secret through an expired patent, then the 
plaintiffs could not assert “a property right in their development such as would entitle them to 
exclusive enjoyment against the world.”669 This statement clearly supports the proposition that 
legitimate disclosure, reverse engineering or ingenuity can lead to the loss of trade secret protection, 
however, a breach of a “confidential relationship” will enjoin the infringer from benefitting from the 
illicit disclosure.  
The issue of how long an infringer will be prohibited from putting to use a trade secret will likely 
be clarified in the recent case involving a Chinese company (Sinovel) and an American company 
                                                 
667 Franke et al v Wiltschek, 209 F (2d) 493 (2d Cir 1953), 99 USPQ (BNA) 431 [Franke]. For a more comprehensive 
discussion of this case, see Charles T Graves, “Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences” (2007) 15 Ga J 
IPL 39. 
668 Franke, ibid at 495–496. 
669 Ibid at para 8.  
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(American Superconductor). The Sinovel case addresses the issue of economic espionage and 
international misappropriation of trade secrets. An engineer of American Superconductor was 
convicted of stealing source codes for wind turbine software and selling it to Sinovel (a state-owned 
company in China). Sinovel was a loyal customer of American Superconductor and it is alleged that 
they began to find fault with the product and eventually stopped paying for its use. At the time of the 
breach it is alleged that Sinovel owed American Superconductor 100 million in already delivered 
services and future contracts totaling $700 million.670 At the time Sinovel had provided 70% of 
American Superconductors annual revenues, and its stock plunged 80% in six months.671 After 
discovering that Sinovel had found a way to use its technology without a license, American 
Superconductor commenced three lawsuits (two against the company and its two executives in 
federal court and the other against the former employee Dejan Karabasevic) in an attempt to prevent 
Sinovel from using the pirated software. The case is set to be heard on December 5, 2016. The ruling 
of this case will likely expand the law on the duration of an injunction for trade secret breaches 
involving impropriety. On July 6, 2018 US District Judge James Paterson convicted Sinovel of 
stealing trade secrets and ordered it to pay 1.5 million dollars in fines.672   Sinovel was also sentenced 
to one year probation and payment of the $ 57.5 million settlement with AMSC.673  
Cases prior to Sinovel largely dealt with the length of an injunction within the context of the 
employment sector. The area of law grew to encompass concerns relating to balancing an employer’s 
                                                 
670 United States Department of Justice, News Release, “Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals Charged in 
Wisconsin with Theft of AMSC Trade Secret” (27 June 2013), online: <justice.gov/opa/pr/sinovel-corporation-and-
three-individuals-charged-wisconsin-theft-amsc-trade-secrets>.  
671 Jonathan Weisman, “U.S. to Share Cautionary Tale of Trade Secret Theft with Chinese Official”, The New York Times 
(14 February 2012), online: <nytimes.com/2012/02/15/world/asia/chinese-official-to-hear-trade-theft-tale.html>.  
672 Todd Richmond, “Federal Judge Fines Chinese Wind Turbine Maker $1.5 Million” AP News (6 July 2018), online: 
<apnews.com/578e4452fffc4ac2b0744b1b56c925ef>; Christie Smythe, “Sinovel Must Pay $59 Million as Punishment 
in Trade Secret Case” Bloomberg (6 July 2018), online: <bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-06/sinovel-must-pay-
59-million-as-punishment-in-trade-secrets-case>.  
673 Ibid. 
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right to maintain proprietary secrets, while simultaneously not limiting an employee’s freedom of 
mobility and right to earn a living.674 For example, courts have relaxed the disclosure rule in cases 
where it is necessary for an employee to reveal a trade secret in order to perform their job.675 It is this 
burden upon employees that has led the courts to question how long a trade secret should enjoy 
protection under the law. The notion that trade secrets could be divided into two classes, a property 
class and a non-property class, has been advanced.676 According to Bruce Bugler, this distinction 
could arguably be implemented as follows:  
All jurisdictions agree that as long as the employer holds an item secret, the law grants 
protection for an unlimited amount of time. However, holding an employee to an obligation 
to a past employer for an unlimited amount of time can reduce his employment mobility. 
Accordingly, the current unlimited protection should only apply where a “property quality” 
trade secret is found to exist.677 
 
It is further argued that where the trade secret is shown to have “non-property qualities” it should 
not be extended unlimited protection.678 In the Sinovel case an employee plead guilty of fraud and 
economic espionage for misappropriating his employer’s confidential information and revealing it to 
the detriment of his former employer. This case could be distinguished from cases that attempt to 
balance the freedom of employment (that is an employee’s obligation to retain the secret against 
his/her right to be employed) from cases involving impropriety of this nature. This analysis has 
largely been dedicated to the courts’ balancing of the rights of the employee with the employer’s 
rights,679 in cases unlike Sinovel where there is no impropriety. 
                                                 
674 Conmar, supra note 664; Winston, supra note 666. 
675 PepsiCo Inc v Redmond, 54 F (3d) 1262 (7th Cir 1995) at 1269–1271. 
676 Bruce A Kugler, “Limiting Trade Secret Protection” (1988) 22:3 Val U L Rev 725. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid; A B Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Pty Ltd, [1978] 2 NZLR 515 (CA), wherein a perpetual 
injunction was granted; this decision was upheld on appeal.  
679 Michael Barclay, “Trade Secrets: How Long Should an Injunction Last? (1978) 26 UCLA L Rev 203, wherein it was 
stated that trade secret protections can be infinite.  
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Teva, one of the world’s largest generic manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, filed a 
Complaint against Apotex Inc and Apotex Corp (“Apotex”). Canadian generic manufacturer under 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).680 The Complaint alleges that a former Teva employee 
(Barinder Sandhu) provided confidential trade secret information to her boyfriend (Jeremy Desai, 
CEO of Apotex), with whom she resided in Pennsylvania at the time of the complaint.681 Sandhu 
allegedly synchronised confidential Teva information with a cloud account and uploaded 900 Teva 
files, as well as saved files on at least 10 USB drives. In addition to claims under the DTSA, Teva 
also alleged that Apotex violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)682 and committed 
various tort and contract violations. In August of 2017, Apotex brought a motion to dismiss the 
Complaint on the following grounds: 
 The specific acts of alleged misappropriation occurred prior to the enactment of the DTSA 
and as such the Act does not apply; 
Teva failed to provide sufficient facts to identify the specific trade secret that was infringed 
and the complaint is therefore not tenable under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secret Act 
(“PUTSA”); 
Teva failed to state a specific loss under the CFFA; 
The PUTSA is not applicable as it would pre-empt the common law conversion claims and 
such claims should fall under the uniform system; 
The state contract and tort claims made under the PUSTA do not allege sufficient facts to 
disclose a cause of action and should be barred at law.683 
 
On January 30, 2018 Justice Savaged delivered a decision on a motion for dismissal which was 
partially granted.684 While the Judge agreed that Teva’s former employee may have transmitted 
confidential information gained from her employment, it failed to plea that Sandhu’s did not have 
                                                 
680 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub L No 114–153. 
681 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc v Barinder Sandhu, Jeremy Desai, Apotex Inc and Apotex Corp, No 2:2017-3031 (ED 
Pa 2017). 
682 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC § 1030. 
683 Teva, supra note 681.  
684 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc v Barinder Sandhu, Jeremy Desai, Apotex Inc and Apotex Corp, No 17-3031 in the 
United States District Court For The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “Memorandum Opinion” (30 January, 2018), per 
Savage J.  
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the authorization to access the computer for this purpose, as outlined in the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act. The balance of the Complaint is still pending and will be instructive on the issue of 
injunctive relief for former employees under the new DTSA and state law. 
The above-mentioned employment cases do not consider the impact of the unlimited trade secret 
protection on development and technology transfer because they do not address issues beyond 
employment that permit a trade secret to be protected even beyond the 20-years afforded to other IP. 
In addition, the extraterritorial considerations as revealed by the Sinovel case need to be further 
explored by the literature. Other suggestions of refining trade secret protection advocate for a trade 
secret registry, but this solution also does not resolve issues around how to limit the duration of trade 
secrets and potential abuses. The concerns arising over extending monopoly periods beyond the term 
granted for the intellectual property have traditionally given rise to the doctrine of “evergreening”. 
This principle has been primarily focused on the practice as it relates to patents, but it has been 
parsimonious in the area of trade secrets. 
5. Trade Secret & Evergreening in the Caselaw 
The principle of “evergreening” has not been widely canvassed in the literature or case law on 
trade secrets. The scholarly focus on evergreening is largely concentrated in the pharmaceutical 
sector and closely tied to North American cases.685 Evergreening traditionally refers to the practice 
                                                 
685 The Canadian process is regulated by the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133 [NOC 
Regulations], while the US process is filed through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 [Hatch-Waxman Act], an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act § 505(j); 21 USC § 355(j), which allows a generic product to be approved on bioequivalency to an expired brand’s 
product via an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”); see Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Co v Apotex Inc [2009] 
FC 137 [Bristol-Myers]; Whirlpool Corp. v Camco Inc. [2000] 2 SCR 1067 [Whirlpool]; Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc, 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 SCR 265, (also referred to as PLAVIX) [Sanofi-Synthelabo]; Apotex Inc v Pfizer 
Canada Inc et al, 2009 FCA 8 [Pfizer]; Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine Ltd, [1985] RPC 59 (UK); see 
also Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine Ltd, [1985] RPC 59 (UK); Pozzoli SPA v BOSO SA, [2007] FSR 37, 
[2007] ENCA Civ 588; Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc v Conor Medsystems Inc, [2008] UKHL 49; KSR International 
Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398 (2007); Beloit Canada Ltd v Valmet OY (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 (FCA); Saint-Gobain 
Pam SA v Fusion Provia Ltd, [2005] EWCA Civ 177; Graham v John Deere, 383 US 1 (1966); Re O’Farrell 853 F (2d) 
894, 7 USPQ (2d) 1673. 
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in which patent owners use legal and regulatory means to extend their intellectual property monopoly 
privileges over a product or a process. While the concept of evergreening has been popularized within 
the pharmaceutical context, the example is not entirely analogous to the green technology sector, 
primarily because evergreening often commences early in the inventive stage with pharma products 
(for example data that is kept secret in the market clearance stage). Unlike pharmaceutical products, 
green technology products like solar panels do not require market clearance from a pharmacological 
perspective, as such, improvements and confidential information exists largely in the form of product 
enhancements after the patent has expired, rendering the old technology inefficient and non-
competitive from a market and profit perspective. Generally, evergreening practices can fit into two 
categories, those that extend the life of tangible products and processes, and those that deal with 
intangibles such as information and know-how. From the perspective of tangible assets, evergreening 
often adopts industry practice that extends the life-cycle of a product, while intangible forms include 
practices like trade secrets. Patents grant a temporary monopoly to an inventor as a balance between 
rewarding the efforts of innovation and fostering disclosure of new inventions. This disclosure is 
expected to facilitate and encourage further innovation and be of benefit to society’s progress at large. 
In most jurisdictions the limited monopoly is granted for 20-years, thereafter, the patent expires and 
the monopoly period ends. It is just prior to the expiry of the patent that evergreening practices are 
initiated. The product that is evergreened continues to be sold at brand-name prices as it remains 
protected under law. This strategy has a direct effect of extending the legal period of the brand patent 
and therefore delaying the entry of cheaper off-patent substitutes. The problem arises when patent 
holders attempt to extend the 20-year monopoly period, especially on items that are critical to societal 
development like green technologies used in climate change abatement or patents on life-saving 
drugs. 
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The literature on evergreening within the pharmaceutical context is rich and provides an extensive 
background to the practice. The concept of “evergreening” in Canadian case law is essentially the 
prohibition against double-patenting, as was explained by Mr. Justice Hughes in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Canada Co v Apotex Inc: 
Double patenting, put simply, involves the concept that a person cannot get a second patent 
for the same thing for which they already have received a patent. A patent is a monopoly for 
a limited period of time and that period should not be extended by the expedient of getting a 
subsequent patent for the same thing.686 
The principle against monopoly extension is clearly elucidated in the prohibition against 
“evergreening.”687 There are also a number of obvious life cycle management strategies adopted in 
this practice, many of which have been popularized by the pharmaceutical sector, including the slight 
modification of drug compositions,688 as well as brand migration.689 Other less obvious practices 
include pricing pressures,690 the refusal to grant licenses associated with products,691 the combining 
of existing drugs,692 and outright litigation.693 While the general rule against evergreening is that the 
same product cannot be patented twice, there is no prohibition against utilizing a trade secret to 
protect improvements or enhancements that would otherwise not be patentable. This omission may 
pose serious concerns for the implementation of green technology transfer to (or within) the 
                                                 
686 Bristol-Myers, ibid at 173–174. 
687 See generally Whirlpool, supra note 685 at para 63; Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 685; Pfizer, supra note 685. 
688 Slightly modifying the composition of a product by way of utilizing its derivatives, such as polymorphs or 
enantiomers, is one example of such a practice. 
689 This practice attempts to phase out an existing drug prior to the expiry of the patent and to redirect the consumer to 
the replacement product. For example Prilosec consumers were migrated to Nexium. AstraZeneca and Prilosec which 
was succeeded by Nexium. AstraZeneca spent over $300 million in advertising to promote Nexium and to move 
consumers away from Prilosec to Nexium. 
690 This is often achieved by creating patent thickets, the use of multiple licenses and patents to obtain a single product. 
691 Korean Trade Promotion Agency, “Case Study 4: The Republic of Korea and the Montreal Protocol” in Veena Jha & 
Ulrich Hoffmann, eds, Achieving Objectives of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Package of Trade Measures 
and Positive Measures, UN Doc UNCTAD/ITCD/TED/6, online: <unctad.org/en/docs/itcdted6_en.pdf>. 
692 This process sees to the combination of two or more drugs or patented compounds. For example, Caduet is a 
combination of Lipitor (Atorvastatin) and Norvasc (Amlodipine), once used to treat liver dysfunction. 
693 The commencement of litigation in jurisdictions like Canada grants a 30-month stay of a generic manufacturer’s 
production, thereby extending the monopoly period by 2.5 years. 
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developing world. Such concerns include the inability of developing countries to utilize green 
technologies that are protected by trade secrets even after patents have expired. 
III. TRADE SECRETS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO GREEN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Evergreening through trade secrets is not directly contemplated in TRIPS, the GATT or the Kyoto 
Protocol, and consequently there is no prohibition against withholding information in perpetuity. 
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement does recognize that judicial authorities will grant infringement 
remedies, however, the duration of these rulings are specifically omitted from TRIPS. Injunctive 
relief under TRIPS is addressed in Article 44 which sets out that:  
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an 
infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their 
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, 
immediately after customs clearance of such goods… 
  2. ...the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with 
a Member's law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available.694 
Thus, while Article 44 recognizes the rights of WTO Members to access injunctive relief in 
national courts, it does not set time limits on the duration of that relief. The fact that these treaties do 
not contain a time limit on trade secrets and there is essentially no mechanism to determine how long 
a trade secret has been in practice, brings into question the efficacy of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS 
which attempts to balance intellectual property abuses so that technology could be mutually 
advantageous to “producers and users”,695 and also Article XX(b) and XX(g) of the GATT which 
recognizes exceptions that facilitate the development of Member States on human development and 
environmental grounds. If these provisions cannot be operationalized, then they cannot represent a 
                                                 
694 TRIPS, supra note 592, art 44. 
695 Ibid, arts 7–8. 
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viable challenge to the prospect that green products may be evergreened through utilizing trade 
secrets. 
Evergreening may have a negative social impact on developing nations that are heavily reliant 
upon technology transfer to address climate change abatement needs. The impact on developing 
countries is most felt when evergreening practices result in barriers to the entry of technologies that 
will help in assisting these markets down a green development path. This barrier may have a global 
impact on climate change abatement strategies. The dilemma arising from the evergreening through 
trade secrets is particularly evident in the solar panel industry which has many off-patent alternatives 
that have been enhanced and are protected by trade secret know-how. In this regard, eliminating 
impediments to obtaining a license to utilize the enhanced technology must be addressed. Article 39 
of TRIPS permits a Member to protect a trade secret except in situations “where necessary to protect 
the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial 
use.”696 For example, pharmaceutical products disclose a step-by-step process of reproducing the 
medicine. Therefore, green technologies like those in the renewable energy sector are often off-patent 
and improvements are in the form of trade secrets. The speed at which technology increases in the 
solar industry would render the filing of new patents useless and as such the more pragmatic option 
of containing enhancements in the form of trade secrets is adopted. In addition, the technical know-
how that is required to assemble some green technologies like solar panels may not be within the 
public domain. These processes are often protected by trade-secrets. The issue of whether there 
should be a time limit on those secrets in a similar manner as patents, raises concerns about fair 
commercial practices. Some scholars have argued that this non-disclosure curtails innovation and 
                                                 
696 TRIPS, supra note 592, art 39. 
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technological diffusion.697 Since many environmental technology patents are enhancements on 
existing technology and know-how, the reduced research and development investment may not 
justify a new patent for a 20-year term. Thus, while the off-patent product can be copied, in the case 
with solar PV panels, enhancements often render the old product economically inefficient to utilize. 
The competition from other producers that can generate the energy at a cheaper cost by using superior 
panels will push any user of an off-patent panel out of the market. In addition, purchasing solar panels 
or operating a photovoltaic solar plant does not require the disclosure of trade secrets to the 
purchaser/operator because panels are often manufactured abroad and shipped to the receiving 
country. As such, the enhancement on this technology can be protected by a trade secret in perpetuity. 
A problem arises in the area of transferring green technology as designed by international 
treaties because companies need to be financially compensated for licensing those technologies. 
When fossil fuels represent a cheaper alternative to green technologies, developing countries 
require an incentive to choose the costlier, environmentally friendly choice. Patents on the 
renewable energy sector are less important to the rights holder as are trade secrets. This is because 
many technologies in the renewable energy sector, and specifically photovoltaic solar panels, are 
off-patent and have expired. The value of these technologies is often found in the 
improvements,698 which require a license to access. Another problem with viewing relaxed patent 
requirements as a solution to green technology transfer is that many developing countries do not 
have the finances or the manufacturing capacity to take advantage of the technology. With 
                                                 
697 John H Barton & Keith E Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on a Multilateral Agreement on Open Access to Basic 
Science and Technology”, in Simon J Evenett & Bernard M Hoekman, eds, Economic Development & Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation (Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave MacMillian, 2006); Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: 
How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Market, Stops Innovation, and Cost Lives (New York: Basic Books, 2008); D S 
Levine “Secrecy & Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure” (2006) 59 Fla L Rev 135. 
698 Michael Hasper, “Green Technology in Developing Countries: Creating Accessibility Through a Global Exchange 
Forum” (2009) 7:1 Duke L & Tech Rev; John H Barton, “Patenting and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in 
Developing Countries”, WIPO Magazine, February 2008, online: <wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2008/01/article
_0003.html> 
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reference to the solar energy industry, the construction of photovoltaic solar plants requires capital 
infusion of tens of millions of dollars, and collaboration with foreign companies and financiers. 
In light of the public good argument, questions are raised about whether there should be 
reasonable limits to such protection.699 The outcome is that the technological know-how as contained 
in trade secrets are intangible and controlled by the bearer of that particular secret. Even if that trade 
secret were disclosed, it would be of no assistance to a country that did not have the financial means 
to acquire, produce or assemble products like solar panels. In Levine and Bolderin’s “Against 
Intellectual Monopoly”, they argue that Article 7 of TRIPS states that patents and limited monopolies 
are an ineffective method of promoting innovation.700 Trade secrets can also limit the freedom to use 
green patents that are in the public domain,701 because of the ability to maintain intellectual property 
protection over enhancements and know-how that are a necessary precondition to properly utilizing 
these products. Thus, the theoretical models that tout strong intellectual property laws like trade 
secrets as a perquisite to foreign direct investment infusion are simply inapplicable to many 
developing countries. The inapplicability arises because many developing nations do not have the 
requisite local capacity to mimic the technology without knowledge transfer assistance. Essentially, 
the scenario that arose from the US-Chinese case law on misappropriation may not be present in sub-
Saharan Africa, and specifically in relation to renewable energy projects. Hence, the extension of 
trade secrets in perpetuity serves merely to increase the costs of production for southern nations that 
may already be discouraged from utilizing costly green technologies. 
                                                 
699 R Bone, “A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification” (1998) 86:2 Cal L Rev 241; Elizabeth 
A Rowe, “Striking a Balance, When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to Government?” (2011) 96 Iowa L 
Rev 791. 
700 Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, 1st ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); see also Claude Henry & Joseph E Stiglitz, “Intellectual Property, Dissemination of Innovation and Sustainable 
Development” (2010) 1:3 Global Policy 237. 
701 Paul J Heald, “Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game” 
(2002) Vanderbilt University Law School Law & Economic Working Paper No 02-21; Surinder K Verma, “Protection 
of Trade Secrets Under the TRIPS Agreement, and Developing Countries” (1998) 1:5 J World Intellectual Property 723. 
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A number of provisions in the Paris Agreement address the hardship that developing nations may 
experience in meeting their commitments, and consequently have built in financial and technological 
mechanisms into the Agreement to address this concern. The xix main provisions in the Paris 
Agreement directly address hardship concerns faced by developing nations:  a mechanism to 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development” 
(Article 6), a finance mechanism (Article 9), a technology transfer mechanism (Article 10), a capacity 
building mechanism (Article 11), an education and knowledge transfer  provision (Article 12), and 
an enhanced transparency provision (Article 13). The new requirement in the Paris Agreement that 
developing countries report the “financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed 
and received under Article 9, 10, and 11” of the Agreement, could also bring to light the impact that 
trade secrets have on green technology transfer. This non-obligatory requirement creates a platform 
for developing countries to open the discussion on areas of intellectual property (such as no fixed 
terms for trade secrets) that are negatively impacting on technology transfer. 
A. EVERGREENING THROUGH PATENT THICKETS AND LICENSING REFUSALS 
Arguably, the absence of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets could encourage perpetual 
secrets if a product is improved through an enhancement and a license may be required to obtain that 
improved knowledge. It is clear that aside from intellectual property constraints, obtaining various 
licenses and finances to build renewable energy plants will require foreign capital. The cost of 
patenting a simple product may be prohibitive when one considers the filing fees in local and multiple 
jurisdictions along with the prospect of litigation. Practices such as “patent thickets” are arguably 
used to compel inventors to apply for multiple licenses in order to obtain a single invention, with the 
outcome of thwarting development.702 In 1993 the Korean government alleged that companies that 
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held green patents refused to grant a license for use of the technology. The withholding of licenses 
has been identified by the IPCC as occurring in “cases where the private firms and even public 
institutions of industrialized countries refused to license such green technologies like HFC-134a, fuel 
cell and IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle)”.703 The IPCC found the following: 
 Firms may choose to withhold technological information from particular countries for 
competitive reasons, a strategy that is facilitated by globalized IPRs. The spectre of 
anticompetitive deployment of patents and patent pools in order to discourage local firms 
from learning technologies through imitation and reverse engineering surely looms large in 
the context of weak competition enforcement in most developing economies.704 
In the Korean case, the country and economy were inundated with non-ozone depleting 
technologies dumped in the country by a foreign company that filed 40 patents. This practice occurred 
at the time when Korea, which was refused a license on HFC technology, decided to develop its own 
local capacity in the area. The filing of multiple patents on the technology was interpreted as an 
attempt to stifle Korean growth in the technology by increasing the cost of development. The effect 
of such broad property rights on development has been found to stagnate innovation because of the 
costly nature of obtaining a licence from the patent holder.705 
The lack of a fixed statutory period for trade secrets may also have impacted on patent thickets, 
or withholding license or enhancements via trade secrets, which has been commonly associated with 
the refusal to license technology. India also raised concerns about evergreening and the application 
of the Montreal Protocol. Indian firms claimed that they were because they were deemed to be a 
                                                 
and the Economy, Vol 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) 119. 
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“potential competitor”, companies possession substitutes to ozone depleting technologies refused to 
license the product to Indian companies.706 India further alleged that these technologies were 
necessary to meet environmental targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and that the refusal to grant a 
license is a demonstration of corporate monopoly over the industry. The fact that a small group of 
technology companies hold these patents leads to the conclusion that these companies may be 
“operating as a cartel to control production.”707 
Technology transfer in the energy sector is largely connected with the effective licensing of the 
technology. In light of concerns that expired patents could still not be utilized in the renewable energy 
sector due to the inability to secure licenses for technology, a joint United Nation Energy Programme, 
European Patent Office and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development’s study was 
commissioned to examine licensing practices in the clean energy sector. The global licensing survey 
concluded that intellectual property protection in the host country was an important factor in entering 
a license agreement. The respondents also cited other local infrastructural factors as also affecting 
the decision to enter into a licensing agreement.708 
Evergreening has also taken the form of patenting many small steps in an invention, or separately 
patenting compounds and technological processes that make it difficult for small inventions to file a 
patent without paying licensing fees. This practice increases the cost of filing a patent to include fees 
payable to the owners that already have a patent on the process or product. For example, multiple 
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patents can be obtained as a form of a “picket fence”, which involves obtaining a series of patents 
around a single product or drug that makes it difficult to produce the product without paying royalties 
for the various patents. The result is that the need to obtain multiple patents may block the innovator 
from using the patent.  
The practice of “picket fencing” also occurs when firms take out patents that may not be used 
immediately, but can guarantee a strategic edge in the future by forcing the user to obtain multiple 
licenses, thereby increasing the cost of production. The practice of “patent thickets” is said to thwart 
innovation by creating multiple patents within a patent, thereby increasing the cost of copying the 
invention by requiring that numerous patent rights are acquired to reproduce one invention. This 
means that a person wishing to utilize the patent may have to pay multiple licensing fees for the 
various patents required to reproduce the product. 
These practices increase the cost of invention which may pose a hindrance to cost sensitive 
developing nations. Figure 1 captures from different perspectives the practice of evergreening, which 
forces users to obtain licenses: 
 
Figure 1: Corporate Evergreening Patent Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A strategy aimed at protecting tangible assets like patents may utilize the life extension approach 
which would extend the patent beyond the stipulated expiry period. In addition, protecting intangible 
assets like “know-how” is most often achieved through trade secrets. Many trade secrets are revealed 
under confidentiality or licensing agreements. Disclosure in this manner does not extinguish the 
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rights to the trade secret. The problem arises with the withholding of a license containing a trade 
secret, or an outright refusal to grant such licenses. These evergreening practices have been referred 
to as patent thickets or patent fencing and these activities apply equally to patents as well as trade 
secrets.  
The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)  has summarized the costliness of patent 
thickets affecting intellectual property rights as follows: 
 …patent thickets – may forego research activity… whereby patent rights are  distributed 
over a fragmented base of IP holders, and those who wish to introduce  products using such 
technologies face the high cost of negotiating with multiple parties. If each technology is 
essential, a negotiation failure with any of the IP holders is equivalent to a failure with all. 
New products are blocked, all IP  holders lose an opportunity to commercialize and society 
misses out on new technology. Even in the case where an enterprising entrepreneur could 
strike a deal with each separate IP right holder, he or she is likely to overpay if the number of 
IP holders that could claim infringement is sufficiently large.709 
Thus, patent thickets represent an indirect form of evergreening by making innovation financially 
impractical because of the requirement to obtain multiple licenses from multiple rights holders.710 In 
addition, some scholars have claimed that weak patent laws that permit “multiple and overlapping” 
patents also contribute to the patent thicket problem. Maskus and Okediji argue the following: 
 [P]atent thickets substantially heighten transaction costs associated with licensing and extract 
additional rents from would-be licensees in the event that one patent owner chooses to hold 
out. Further, fragmentation of patent ownership increases the costs of the patent system from 
public users. Another problem is that patent documents may not require sufficient disclosure 
to be useful as sources of cutting-edge technical information for less sophisticated users, 
including firms in DCs and LDCs.711 
Thus, according to Maskus and Okediji the requirement that a user obtain multiple licenses may 
act as an impediment to innovation. Moreover, if one patent holder refuses to grant a license this 
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710 UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), “Patent Thickets: An Overview” (2011), online: <ipo.gov.uk/informatic-
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could prevent use of the patent. In this regard, the financial burdens imposed by patent thickets 
represent a form of evergreening. 
The advantage of the patent thickets to the patent holder does not end with the expiry of the 
patent. In fact, this practice may be extended through trade secrets. Many PV panels are constructed 
and assembled through trade secrets and there is no guarantee that technical know-how will be 
transferred to the public once the patent has expired. Technical know-how is an essential ingredient 
in transferring green technology. The costs associated with such transfers are expected to be borne 
by the recipient of the technology. Trade secret coverage can broadly apply to a number of business 
practices and strategies, including technical, financial, or even strategic information that are 
proprietary and are of a secretive nature, including formulae, processes,712 pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.713 It is well accepted that trade secret law has also 
been extended to protect “know-how” which is defined as follows: 
[K]now-how is defined as a body of unpatented technology useful in making a product to be 
sold commercially. It includes a complete body of manufacturing information needed by an 
industrial organization to satisfy design, develop, fabricate or produce goods.714 
The issue of development and the transfer of technology in green energy projects is largely 
concerned with the “know how” aspect of trade secrets, and as such, the analysis herein will largely 
focus on trade secret “know how”.  
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Trade secrets can be used to protect information that enhances expired patents.715 While contracts 
involving technology transfer usually require a license for patents, the trade secret aspect may be 
protected by having the company import its employees to the domestic project destination. In that 
vein, the company can maintain its trade secrets by transporting their employees to work on foreign 
projects, rather than reveal the proprietary information or “know-how.” In energy projects, patent 
licenses alone may not be sufficient to commence the project and the “know-how” which is protected 
by trade secrets may be of more value since, in many cases, the patents on solar panels have expired 
and are readily accessible in the public domain.716 
The fact that many climate change technologies are subject to multiple patents and processes 
makes the cost of accessing them quite prohibitive.717 Unlike other forms of patenting products such 
as those in the pharmaceutical sector, it has been argued that no singular technology “will be 
necessary or sufficient on its own to solve climate change.”718 It is indisputable that once a patent 
expires(usually after the 20-year exclusivity period), the utility of the patent must be opened to the 
public for social benefit. However, where the patent is improved on by an enhancement through trade 
secrets, this may indirectly extend the life of the patent in perpetuity. Consequently, trade secrets 
represent a more onerous form of intellectual property than patents as the latter has time limits on the 
monopoly period. The consequences of an intellectual property mechanism that has no time limits 
can have a severe impact on technology transfer which will directly affect how the developing world 
addresses costly issues like climate change abatement.  
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The concerns raised by developing and least-developed Member States in the TRIPS Council 
meetings on technology transfer and climate change abatement highlight the need to set tangible 
targets for technology transfer especially in the area of green technology. In addition, cases like the 
Korean and Indian licensing cases demonstrate the power of trade secrets and impact that withholding 
licenses can have on development. It further highlights the fact that there are a number of commercial 
strategies that can be adopted beyond patents that can extend the life cycle of product and processes. 
The tolerance for these strategies may wane given the impact that these practices may have on the 
ability of nations to meet climate change objectives. New mechanisms need to be developed that will 
address some of the problems posed by the application of trade secrets and patent thickets to green 
technology transfer. With the lag in technology being a reality in many developing countries, the 
developing world’s ability to technologically catch-up and compete in the world of inventions and 
innovations is severely hindered. Arguably, the practice of evergreening exacerbates already existing 
problems by further thwarting innovation, with the most profound effect being on the developing 
world. This is because the patent rules are so technical, that large companies may hide behind the 
technical complexities of energy production and products. Innovation then becomes directly 
associated with the level of technological advancement and the ability of companies in the developing 
world to imitate existing inventions. Where such inventions are only accessible through costly patents 
or licensing fees, this poses a financial burden for developing countries that can only be remedied 
through some aspect of foreign investments. Without external investments, innovation remains 
curtailed and reduced to “technical evergreening”.  
B. THE IMPACT OF EVERGREENING ON GREEN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
This practice of evergreening concentrates patents and compounds in the hands of fewer owner 
corporations and brings to light concerns arising from the “anti-commons”. A theoretical framework 
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for assessing the impact of overuse, or underuse, was initially contemplated in 1968, when Garrett 
Hardin adopted a metaphor of overuse and the overexploitation of common pastures by cattle leading 
to a “tragedy of the commons”.719 Hardin postulated that unfettered use of the commons would 
eventually lead to overuse and ruins: 
 Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best  interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all.720 
Some thirty years later, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg modified the “tragedy of the 
commons” theory by focusing on the opposite consequence that could arise from too many people 
being given the “rights to exclude others”.721 Heller and Eisenberg explain the distinction between 
the tragedy that arises from “commons” and “anti-commons”:  
 Anticommons property can best be understood as the mirror image of commons property. A 
resource is prone to overuse in a tragedy of the commons when too many owners each have 
a privilege to use a given resource and no one has a right to exclude another.722 
By contrast, a resource is prone to underuse in a: 
[t]ragedy of the anticommons: when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from 
a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege to use. […] Once an anticommons 
emerges, collecting rights into usable private property is often brutal and slow.723 
The anti-commons is the reverse situation where a small number of users have the rights to 
exclude others from resources. This results in a situation of underuse. In the intellectual property 
context, this is similar to a patent thicket, in that multiple exclusive rights can be used to impose very 
high taxes on a person who wishes to use a product. This tends to discourage use of products. The 
theoretical principle underlying evergreening recognizes that when the exclusivity period is extended 
beyond the 20-year patent protection period, society’s ability to benefit from the invention is 
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diminished. This results in knowledge and innovative capacities being concentrated in the hands of 
fewer inventors. This extension of monopoly period for intellectual property may actually thwart 
innovation by blocking entry into the common market. The impact of these evergreening practices 
on the market is well known and documented in the patent sector as it relates to the pharmaceutical 
industry. However, these same practices are also adopted in other intellectual property sectors like 
trade secrets and other industries including renewable energy products. 
Rebecca Eisenberg also highlights the problem of evergreening as it relates to “new uses”, 
especially within the pharmaceutical sector. She argues that inventing products or identifying new 
compounds is easy, but the difficulty lies in the efficacy of the product.724 The process of ascertaining 
the safety of the product may involve “secrets” that may not be divulged even after the product hits 
the market. She argues that trade secrets have an unfair advantage in almost circumventing the 
regulatory process. Eisenberg highlights the impact of trade secrets in the pharmaceutical sector and 
notes that:  
Trade secrecy mitigates this risk by allowing firms to suppress data from clinical trials, 
withholding its value not only from competitors but also from consumers who might 
otherwise demand less of the product. But trade secrecy greatly compromises the social value 
of the information as a resource for improving public health and for promoting further R&D. 
It also exposes drug companies and regulators to charges of bad faith and incompetence, 
compromising the signaling function of regulatory approval as a maker of safety and 
efficacy.725 
The compromised social value raised by Eisenberg is not confined solely to the pharmaceutical 
sector, but would encompass other public goods such as the environment. In addition, the exercise 
of trade secrets have been found to sometimes have a very detrimental impact on society and the 
public good.726 Eisenberg’s recognition of trade secrets and the harm that may emerge from the 
                                                 
724 Rebecca S Eisenberg “The Problem of New Uses” (2005) 5 Yale J Health Pol'y L & Ethics 717. 
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suppression of data from clinical trials raises an important question about the impact of this form of 
intellectual property on technological innovation and development. 
The impact of expired patents and trade secrets on competition was addressed by W N Price II, 
in the article “Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition”.727 Price acknowledges that 
patents and trade secrets are often used in a complementary manner whereby the latter is adopted as 
an enhancement for the patent or where the patentee claims “a broad group of inventions, but keep 
secret the precise member of that group she has determined will work best and me most commercially 
successful.”728 While the best mode requirement is referenced in the paper, Price acknowledges that 
it can be circumvented by updating the patent after filing (and perhaps not filing) the update as an 
enhancement but maintaining it as a trade secret. Price notes that the best mode requirement “has 
many limitations” primarily because a “licensee or assignee” do not need to be disclosed.729 The 
ability to update a patent after filing via a trade secret and to keep that enhancement a secret is at the 
heart of the debate on evergreening and trade secrets. The practice of evergreening a patent goes 
beyond mere extension of the patent life through new product filings, but also includes more covert 
practices such as patent thickets and license refusals.  
Evergreening has traditionally been viewed from the perspective of pharmaceutical companies 
extending the life of a drug through various practices. Little attention has been paid to other areas 
like climate change and also other forms of intellectual property beyond patents like trade secrets. 
The issue of evergreening is particularly relevant to the application of international treaties that 
contemplate the ability of developing countries to grow their economies by transferring technologies 
to these areas. If this objective is thwarted by a technicality that permits enhancements on green 
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technologies to be protected beyond the tradition 20-year period, this may have grave effects on the 
ability of developing nations to meet their climate change abatement goals. The global problem of 
climate change is being addressed by setting universal abatement targets. The 2014 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report set the goal of keeping climate change 
within a 2% of pre-industrial levels.730 Achieving this goal will require a migration away from high 
polluting fossil fuels to clean solutions like solar energy. The technological solutions that would 
assist developing countries in making clean choices are largely concentrated in the hands of 
companies and governments within industrialized nations. The International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development reported a total of 2, 310, 472 clean patents by 2007.731 Figure 2 highlights 
this global disparity in worldwide clean energy patents.732 
 
Figure 2: Top 10 Clean Patent-Holding Countries Compared to Others733 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The disparity of proprietary interests over green patents is starkly contrasted in the following figure 
– Figure 3 – which highlights that, of the 2,310,472 clean patents, 1,905,154 (or 82%) were 
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concentrated in the hands of ten countries, while the rest of the world owned 405,318 (or 17.5%) of 
those patents. The following figure captures the disproportionate concentration of patents across the 
globe.734 
Figure 3: Clean Patents by Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The problem of climate change abatement and technology transfer is complicated by the fact that 
the patents and intellectual property that facilitates green energy alternatives are primarily 
concentrated in the hands of industrialized nations. Consequently, developing nations that wish to 
utilize green technologies may encounter financial obstacles associated with purchasing the licenses 
and patents. 
Patent statistics clearly demonstrate the dominance of certain developed countries in holding 
patents on specific technologies. According to the WIPO World Patent Report, the number of patents 
filed on environmental technologies have increased over the past 30 years.735 The number of patents 
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filed on clean technology is predicted to increase in the future.736 With specific reference to solar 
technology, it is anticipated that this form of renewable energy will increase by 35 per cent by 
2020.737 Figure 4 captures this increase in green patents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4738 also shows the drastic increase in patents among OECD nations over the past 28 years. 
A collaborative study encompassing various green technologies including solar PV, wind, geothermal, 
fossil and nuclear identified 2310472 patents worldwide.739 Of these worldwide patents, 2,071 are related 
to solar PV technologies from industrial nations like Japan, United States, Denmark, United Kingdom and 
France.740 The aforementioned countries own 96% of these patents.741 The proliferation of green energy 
technologies and for a perpetual monopoly through trade secrets over them, may have tremendous cost 
effects on the developing world.  
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C. TRADE SECRETS IN PERPETUITY ON ENHANCEMENTS AND KNOW-HOW 
 The connection between access to this knowledge and economic development cannot be 
understated and has been identified as one of the most important aspects of economic growth.742 
Endogenous growth models acknowledge that companies continue to monopolize information that 
are in the public domain by keeping secret critical information that could further innovation of the 
expired product or process that is no longer protected by a patent.743 Scholars like Mark Lemley see 
the competitive advantage that is gained from trade secrets as an incentive for firms to invest in 
developing trade secrets over other forms of intellectual property.744 In this regard, trade secrets may 
displace patents as a desired form of intellectual property, especially in the early stages of 
development745 or inventions that occur after the expiry of the patent.746 Cost factors may also 
influence the gravitation towards trade secrets over patents.747 The role that trade secrets play in the 
international diffusion of technology would differ depending on the development stage of the 
recipient country and also the nature of the technology that is subject to the trade secret. It has been 
postulated that firms’ foreign direct investments may be tied to the strength of trade secret protection 
in a country.748 It has been argued that firms may be more likely “to invest or trade in a country that 
protects trade secrets, particularly where that investment requires the business to reveal or develop 
trade secrets.”749 However, this analysis may only hold true in cases where the recipient country has 
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the local capacity to mimic the technology and convert the misappropriated technology into a 
commercial opportunity. This scenario has taken place in a number of disputes between US and 
Chinese companies, but this reality may not unfold where the foreign company retains the secret by 
transplanting its own employees to the overseas development which is often the case in green energy 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In the area of solar panels and other green energy products, the patents are often expired, and the 
knowledge associated with enhancing these products is protected by trade secrets. This protection 
limits the new creation of second generation products,750 and most importantly, inhibits the ability to 
transfer knowledge in ways that would encourage growth and development in underdeveloped 
regions. The issue becomes whether the social value of primary inventions and the infinite protection 
of these undisclosed enhancements through trade secrets, has more social value than secondary 
inventions.751  
Evergreening adopts multiple forms of life-extension strategies. Within the green technology 
sector, evergreening is practiced by maintaining technological knowledge via trade secrets, thereby 
creating an “anti-commons” effect. This non-disclosure is said to curtail innovation and technological 
diffusion.752 The result is that the cheaper product (in this case solar panels) becomes inferior and 
falls into disuse because of the higher costs associated with using an inefficient product. Access to 
the superior product can only be gained through acquiring a license to use the enhancement. The fact 
that this enhancement is often protected through trade secrets means that developing countries may 
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never have access to the know-how contained in the technology. Moreover, the cost of acquiring 
licenses may render this aspect of technology transfer unattainable on the African continent if all 
means of financing are not contemplated from the outset. The reality is that despite the concentration 
of technology in the hands of the procurer of the trade secret, the inability to finance renewable 
energy projects is probably a more profound barrier on the African continent than any form of 
intellectual property protection.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The implications of trade secrets on international law, as related to climate change, is intrinsically 
tied to a legislative and judicial climate that recognizes the rights of trade secret holders to maintain 
their intellectual property in perpetuity or at least beyond the traditional 20-year period. This paper 
has explored both the statutory expiry periods of trade secrets along with its treatment under Canadian 
and U.S. common law. It found that absent reverse engineering, disclosure by a patent holder or 
through either criminal or civil misappropriation, trade secrets have the potential of having perpetual 
intellectual property protection. This practice is contrary to the principle of granting limited fixed 
term monopoly rights in exchange for disclosure. The absence of a statutory fixed term for trade 
secrets enables the practice of evergreening as a legitimate business practice. The impact on 
developing nations is that the ability to utilize green technology to aid development may be hindered 
by practices like undisclosed product enhancements, patent thickets or licensing withholding 
practices that are based on trade secrets. If this is not the direct goal of trade secret law, then further 
scholarly work needs to be devoted to understanding the current state of trade secret law and its 
impact on the social, economic and legal implications affecting a nation’s ability to meet its 
environmental and climate change abatement objectives. It is clear that the developing world, and in 
particular sub-Saharan African countries, are engaging in development projects in the green energy 
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sector that could lead to economic growth in green industries through knowledge transfers and 
technology diffusion. This calls for a greater analysis of the role of trade secrets, in fostering or 
impeding economic growth in green energy and other environmental/climate change abatement 
projects and strategies. A debate needs to occur regarding how confidential commercial information 
is going to be balanced against global climate change abatement objectives, and primarily whether a 
fixed monopoly period needs to be created for trade secrets, especially those containing public utility 
features of climate change abatement.  
The issue of trade secrets and climate change must balance the dual societal need of encouraging 
innovations through limited intellectual property protections with the public good of accessing 
needed technologies designed to solve environmental problems. The practice of evergreening is 
contradictory to the international agreements ratified by WTO Members in that the practice results 
in the circumvention of the technology transfer obligations as outlined in agreements like TRIPS. 
While TRIPS does set minimum intellectual property standards for nations to uphold, it does not 
enforce the non-compliance of directives, such as those of technology transfer. Article 39.2 of TRIPS 
recognizes the rights to intellectual property protection in the form of trade secrets but sets no limits 
or conditions on the duration of that protection and exceptions or flexibilities that may be adopted in 
addressing global issues such as climate change abatement.  
While evergreening is arguably anti-competitive, the study of this practice has not extended far 
beyond the pharmaceutical sector. The debate that emerged around evergreening often addressed 
equitable issues such as the impact of this practice on the affordability of life-saving medicines in the 
developing world. The subject of evergreening rarely considers issues of global concern like the 
environment. In addition, throughout the practice of evergreening, the scholarly focus dedicated to 
the practice of evergreening has not adequately considered other intellectual property areas like trade 
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secrets, especially within the framework of climate change. Specifically, consideration of the practice 
of not having fixed intellectual property terms for trade secrets have been minimally considered 
within scholarly debate. Instead, the focus on trade secret infringement or loss of protection primarily 
addresses issues of reverse engineering, employee disclosure and voluntary disclosure through 
patents. The concept that trade secrets can extend even beyond a 20-year period that is prescribed for 
other forms of intellectual property has received very little scholarly attention. This omission has led 
to the consequence of having an intellectual property category (trade secret) that fails to limit the 
exclusivity period, thereby neglecting the public social benefit of inventions or innovation. This 
shortcoming may render technological transfer-provisions in an international treaty, like TRIPS, 
completely inoperable, and may also impact the ability of developing nations to utilize green 
technology in their developmental paths.  
While technology transfer as well as the economic, technical and industrial barriers to the 
technology transfer has been raised in international trade discussions on numerous occasions, the 
discussion has often focussed on the impediments that TRIPS poses from a patent perspective. 
Consequently, solutions and discussions have centred on the compulsory licensing of green 
technologies.753 Little focus has been given to potentially anti-competitive practices like 
evergreening as it relates to trade secrets. Virtually absent from the debate are discussions of practices 
like trade secrets on the dissemination of green technology to the developing world. 
In technologically intensive industries like those of renewable energy, evergreening can also 
impact on development. For example, the solar panel industry requires extensive know-how and 
financial outlay. If such paths to development are impeded by anti-competitive practices then 
developing countries may choose a cheaper, less complicated and less green development path, like 
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intensive burning of inexpensive fossil fuels for energy. The applicability of evergreening to 
environmentally sound technologies has been an area of neglect in the scholarly debate of the subject. 
The fact that many environmental products like solar panels use enhancements that are maintained 
through trade secrets also renders these improvements an area of intellectual property worth studying. 
An even greater omission is that very little connection has been identified in the literature between 
the practice of evergreening and its impact on climate change abatement strategies like green 
technology transfer. International treaties, including TRIPS, the UNFCCC Conventions, and the 
Paris Agreement, all contain technology transfer provisions, yet if industry practices, such as 
evergreening, block the operationalization of these provisions, then such treaties become essentially 
toothless in their capacity to encourage commitments related to technology transfer and climate 
change abatement. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Kofi Asante, Leslyn Lewis, and Jon Sarpong “A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of 
Large scale Photovoltaic Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments” 3:7 
(2014) International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT) 1415. 
 
Abstract 
 
To date, the primary energy issue facing developing economies is one of energy deficiency. 
Given continental Africa’s geographic location and optimal access to the equator, terrestrial 
photovoltaics (“PVs‟) are the ultimate solution to Africa’s quest of achieving an environmentally 
comparatively benign source of electrical energy. 
The resulting energy deficiency highlights a scenario that is caused, in part, by a lack of 
investment in large scale commercialized renewable energy plants which is primarily due to the 
unwillingness of financiers to provide early stage resources in the developing world. This paper 
describes an optimal investment planning model for large-scale PV generation in an existing power 
grid. The objective of the model is to arrive at decisions that yield the most profitable outcomes for 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) opportunities, while taking into consideration the technical 
constraints as well as environmental impacts pertaining to Ghana. 
 
Keywords—photovoltaics; levelised cost; foreign direct investment; system capacity factor ; 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
To date the primary energy issue facing developing economies is energy deficiency. 
Terrestrial PVs are the ultimate solution to mankind's quest of achieving an environmentally 
comparatively benign source of electrical energy.  PV technology has been under-utilized as a 
source of energy generation due to the perceived high cost relative to other sources such as fossil 
fuels in these emerging economies.754 Recent advances in solar technology has led to increased 
efficiency, decreased cost of PV modules, and ultimately a significant decrease in the cost of solar 
generated electricity.755 Some authors predict large scale PV generated technology will achieve grid 
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parity when appropriate carbon taxes are considered.756  
PV projects are generally recognized as embodying more elements of sustainable 
development than a conventional energy projects and sources.  Among the noted benefits of PV 
projects are the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from CO2and NOx and an overall reduction 
in toxic gas particles (SO2).757  In addition, PV plants can be placed in esthetically desirable places 
such as near natural parks, since these plants result in a reduction in electricity gridlines.   However, 
these projects are not completely without environmental harm and as such FDIs need to consider 
Environmental Impact Assessments even for PV projects.  Proper project design requires a complete 
contemplation of the potential environmental harms, which in the case with PV projects may 
include: noise pollution during construction, depletion of natural resources where the plant is 
situated, air pollution, and waste management arising from the disposal of batteries.758   
The economic feasibility of an energy generation project is usually evaluated by a number 
of measures such as ROI (Return on Investment), IRR (Internal Rate of Return) and LCOE 
(Levelised Cost of Electricity).759  LCOE is dominantly used in estimating the cost of producing 
electricity by a power producer. It is calculated by accounting for all of a system’s expected lifetime 
costs (including construction, financing, fuel, maintenance, taxes, insurance and incentives), which 
are then divided by the system’s lifetime expected power output (kWh). The LCOE can be expressed 
in units that are directly comparable to the rate paid for electricity from the local utility (e.g., cents 
/kWh), a simple way to assess the cost effectiveness of a PV system is to compare its LCOE to the 
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rate charged by the local utility.760 Several authors have estimated the PV LCOE’s for different 
countries.761 Schmidt et al762 obtained LCOE’s ranging from $0.20- $0.35/kWh for six developing 
countries – Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya, Nicaragua and Thailand.  Focusing only on Africa, it has 
been reported that estimated PV LCOEs range from $0.20- $0.51/kWh.763 On the other hand the PV 
LCOE for Canada ranges from $0.10 -$0.15/kWh,764 while that of the USA varies widely from 
$0.07-0.18/kWh for utility scale under various incentives.765  
Although several studies have been dedicated to economic and technical analysis in African 
countries, it remains challenging to project the study from one country to the other. Reasons include: 
the differences between regional markets, the complexity of the balance systems, transmission 
tariffs and labor rates.  Secondly the LCOE varies based on geographic (including solar insolation), 
financing terms, as well as the grid connection capacity of the existing system. Finally, the 
environmental aspect of large scale PV on developing nations and in particular Ghana has not been 
thoroughly studied. In the past two decades, Ghana’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has fluctuated 
initially dropping substantially from 1994 to 2004 by forty (40%), and later demonstrating a sharp 
increase between 2004 to 2012 of two thousand two hundred and sixty-five percent (2,265 %) (from 
233,000,000 in 1994, reduced to 139,270,000 in 2004, and 3,294,520,000 in 2012).766  Despite this 
increase, there is still a level of consternation among multinational enterprises in investing in various 
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and dispatchable electricity generating technologies” 100:238 (2011) American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings. 
761 Ibid, Branker et al. 
762 T S Schmidt, R Born & M Schneider “Assessing the Costs of Photovoltaic and Wind Power in Six Developing 
Countries” 2 (2012) Nature Climate and Change 548.  
763 Bazilian et al, supra note 756. 
764 K Branker, supra note 760. 
765 P Joskow “Comparing the costs of intermittent and dispatchable electricity generating technologies” 100:238 (2011) 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings. 
766 World Bank. ―Foreign Direct Investment, net flows‖ at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD 
last visited March 24, 2014.  
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sub-Saharan African countries, and particularly in high capital ventures such as PV plants. A number 
of scholars have explored the role of FDIs in contributing to development in Sub-Saharan Africa767 
however, few studies have focused on Ghana, and there is a clear absence in the literature on 
scholarly work dedicated to FDI and PV projects. This paper focusses on using a suitable 
mathematical model to calculate the LCOE and in the process demonstrate to investors the viability 
of investment in Ghana, while examining the technical and environmental constraints.  This model 
provides a framework and tools to help investors make good decisions in the complex LCOE 
calculations, thereby enhancing economic development through increased foreign direct 
investments (FDIs).  
  
2.0 ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION FOR PV PROJECTS IN GHANA  
Ghana lies near the equator, this prime location leads to the country having optimal access to 
solar resource. It is also considered as a country with relatively stable economic growth and a 
suitable climate for industrial investment. However, there is a growing need for access to electricity. 
Subsequently, the emerging economy faces energy crisis because the electricity generation lags 
behind demand. The demand for energy has doubled within the past decade as displayed in Fig. 1. 
In addition to this, system losses have increased correspondingly. The annual growth rate for 
electricity demand in the country has exceeded 10% in the last three years. For instance, between 
the first quarter of 2011, and the same period this year, the system peak demand has grown by 101 
MW (from 1609 MW to 1710 MW). Indeed, peak demand has now risen to 1,726 MW, supply 
                                                 
767 D W Loree, and E Guisinger "Policy and Non-Policy Determinants of US Equity Foreign Direct Investment." Journal 
of International Business Studies 1995, pp 281-299; T Addison, and H Almas, “The New Global Determinants of FDI 
flows to developing countries: The importance of ICT and democratization‖. No. 2003/45. WIDER Papers//World 
Institute for Development Economics (UNUWIDER), 2003.  
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capacity, however, has not kept pace with this growth in demand thereby putting the power system 
under great stress in 2012.768  
Transmission losses are also a major source of concern. As depicted in Fig. 1, the transmission 
network reported losses of about 2.8 % and that has steadily increased to about 4.7 % in 2013. To 
put the losses into perspective, in 2010, the transmission network transported about  
10,232.1GWh of electricity with 3.7% losses.  A loss of 3.7 % represents 378GWh.769 This amount 
of significant transmission losses in the system impacts the incentive for foreign investment.  
The Government of Ghana in a bid to encourage alternative sources of energy passed the 
renewable Energy Act 2011 [Act 832].  This act established Ghana’s first comprehensive guaranteed 
pricing structure for renewable energy production applicable to large-scale PV generation. This 
policy is also referred to as a feed in tariff (FIT). In Ghana, the current FIT rate of $0.20 /kWh is 
much higher than the rate of conventional sources.770 
Some factors particularly favorable to FDI’s include (i) political stability (ii) availability of 
solar resource, and substantial Government support. With all three indicators fairly met, it is a 
paradox that large scale PV generation has not yet began in Ghana with the exception of the 
Governments 2MW VRA test plant in the Northern region. The rest of the paper attempts to unravel 
this paradox by examining factors that are pivotal to attracting investors.  
2.1A Model for Investment in PV in Ghana 
Corporations involved with FDI are not only concerned with the LCOE, but also yielding a 
                                                 
768Ghana Grid Company Ltd. Annual Report  2011, online: 
http://www.gridcogh.com/media/photos/forms/annual/2011%20GRIDCo%20Annual%20Report.pdf, last visited March 
24, 2014. 
769 Public  Utility  and  Regulatory  Commission (2013), online:  
www.purc.com.gh/purc/sites/default/files/2013_Tariff_Prop 
osal_GRIDCo.pdf last visited March 24, 2014. 
770 Ibid; Energy Statistical Bulletin 2000-2011, Energy Commission, Ghana Publication April 2012.  
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return 
on investment Our LCOE was derived by analyzing the cost of generating electricity from PV, 
accounting for geographic location (including solar insolation), balance of system, inflation and 
discount rate.        
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Plot of energy demand and Loss between 2011 and 2013 (Source private communication with Gridco).  
 
2.1.1Mathematical Model  
The model proposed by Darling et al771 is adopted with our additional constraints.  
Mathematically, the LCOE is represented as;  
  
 
with   
 where PCI is the project cost minus any investment tax credit or grant, DEP is depreciation, INT is 
interest paid, LP is loan payment, and TR is the tax rate where AO is the annual operations cost, DR 
is the discount rate, RV is the residual value, SDR is the system degradation rate, and N is the 
                                                 
771 Darling et al, supra note 760. 
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number of years the system is in operation. This work assumes a 10 MW grid connected PV system 
is to be developed at each of the ten regional capitals.  The locations are Accra, Koforidua, 
Takoradi (Sekondi Takoradi), Kumasi, Tamale, Wa, Ho and Sunyani. Because Ghana lies close to 
the equator, a single tracking axis system will provide optimum results. The rest of the assumptions 
are displayed in table 1. 
 
Table 2: PV Cost Assumptions 
 PV COST 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
I Capacity Project MW 10 
Average Insolation in year (> 2500 sunshine hours) 5.4 
Output per year per MW Installed Capacity  MWH 1971 
Increase in Output with Tilt 15% 2267 
System Efficiency to Grid  87.50% 
Degradation Factor for Panels  0.75% 
Project Cost per MW   
II (including tilt) $ mil / MW 1.75 
Total Direct Project Cost $ mil 17.5 
Corporate, Consulting & Op 
Expense-Construct Period 
2 years 3.00 
Contingency as % of Project Cost  0.88 
Total Direct Project Cost $ mil 21.38 
Working Capital 2 years 1.09 
Total Capital Required $ mil 22.47 
Financing 
 
  
Debt 90.00% 20.22 
Equity 10.00% 2.25 
Interest of Bank Borrowings  6.00% 
Loan Repayment   
Grace Period for Principle & Interest Years 1 
(No Accrued Interest Capitalization 
during construction) 
2 years  
Repayment from COD Years 14 
Project Life Years 25 
   
 
2.2 Major LCOE Inputs 
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Our model for FDI indicates that the total upfront cost of a solar PV power plant can be split 
into several major components.772 These costs are dependent on a variety of parameters, as discussed 
below.  
2.2.1 Plant cost  
There are a variety of ways to talk about plant cost. The first step is to determine the type of 
technology suitable for ones needs. The conventional flat PV modules are preferred in developing 
countries as opposed to the new technology Concentrated Photovoltaics because of the reliable 
history flat PV’s have generated. In general, there are 3 types of flat panel PV modules on the 
market: monocrystalline, polycrystalline, and thin film panels. Polycrystalline has been found to be 
more suited for temperatures above 25°C.773  PV module costs represent 40-60% of total PV system 
costs, and installation costs account for the remaining costs.774   Hence the PV module cost displayed 
in table 1 is reasonable.775 The equipment cost reflects the cost of modules, inverters and balance of 
system (BOS). The BOS refers to all the components that make up the grid-tied PV system except 
the PV panels and the inverter, it includes the wiring, protection devices, enclosures, disconnects, 
installation equipment and power metering devices. 
  
2.2.2 Annual Cost 
In the LCOE calculation the present value of the annual system operating and maintenance 
costs is added to the total life cycle cost. These costs include inverter maintenance, panel cleaning, 
                                                 
772 W Muneer, K Bhattacharya, and C A Ca˜nizares “Large-Scale Solar PV Investment Models, Tools, and Analysis: 
The Ontario Case” 26:4 (2011) IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2547.  
773 D C Jordan   Methods for analysis of outdoor performance data. NREL PV Module Reliability Workshop, Golden CO, 
USA. http://www.nrel.gov/pv/pvmrw.html 2011.  
774 Muneer et al, supra note 772.  
775 Avior Energy Technical Reports, available online at www.aviorenergy.com (2013).  
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site monitoring, insurance, land leases, financial reporting, general overhead and field repairs, 
among other items.  
 
2.2.3 System Residual Value 
The present value of the end of life asset value is deducted from the total life cycle cost in 
the LCOE calculation. Silicon solar panels carry performance warranties for 25 years and have a 
useful life that is significantly longer. Therefore, if a project is financed for a 10- or 15-year term 
the project residual value can be significant.776  
 
2.2.4 System Energy Production  
The value of the electricity produced over the total life cycle of the system is calculated by 
determining the annual production over the life of the production which is then discounted based on 
a derived discount rate.  
  
3.0 PROJECT CONSTRAINTS  
  
The project constrains considered included: (i)The solar insolation (geographic location) and 
ambient conditions which defines the most attractive design. (ii) The capacity factor is an index of 
the efficiency of the plant’s output (iii) High capital cost (iv) Technical constraints.  
 
3.1 Solar Insolation 
  In other to determine the location of a PV plant, it is of prime importance to have an idea of 
the local weather and specifically the average annual daily solar radiation (kWh/m2/day),  as it is a 
                                                 
776 SunPower Corporation. ―Levelized Cost of Electricity - The Drivers of The Levelized Cost of electricity for Utility-
Scale Photovoltaics‖, 2008 pp. 1-27.  
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good indicator of the long-term performance and economics of solar energy systems at that 
location.777  
To this effect data of the seasonal variation in horizontal solar radiation were obtained from 
NASA online database778 and Avior Energy Inc. Technical reports.779  A plot of the solar irradiance 
for each of the capital cities is displayed in Fig. 6. These provide a rough indication of the solar 
resource available in the area in units of kWh/m2/day of insolation. It means that on a sunny day 
with the sun high in the sky, the insolation at the earth’s surface is roughly 1kW/m2 (1-sun).  
Therefore if, the average insolation is 5.4 kWh/m2 it is equivalent to 1 kW/m2for 5.4 hours of full 
sun.   
 
Figure 6: Average solar activity for Accra, Ghana.780   
                                                 
777 NASA Surface meteorology and Solar Energy (SSE) Dataset NASA Earth Science Enterprise Program in 
collaboration with CANMET Technology Centre, release 6.0, 2008, online: www.eosweb.larc.nasa.gov/sse/RETScreen/ 
last visited March 25, 2014. 
778 Ibid.  
779 Avior Energy Technical Reports, available online at www.aviorenergy.com (2013).  
780 Ibid; NASA (SSE) Dataset, supra note 777.  
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781 M Wajid, K Bhattacharya & C A Canizares, “Large-Scale Solar PV Investment Models, Tools, And Analysis: The 
Ontario Case” IEEE, sponsored by IEEE Power and Energy Society, May 27, 2011, online: 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5778963, last visited March 24, 2014.  
It can be seen from Fig. 5, that the average insolation of Ghana lies between 3.5 -6.4 kWh/m2.  The 
average solar insolation for the different cities (Fig. 5) displays a seasonal variation consistent with the 
rainfall pattern in Ghana. Generally, the rainy season which occurs from the 5th – 8th month has more 
cloud cover and hence a lower insolation levels for all the cities. Clear days especially in 2nd- 4th the dry 
season with little overcast occurring in the 2 months have higher insolation levels. Comparing the 
insolation at Wa with that of Cape Coast, we observed that the profile of Wa is about 15% higher than 
that of Cape Coast (Fig. 5). Hence in the average, a Wa location will give a PV output of 15% more 
output than an identical PV system situated in Cape Coast. 
 
3.2   System Capacity Factor  
         The capacity factor which is a key driver of a solar project’s economics is dependent on the solar 
irradiation. With the majority of the expense of a PV power plant being fixed, capital cost LCOE is 
strongly correlated to the power plant’s utilization (capacity factor). In this work we extend the concept 
developed by Wajid et al (2011)781 to evaluate the capacity. The capacity factor of a solar PV module is a 
function of the solar irradiance of the geographic location, and the performance of the PV panel among 
other factors.  Mathematically the capacity factor is evaluated as follow 
 
where , the energy produced is based on the number of daylight hours,   is the PV output and  is 
the rating of the PV module.  
Using the above equation the capacity factor for the different regional capitals is calculated and displayed 
in Fig.7.  It is worth mentioning that we were conservative in our calculations and we assumed the worst 
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case scenario for each case displayed in Fig. 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Solar capacity factors for the capitals in Ghana’s ten regions. 
 
The LCOE can be simplified to  
 
 
 
To illustrate the impact of the CF, the LCOE is evaluated assuming the same conditions and panels except 
for a change in CF due to solar irradiance. The result is displayed in Fig 8.  
The Wa site provides the most economically attractive returns, while Cape Coast provides the least returns. 
For the sake of brevity, all other factors were considered equal for all the regions with the exception of the 
CF. 
  
Figure 8:  LCOE for the different regional capitals. The LCOE increases with decreasing CF. 
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3.3 Capital Cost  
There are various ways to optimize the capital cost. However, because PV modules cost 
about 65% of the total capital cost hence an accurate forecast of the performance of the panels is 
crucial to project investors.782  Hence for our analysis, the focus is on ways we can minimize PV 
panel cost.   
First, capital cost can be reduced by minimizing the cost of the PV modules. PV modules 
are made up of interconnected PV cells and encapsulated to form modules. The PV module is 
protected further by covering the surface with tempered glass. The cost of shipping modules by sea 
is about $0.05–$0.06/W783 adding 5%–10% to module costs. As module costs decrease, shipping 
costs for some types of module manufacturing could become a more significant factor and may lead 
to disaggregated manufacturing models, with separate cell manufacturing and module assembly 
facilities, for example. Many PV components—including polysilicon, wafers, and cells—can be 
shipped cheaply due to their low weight and volume and high value. In fact, cells can often be 
shipped by air to module manufacturing facilities. The glass cover of c-Si modules adds the most to 
shipping costs, because glass is dense and tends to fill a shipping container based on weight rather 
than volume. Lower- efficiency modules have more glass per watt— and thus cost more to ship—
per unit of power. The key to reducing these charges is to ship the cells separately into the country, 
fabricate the glass locally and assembly the unit locally.    
Second, temperature plays an important role, PV modules are rated (power, voltage, and 
current) at a standard test condition (STC) temperature of 25°C (77°F). The effect of temperature 
                                                 
782 W Short, D Packey & T Holt “A Manual for the Economic Evaluation of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Technologies”, Report NREL/TP 1995 pp 462-5173.  
783 P Joskow, “Comparing the costs of intermittent and dispatchable electricity generating technologies” 100:238 (2011) 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings; A Goodrich, M Woodhouse, T James, “Installed Solar PV System 
Prices” ARPA-E Solar ADEPT/EERE SEGIS-AC Workshop (Proceedings) 2011.  
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on the PV module cannot be overstated, since crystalline silicon PV modules respond to the widely 
varying environmental conditions addressed above. From a performance perspective (needed to 
calculate the output of the PV system), the electrical output is directly proportional to the irradiance 
and has an inverse relationship with the module operating temperature. However, as the module 
temperature increases above the 25°C level, the module power output will drop about 0.5 percent 
per degree C increase in temperature.784 Hence meteorological records must be accessed to predict 
the temperature variation of the location.  
Finally, the PV modules cost about 65% of the total capital cost hence an accurate forecast 
of the performance of the panels is crucial to project investors. To be able to forecast accurately, the 
panel efficiency and an accurate quantification of power decline over time, also known as 
degradation rate is essential to all stakeholders. Financially, degradation of a PV module or system 
is equally important, because a higher degradation rate translates directly into less power produced 
and, therefore, reduces future cash flows.785  Furthermore, inaccuracies in determined degradation 
rates lead directly to increased financial risk.786  PV systems are often financed based on an assumed 
of 0.5 to 1.0% per year degradation rate although 1% per year is used based on warranties.787  
 
3.4 Interest Rates 
  
Large scale PV projects require a considerable size of investment. Such finance can be 
provided by commercial bank loans or equipment finance from a global PV companies.  For large 
                                                 
784 P Gilman, N Blair, & C Cameron, Solar Energy Costs: The Solar Advisor Model, in Solar Cells and their Applications 
(2nd Ed) in eds L Fraas and L. Partain (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Hoboken: NJ, USAm 2010)  pp 472-493  
785 Short & Packey, supra note 782. 
786 Ibid.  
787 D C Jordan & S R Kurtz, “Photovoltaic Degradation Rates—an Analytical Review” 21 (2013) Progress in 
Photovoltaics: Research and Applications 12.  
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scale utility projects involving PPA, the LCOE can be considered as revenue per unit of electricity 
generated that is required to recover costs, meet targets, cover debts and account for incentive 
payment. This required revenue can be considered as the LCOE .788  
Interest rate plays a substantial part which is the foremost in seeking finance for any project.  
In our calculation to verify the impact of interest rate on the LCOE, the following assumptions were 
made: (i) the life time of the solar farm was tied to the length of the PPA which is 20 years.789 The 
discount rate in was assumed to be constant at 6% .790  Fig. 9 shows how sensitive the LCOE is to 
interest rates. For each loan interest, at a debt fraction of 90% was assumed.  
 
  
Figure 9: Interest Rate as a function of LCOE  
  
The results are displayed in Fig 9 clearly shows that LCOE increases as interest rate increases and 
that LCOE is heavily dependent on interest rate. Secondly Fig. 9 illustrates that the LCOE for 
different CF varies with interest, by comparing the LCOE in $/kWh for identical PV systems 
installed in Cape Coast with identical systems installed in Wa as a function of the interest rate. To 
highlight the impact of interest component on LCOE, the models assumed that all other cost remain 
the same. Clearly the LCOE for the low CF (Cape Coast) is much higher than that of the relatively 
                                                 
788 P Gilman, N Blair, & C Cameron, “Solar Energy Costs: The Solar Advisor Model, in Solar Cells and their 
Applications” in L Fraas and L Partain eds., Solar Cell and Their Application 2nd ed (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Hoboken, 
NJ, USA: 2010) 472.  
789 Public  Utility  and  Regulatory  Commission (2013), online: 
www.purc.com.gh/purc/sites/default/files/2013_Tariff_Proposal_GRIDCo.pdf. 
790 Darling et al, supra note 755; K Zweibel, E James, & F Vasilis, “A Solar Grand Plan”, (2008) Scientific American 
64, online: http://www.science.smith.edu/~jcardell/Readings/uGrid/Solar_Plan_08.pdf, last visted March 10, 2014.   
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higher CF (Wa).  
  
3.5 Bankability 
Bankability refers to whether the projects using the solar products are likely to be offered 
non-recourse debt financing by banks. Banks and independent rating agencies use formal and 
informal ways to assess the credit risk of a project.  Projects have to meet minimum criteria in order 
to bankable through commercial debt; at least a BB or Ba grade is required to attract commercial 
debt.791 Lower credit rating implies higher interest rates.  Moody's Investors Service provides 
international financial research on bonds issued by commercial and government entities and, with 
Standard & Poor's and Fitch Group, is considered one of the Big Three credit rating agencies.  
Unfortunately, Moody’s has lowered Ghana’s B1 sovereign rating from stable to negative, 
the agency announced December 5, 2013.792 This implies that financing from a commercial bank 
for a solar project in Ghana will inquire higher interest rate, to obtain lower interest rates, equipment 
finance from large scale PV manufactures should be negotiated.793 The bankability of a project is 
not only predicated on the pragmatics of systems capacity factors and technical constraints, but also 
on the viability of obtaining a bankable PPA. This includes negotiating payment currencies and 
frequencies, bank guarantees and comfort letters, price escalators and a term duration sufficient 
enough to recoup the capital investment and earn a profit from the project. Consequently, PV 
projects require not just a solid financial plan and technical expertise, but also a legal team that is 
familiar with PPA clauses and negotiations. A small omission as not negotiating a price escalator 
                                                 
791 H Cleijne, and W Ruijgrok, “Modelling Risks of  Renewable Energy Investments Work Package 2” - Report witin 
the 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission supported by DG Research (Netherlands, July 2004), online: 
https://green-x.at/downloads/WP2%20-
%20Modelling%20risks%20of%20renewable%20energy%20investments%20(Green-X).pdf.  
792 Ghanawebn(2013) http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/artikel.php?ID=294353   
793 Avior  Energy  Technical  Reports,  available  online  at www.aviorenergy.com 
(2013).  
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that is greater than the rate of inflation could render the PPA un-bankable, and unable to attract 
FDIs.  
  
3.6 Technical Constraints 
These constraints deal with the actual construction and output of the PV farm. More often 
than not, a solar PV project can be made more economical by combining excellent components of 
various types of technologies and brands, for example, the PV panels are bought from a manufacturer 
other than the one supplying the inverter, checking the performance of the various types of 
technology can be extremely daunting. To maximize the output, there is a need for a universal 
algorithm that monitors performance of the entire site and can also detect a drop in performance of 
a specific unit of the site.794 Other constraints include the degradation of the optical performance of 
the PV panels due to the accumulation of dirt on the PV panels especially in the dry season. Cleaning 
panels represents a considerable expense in manpower and water, usually a scarce resource in the 
dry season. Currently there is no record of any efficient automatic panel cleaning device. Developing 
of such a device will minimize the use of water and potentially decrease the expense of manpower. 
Furthermore, degradation also contributes to module mismatch over time which adversely impacts 
power plant performance.   
  3.7 Transmission Constraints 
 
Illiceto et al reported that within the period of 1996- 1998 the 161 KV lines underwent an 
average of 2.1 outages per 100 Km per year due to lightening and transient faults.795  Although 
                                                 
794 Black and Veatch Corporation Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative Phase 2B: Draft Report. Sacramento, CA: 
RETI Stakeholder Steering Committee, 2010.  
795 F Iliceto, F M Gatta, S Lauria, and  G Dokyi ―Three-Phase and Single-Phase Electrification in Developing Countries 
Using the Insulated Shield Wires of HV Lines Energized at MV", CIRED paper N° 5/p10, Session, (Nice, France: 1999).  
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GRIDco reports that the occurrence of power outages on the power lines is significantly lower, there 
are no existing records available to us to suggest otherwise. Besides there are no clear guidelines in 
the Renewable Energy Act as to who is responsible to pay for the power of renewable energy without 
storage in the case of such an outage. Furthermore, there is no grid code for renewable energy. This 
lack of uniformity will be an impediment to integrating renewable energy on the grid.  
Currently in Ghana there is an on-going project to replace all the 161kV lines with 330kV 
as the country’s primary transmission backbone will be 330 kV, which will provide significant 
reinforcement and increased power transfer capability from generators to load centres. Although 
this is a step in the right direction, conventional power systems have addressed the uncertainty of 
load demand by controlling supply. With renewable energy sources, however, uncertainty and 
intermittency on the supply side must also be managed. The smart grid—an evolution of electricity 
networks toward greater reliance on communications, computation, and control—promises a 
solution.  
4.0 DISCUSSIONS  
  As mentioned earlier, grid parity is considered pivotal for the cost effectiveness of solar PV, 
and entails reducing the cost of solar PV electricity to be competitive with conventional grid-supplied 
electricity. For parity, the total cost to consumers of PV electricity is compared to retail grid 
electricity prices. Although the LCOE is not the same as retail electrical prices, it is used as a proxy 
for the total price to be paid by consumers, adding in as many of the realistic costs as possible. The 
LCOE methodology is then used to back calculate what the required system and finance costs need 
to be to attain grid parity.  
In Ghana, electricity prices range from $0.09/kWh $0.22/kWh in major cities for residential 
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and commercial load796 so using that as a proxy for grid parity, with the addition of  incentives like 
carbon credit  and government tax credits, the LCOE for solar in Ghana is attractive.   
Any the positive aspects of PV far outweigh any negative potential,  however, the potential 
destruction of farms, and forest  land for PV’s should be considered carefully.   
  
5.0 CONCLUSIONS  
A number of measures from the developing point of view was discussed that can reduce the 
LCOE. By the methodology adopted, site, CF and capital cost can reduce the LCOE, and make the 
project viable.  
Ghana’s’ solar resource is vast, accessible, and can be synchronous with energy demand. 
While the resource differs from one region to the other, with proper planning a suitable site can be 
accessed. The main factor limiting utilization of the Ghana’s solar resource at a large scale today is 
its cost and bankability of the PPA.  Secondly if the residents of the country pay less than the tariff 
as it used to be in the case (electricity bill was $0.05/kWh), while solar tariffs were $0.24/kWh,797 it 
drives FDI’s away because the process appears to be unsustainable.  However, with the recent 
increase in tariffs (domestic users are currently at ranging from   $0.09/kWh whilst heavy industrial 
users like the mines are at $ 0.22/kWh) makes the program sustainable (albeit the FIT is now 
$0.20/kWh).   
The poor credit rating of the Government of Ghana (although ECG is the off taker) negatively 
                                                 
796 Public  Utility  and  Regulatory  Commission (2013) 
www.purc.com.gh/purc/sites/default/files/2013_Tariff_Proposal_GRIDCo.pdf  
 
797 Avior  Energy  Technical  Reports,  available  online  at www.aviorenergy.com 
(2013).  
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impacts lending interest rates from commercial banks for developing solar PV’s in Ghana, it is 
therefore suggested that project developers should seek equipment finance from venture and 
manufacturing companies to reduce interest rates.  Finally, for brevity the cost of land was assumed 
to be the same for all regional capitals, which is not the case and that should be factored in any 
working model.  The final conclusion is that the frame work and technology that currently exist is 
sufficient and cost effective to attract FDI, when the right modalities are considered.   
  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CREATING A GREEN ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
 
CLIMATE FINANCE AS AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO THE UNDER-
REPRESENTATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A number of Conference of Parties (“COP”) to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change 
(“the UNFCCC”) have addressed the issue of climate change and its effect on the developing 
world. Energy insecurity must be addressed as a precondition to sustainable development, along 
with the regional factors that pose legal and institutional barriers to implementing of green energy 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  Many sub-Saharan African nations have enacted renewable energy 
laws and regulations to increase investor confidence in green energy projects.  Despite current 
regulatory enhancements, investors are still reluctant to invest in the region due to financing and 
political risks. Climate financing could potentially address investor concerns, however, initiatives 
like the Green Climate Fund (“GC Fund”) and the African Climate Change Fund need to be 
implemented in a manner that promotes confidence among investors in these high capital projects.  
Arguably, for climate financing to achieve its full potential in sub-Saharan Africa it must be 
implemented in an innovative fashion that contemplates the infrastructure, environment and social 
governance for investments as well as fulfilling the dual goal of development and balancing 
national commitments under the Paris Climate Change Agreement (COP 21).  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 Climate change is an urgent global challenge that requires unprecedented legal and policy 
innovation to reduce global CO2 emission levels. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction estimates that approximately an annual loss in global GDP production of US$ 4 trillion 
per year (or 5%) is attributed to climate change.798  Energy security issues are at the forefront of 
many national policies, however, developing nations must simultaneously contend with issues 
relating to poverty and the lack of energy.  There is still 1.1 billion people world-wide without 
access to electricity, and in sub-Saharan Africa only 65 percent of the population lacks access to 
electricity which is the highest among all regions.799   
 Financial impediments have been identified as a primary barrier to developing renewable 
energy choices in Africa.  In 2013 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) along with the Climate Policy Initiative conducted a study on climate finance and 
identified the lack of climate financing as one of the primary barriers to implementing green 
projects in the developing world.  They estimated that developed countries had mobilized US $62 
billion towards climate finance.800  Despite this large financial commitment, regions like sub-
Saharan Africa have not shared in the benefits from these climate funds.  Some developing nations 
have argued that there was limited transparency in the OECD report and that the actual figure is 
closer to US $2.2 billion,801 thus, explaining the limited impact on certain regions.   
                                                 
798 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, From Shared Risk to Shared Value – The business Case for 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Global Assessment Report for Disaster Risk Reduction (Geneva, 2013). 
799 World Bank, World Development Indicators: Featuring the Sustainable Development Goals (Washington: World 
Bank Group, 2016), online: 
www.openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23969/9781464806834.pdf,  14 accessed 3 June, 2017. 
800 OECD “Climate Finance in 2013-2014 and the USD 100 Billion Goal”, a report by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative (2015), online: 
www.oecd.org/environment/cc/OECD-CPI-Climate-Finance-Report.pdf,  7 accessed July 4, 2017. 
801 Paris Climate Talks: Indian Officials Accuse OECD of Exaggerating Climate Aid, 
www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/02/paris-climate-talks-indian-officials-accuse-rich-countries-of-
exaggerating-climate-aid. 
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According to the African Development Bank the lack of climate financing in sub-Saharan 
Africa is largely attributable to infrastructural problems. The Akinwumi Adesina, President of the 
African Development Bank notes that “If we don’t fix Africa’s infrastructure financing gap – 
which we put at some US $60 – 70 billion a year – we will continue to take two percentage points 
off Africa’s annual growth rates…”802   In 2014, a total of US$ 391 billion was invested in climate 
finance initiatives, yet, despite bearing a disproportionate impact of climate change, sub-Saharan 
Africa only yielded US$ 12 billion(3%) of the total global climate change investments.803  With 
specific reference to renewable energy investments, in 2014 these initiatives far surpassed all other 
categories of mitigation finance combined, accounting for 81% or US$ 292 billion.804  A negligible 
amount was allocated towards sub-Saharan Africa projects. 
 1.1 Research Question 
 This paper will begin by exploring possible regional barriers to the implementation of green 
energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  It will examine the lack of interest in renewable energy 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa and question whether local policies, institutions and organizational 
structure may act as barriers to investors.  In this regard, can international Agreements like the 
2015 Paris Agreement805  address some of the financial barriers to sustainable development by 
creating a financial environment that is conducive to green energy projects and climate finance for 
sub-Saharan Africa?  Specifically, this paper highlights the role of climate finance in addressing 
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals from both a host nation perspective, and also an 
                                                 
802 Africa Development Bank Group, “ACCF Grants USD 1.35 Million to Enhance Climate Finance Readiness in 
Cape Verde, Kenya and Swaziland”, (October 23, 2016) online: www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/the-future-
of-africa-lies-inside-africa-15606/.   
803 Ibid. 
804 Barbara Bucher et al, The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2015, Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) Report (San 
Francisco, CPI, 2015), online: www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Landscape-of-
Climate-Finance-2015.pdf , 9.  
805 UNFCCC, Paris Climate Agreement, online: www.unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php, accessed July 1, 
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international law approach.  The study will highlight climate financing instruments and provisions 
in international Agreements and explore whether they have been effectively operationalized in 
relation to sub-Saharan Africa.  The scope of analysis will focus on renewable energy projects, 
such as solar photovoltaic plants (“PV”), and the barriers of private financing for these high 
investment initiatives. 
According to the International Energy Agency, Africa’s greenhouse gas contribution is 8% 
of the total global emission, and 21% of the carbon from forest biomass.806   With deforestation 
accounting for about 12 to 17 % of total greenhouse gas emissions,807 and 81.2% of the sub-
Saharan African population reliant on biomass as the source of energy,808 the potential for 
renewable energy projects cannot be overlooked.   In this regard, the importance of including sub-
Saharan Africa in mitigation efforts is tied to the fact that a large number of the continent’s 
population are reliant on fossil fuels and forests play a role in regulating greenhouse gases.  As 
such, the mitigation strategy of preserving forests and finding alternative energy sources for the 
growing sub-Saharan population must be equally considered in global climate change abatement 
measures.   Moreover, despite sub-Saharan Africa’s current low contribution to GHG emissions, 
emission projections for the next two decades are expected to increase by 50% within the region.809  
This great increase may negate gains made in other parts of the world.  The International Energy 
Agency expects that the developing world will account for 93% of the growth in energy needs 
from 2010 to 2035.810  The statistics point to the need to steer Africa down a sustainable 
                                                 
806IEA (International Energy Agency), “2009 Energy Balance for Africa”, online 
www.iea.org/stats/balancetable.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=11. 
807 G Van der Werf, D Morton, R DeFries, J Olivier, P Kasibhatia, R Jackson, G Collatz, J Randerson, “CO2 Emissions 
from Forest Loss” (2009) 2 Nature Geoscience 737. 
808 K Stecher, A Brosowski, and D Thran, (2013) Biomass Potential in Africa, A Publication of IRENA and DBFZ.  
809 IEA (International Energy Agency), 2010. World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris, France: International Energy 
Agency, online: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf.    
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development path that will require investments in the renewable energy infrastructure.   These 
investments must find innovative ways balance the needs of investors to create financially viable 
projects, while addressing the continent’s energy infrastructure needs.  
Climate finance instruments can adopt the form of a concessional loan, grants, letters of 
credit, or bank guarantees.  The UNFCCC does not have a specific definition of climate finance,811 
however, it has combined a number of aggregate factors which frames the goal of climate finance 
as “reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability 
of, and maintaining the increasing resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate 
change impacts.”812   The financial mechanism was initially articulated in relation to technology 
transfer under Article 11 of the UNFCCC as providing “financial resources on a grant of 
concessional loan basis, including for the transfer of technology”.813  Climate financing 
encompasses, loans, grants, equity investments, venture capital, infrastructural funds, institutional 
investors and government guarantees. The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance Report 
explains climate finance as followings: 
“Climate finance data are aggregated in two ways in the 2014 BA: (i) Global climate 
finance which includes public and private financial resources devoted to addressing climate 
change globally, and (ii) Flows from developed to developing countries aimed at 
addressing climate change, which includes climate finance reported to the UNFCCC.”814 
 
The Report further concluded that both the National Communications and Biennial Reports need 
to present a more “comprehensive picture of climate finance”, and that “information on both 
finance provided by developed countries and finance received by developing countries is 
                                                 
811 UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance: 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows 
Report, online: 
www.unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2014_bie
nnial_assessment_and_overview_of_climate_finance_flows_report_web.pdf, 5. 
812 Ibid.  
813 UNFCCC 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany. 
814 UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, 2014, supra note 811 at 34. 
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needed”.815  The UNFCCC Report describes global climate finance as including the following: 
 “all financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and/or  
 to enhance resilience to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate 
change. This covers  private and public funds, domestic and international climate finance 
flows, and expenditures for  mitigation and adaptation to current  climate variability as 
well as future climate change. It covers the full value of the financial flow rather than the 
share associated with the climate change benefit, e.g. the entire investment in a wind 
turbine rather than the portion attributed to the emission reductions (IPCC 2014).”816  
 
The Report estimates that the climate finance flows to the developing world range from 40 to 175 
billion USD per year, or which 35 to 50 billion are from public institutions and 5 to 125 billion are 
from private finance.817  While the summary of climate finance includes private funds, these funds 
are not “systematically tracked” resulting in only limited information existing about the level of 
contribution.818  The shortcomings in tracking private financing may contribute to an added 
obstacle when assessing how the Paris Agreement will address some of the financial obstacles that 
previously limited sub-Saharan Africa’s inclusion in private climate finance projects.    
2.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEAN ENERGY PROJECTS TO SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
 Africa’s development challenges have longed been linked to the lack of accessible energy.  
Access to affordable renewable energy is also directly tied to a country’s access to the finances.  
The lack of finances curtails the development of industries fueled by renewal energy, as well as a 
nation’s transition to a sustainable renewable alternatives. Müller et al have found that countries 
with higher gross domestic products per capital are more readily adapted to renewable energy 
technologies. 819  Thus, the wealthier the nation, the more likely that it will have the resources to 
                                                 
815 Ibid, 6. 
816 Ibid, 15.  
817 Ibid, 6. 
818 Ibid, 16. 
819 S Müller, A Brown and S Ölz, Renewable Energy. Policy Considerations for Deploying Renewables (Information 
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fund renewable energy projects.  In addition, the “full belly thesis” espoused by Damilola Olawuyi 
in The Human Rights Based Approach to Carbon Finance, maintains that citizens would only 
become concerned with issues like choosing renewable alternative over high polluting fossil fuels 
after their basic necessities have been met.820  Olawuyi also raises concern related to carbon finance 
and the ability to safeguard against funding projects that violate human rights.821   
The World Bank’s prepared the World Development Indicators: Featuring the Sustainable 
Development Goals which identified “universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy 
services [as] critical to sustainable development.”822 In relation to energy and sustainable 
development, the Report concluded the following:  
“Energy, especially electricity, is crucial to improving the standard of living  for 
people in low-and middle income countries. It is key to providing reliable  and efficient 
lighting, heating, cooking, and mechanical power; to delivering clean water, sanitation, and 
healthcare; and to operating well functioning transport and telecommunications services. 
Modern energy services are central to the economic development of a country and to the 
welfare of its citizens. Without such services, businesses stagnate, and the potential of 
people to live healthy, productive lives is diminished.”823 
 
Poverty eradication, especially in Africa, cannot seriously be addressed without a discussion of 
energy security.   
   
2.1 Barriers to Clean Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The lack of regulatory energy framework was once recognized as a primary obstacle to 
attracting foreign investments in the renewable sector.824  However, many sub-Saharan African 
nations have implemented renewable energy legislation and regulatory frameworks that promote 
                                                 
820 Damilola Olawuyi, The Human Rights Based Approach to Carbon Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
821 Ibid. 
822 World Development Indicators (2016), supra note 799 at 14. 
823 Ibid, 14. 
824 World Bank, A Brighter Future? Energy in Africa’s Development (World Bank, 1996). 
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practices like feed-in tariffs that take into consideration investor risks. Thus, the new regulatory 
framework did not cure fundamental problems, including namely, the lack of finance to fund 
renewable energy projects, and also the absence of poor institutional policy frameworks to 
facilitate alternative energy markets.  Essentially, a change in regulatory frameworks alone is 
insufficient to address the range of obstacles including “economic, policy, structural and social 
challenges”825, that could impede the implementation of renewable energy technologies.  In this 
regard, an enabling infrastructure that includes policy organizations aimed at facilitating the 
economic, technical, financial and social needs of the community’s transition to renewable energy 
must complement regulatory changes in order to have a societal impact.  
The International Support for Domestic Action (“ISDA”) Project featured case studies on 
the barriers to transition to low carbon economies in five developing countries.  The study 
recognized the need for private and public sector investment in encouraging low-carbon choices.826  
The ISDA study explored some of the reasons why private financiers shy away from investing in 
green projects.  They note that a “frequent mentioned reason is that the risk of return ratio of 
climate often does not compete with that of conventional projects.”827  One of the 
recommendations for international support mechanisms is to “facilitate access to finance to support 
private investors in the transition to low carbon investment”.828  In 2010, the Cancun Agreement 
(COP 16) recognized the need to set specific targets for climate finance by stating that “developed 
                                                 
825 S Hostettler, “Energy Challenges in the Global South”,  In: S Hostettler, A Gadgil, and E. Hazboun 
(eds). Sustainable Access to Energy in the Global South: Essential Technologies and Implementation Approaches, 3-
9 (London: Springer International Publishing, 2015); Lada V Kochtcheeva, Renewable Energy: Global Challenges 
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826 International Support for Domestic Action (“ISDA”), online: www.iddri.com/Publications/Publications-
scientifiques-et-autres/isda_financial-support_september-2009-report.pdf, 3. 
827 Ibid, 7. 
828 Karsten Neuhoff et al, “Structuring International Financial Support to Support Domestic Climate Change 
Mitigation in Developing Countries” (Climate Strategies, 2009), online: www.iddri.com/Publications/Publications-
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country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the 
needs of developing countries.”829  The Cancun COP outlined a variety of sources of financing 
ranging from public and private, bilateral and multilateral financing to developing country 
Parties.830  A new commitment of 30 billion US$ was also undertaken to finance Fast-start Finance 
that supports mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries. The 30 billion US$ 
commitment for Fast-start Financing was reiterated in the Bali COP 18.831    
The issue of Africa’s underrepresentation within the climate finance sphere is compounded 
when the issue of private finance of renewable energy projects are considered.  Global climate 
finance increased in 2014 and was largely attributed to “a steady increase in public finance and 
record private investments in renewable energy technologies.”832 Climate finance flows totaled 
US$ 391 billion in 2014 with 148 billion generated from public finance and 243 billion from 
private funds.833    With respect to the sources of funding developed from private investors, project 
developers comprised US $92 billion of the total $243 billion in funds raised by this sector. 
                                                 
829 COP 16, Cancun Decision 1/CP.16, www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf, para 98. 
830 Ibid. 
831 Bali (COP 18) Decision 1/CP.18, United Nations, “Bali Action Plan 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on Its Thirteenth Session held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, 
online: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf, accessed 18 August, 2017.  
832 Global Landscape of Climate Finance, supra note 804 at 1. 
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Figure 10: Global Mitigation Financing 2014, totaled US 391 billion.834 
 
 
Of the 391 billion in climate financing, 93% was focused on mitigation initiatives and 81% of the 
total amount (US$ 361 billion) was directed towards renewable energy activities.835  In 2015 the 
renewable energy landscape would be funded 80% by private sector funds (US$ 242 billion) versus 
20% public finance (representing US$49 billion).836   The 2016 World Bank Group annual report 
acknowledges that  $720 million will be allocated to the Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low 
Income Countries Program (“SREP”).837  
Another barrier to financing green energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa is that many 
countries in the region may not have the institutional structures that would lend confidence to 
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835 Ibid, 9. 
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raising the private capital required to fund high cost projects.  Private funds appear to be 
predominantly spent in the region where those funds were initially raised, and “92% of private 
investments were raised and spent within the same country, highlighting the importance of 
domestic frameworks for attracting investments.”838  This outcome is primarily due to the fact that 
private developers will often invest in projects and regions where their risks are low or mitigated 
by governmental policies, guarantees and political risk factors.  The propensity of private investors 
investing in regions where the finance is being raised has led to disproportionate investments 
outcomes, with sub-Saharan Africa being per capital the least desirable area of private climate 
finance flows.  Of the total USD$ 391 billion investments in 2014, sub-Saharan Africa only yielded 
USD$ 12 billion(3%) of the total global climate change investments with Asian and the Pacific 
receiving the largest finance flows of USD $119 billion (31%), and China receiving USD$ 84 
billion (22%).839 
Figure 11:840 Climate Finance by Region USD$ Billion (2014) 
 
 
                                                 
838 Ibid, 10. 
839 Ibid. 
840 The date in this chart was taken from: “Global Landscape of Climate Finance”, supra note 804 at 10. See 
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2015.pdf, 2 
accessed May 24, 2017. 
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The regional disparities revealed by the statistical evidence of climate finance flows cannot be 
understated, and raises questions about how to improve the regional investment framework and 
provide confidence to private investors considering projects within the sub-Saharan African 
region.   
 
3.0 OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO FINANCING GREEN ENERGY PROJECTS IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND AND THE AFRICAN 
CLIMATE CHANGE FUND 
 
 The seminal role of financial institutions in shaping economic policy was advanced by John 
Gurley and E Shaw in their article “Financial Aspects of Economic Development”.841  A modern 
and innovative approach to climate finance should consider the role of local financial policies in 
facilitating climate change and how initiatives like the Green Climate Fund (“GC Fund”) can offset 
these regional problems.  Barriers can be removed through private Sector Facility which allows 
private financiers to access finance through the GC Fund.   
3.1 The Green Climate Fund and the African Climate Change Fund 
The establishment of the GC Fund (“the Fund”) and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 
at the COP21 creates a framework for the mobilization of global climate finance initiatives 
including the continent of Africa.  Climate finance attempts to address the challenges that arise 
from meeting the population growth needs while keeping carbon emissions within a globally 
acceptable level.  Therefore, the goal must consider both the objective of meeting and expanding 
the current needs while also providing a mechanism to include the 1.2 billion people around the 
globe that lack access to energy.842   
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 The effectiveness of the GC Fund’s programming are measured by “country-driven 
programming”, the viability of the “investment framework, which lays out the criteria against 
which proposals will be considered”, and the “results management framework, which sets out the 
metrics by which the results and impact will be monitored and assessed.”843  High value areas of 
the Funds investments in reduced emissions were also identified as including: energy generation 
and access, transportation, building (cities, industries and appliances), forest and land use.  
Country ownership of projects is a fundamental cornerstone of the Fund.  Each country 
was required to establish a National Designated Authority (NDA) which will facilitate projects 
and interactions with the Fund. The Funds are directly administered through accredited entities 
including government ministries, local development banks, and other organizations that meet the 
Funds standards.  The non-objection procedure ensures national ownership over the development 
and initiative and prevents private interest from hijacking projects.  This ensures that no goals that 
are parallel or contrary to the national initiatives are funded through the project.   
Shortly after the GC Fund was created, it became obvious that sub-Saharan Africa was not 
optimizing climate financing in ways like regions such as China and India.  This reality gave rise 
to an initiative to create an ACC Fund that would respond to the direct and special needs of 
countries on the African continent. This push was borne out of not only addressing mitigation 
factors, but a recognition that the poorest countries will suffer a disproportionate impact from 
climate change and may also be ill-equipped to adapt to the change.   
 An interesting aspect of the GC Fund is that it provides both loan and grants for public and 
private sector climate initiatives which were extensively canvassed in both the 8th and 9th Board 
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meeting of the Fund. The 8th Board Meeting of the Green Climate Fund laid out the foundations 
for grants and concessional loans terms.844  The terms for both grants and concessional loans, 
factored in issues relating to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement on and the 
prohibition against distortive subsidies.845  Accordingly, both grants and loans will have a service 
fee of 0.5 percent and a commitment fee of 0.7 percent.846  Grants can contain a repayment period, 
in which case these grants would be highly concessional with grace periods of up to 10 years.  For 
grants without a repayment contingency, such instruments would have no reimbursement 
provision. Loans are also divided into two categories: highly concessional (with up to 40 year 
repayment and 10 years grace period) and moderately concessional (with up to 25 year repayment 
and 5 year grace period). Interest rates are based on a number of country factors including credit 
risk, while concessionality is largely tied to whether it is public initiative (more concessional) or 
private sector (less concessional) project.  While the grant portion may be advanced with or without 
a repayment contingency to rebuff allegations of a prohibited subsidy, the repayment contingency 
is primarily only applicable to the private sector.   
 Funding through grants or loans of up to US$50 million can also utilize the simplified no-
objection procedure.  This process does not require the approval of the Investment Committee 
Board on the recommendation from the Secretariat and the technical advisory report from the 
Technical Advisory Panel, but instead may obtain a decision directly from the Executive Director 
of the Secretariat. There are also flexibilities or concessionalities that can be applied in the manner 
                                                 
844 Green Climate Fund, 2014. Revised Programme of Work on Readiness and Preparatory Support. 8th Board Meeting, 
GCF/B.08/11, October 2014, online: www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/documents/MOB201410-
8th/GCF_B.08_10Revised_Program_Work_Readiness_fin_20141007.pdf [“Green Climate Fund”]. 
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Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 14 online: 
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by which the loans are dispensed, with again the public sector receiving more concessions that the 
private sector loans.847  One such concessionality is found in the “Other Financial Instruments” 
commitment that recognizes the need to provide guarantees and equity to finance higher risk 
climate change projects.  The Board also approved an allocation that equally distributes funding 
based on 50% mitigation and 50% adaptation initiatives, with 50% of these funds being allocated 
for LDC, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and other sub-Saharan African nations.848   The 
ninth Board meeting of the Green Climate Fund queried the initial mobilization process that would 
be in place for establishing investment portfolios.  Seven strategic programming approaches were 
identified, these include: emissions reduction potential, adaptation costs and needs, poverty 
alleviation and vulnerability, co-benefits, cost efficiency programming priorities including other 
climate related funds, and the potential for private sector investments.849  
The ACC Fund was established April 2014 to act as a bilateral trust fund with a mandate 
to facilitate global climate finance to regional member countries.  The ACC Fund supported its 
first two projects: the first, allocated USD $ 420,000 towards the appropriate and accurate 
measurements of “up-to-date information on climate change vulnerabilities, greenhouse gas 
emissions and opportunities for climate change adaptation and mitigation.”850  The second grant 
was given to Mali in the amount of US $ 404,000 to develop strategic programs for climate 
resilience strategies.851  The ACC Fund operates under the Africa Development Bank and has 
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financed projects in Mali, Cape Verde, Swaziland, Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Kenya primarily for 
climate finance readiness.852  In May 2016 the bank also granted a US$ 0.8 million capacity and 
mobilization grant in Côte d’Ivoire.853  Two of three of the first projects were in Africa, and 
collectively received $363 million to rebuild Peruvian wetlands, providing off-grid solar in East 
Africa and enhancing the extreme weather warning system in Malawi.  By 2013 there were at least 
15 climate funds that were active in Africa.854   Under the new model, the GC Fund will fund 
approximately 40% of the Green Facility for Africa (formerly known as the Africa Green Fund), 
and this new model will be managed by the African Development Bank.855 
 Currently, the Green Climate Fund projects in sub-Saharan Africa that have received 
funding are largely small-scale as medium/large scale projects and are generally not funded by 
grants on the continent of Africa.  Of the 492 projects, only 9 were large-scale projects, and all 
were funded by loans, while 483 were small scale and funded by a combination of financial 
instruments (grants 467, loans 8, private equity 1, unknown 7).856   The reality of funding only 
equity funded small-scale projects, and only 9 loan funded large-scale projects, reveals the 
reluctance on the part of investors to undertake both large-scale projects along with those involving 
equity and loan components on the continent.  
3.2 The Paris Agreement & Green Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 The Paris Agreement was adopted on December 12, 2015 by the Conference of Parties to 
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the UNFCCC.  Despite the existence of numerous international agreements that referenced the 
importance of finances in assisting developing and least-developed countries,857 the Paris 
Agreement did not address the mechanisms that would assist least-developed and developing 
nations to meet climate change obligations.858 In December 2015, the Paris Climate Change 
Conference (COP21) was held and it was the culmination of numerous attempts to craft an 
international climate regime agreement that initially began in Bali (2007), continued in 
Copenhagen (2009) and was attempted again in Durban (2011).  The commitment to negotiate the 
Paris Agreement essentially emerged out of the 17th Conference of Parties in Durban 2011.  In 
preparation for the Paris Conference, all national participants were invited to initially submit 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (“INDC”) prior to attending the Conference and to 
firm up these intentions in Nationally Determined Contributions (“NDC”).  The Paris Agreement 
sets the goal of “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ºC above pre-
industrial levels…”.859  NDC is a movement away from pre-determined standards as set out in 
treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, to an approach that permits Members to set “voluntary” targets as 
adopted in the “Lima Call to Action” which recognized “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”.860  The Paris Agreement is the first international climate change Agreement that 
permits Members to submit their own voluntary pledges to climate change mitigation, which were 
                                                 
857Montreal Protocol on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3, 26 ILM 1541 
(entered into force 1 January 1989); UNFCCC, supra note 241; Kyoto Protocol,  supra note 240;  Copenhagen Accord, 
United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen; Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force 21 March 1994; United Nations, “Agenda 21: Earth Summit – The United 
Nations Programme of Action from Rio” (June 1992); TRIPS: 1994: Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Appendix 1C of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Apri15), online: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. 
858Paris Agreement, supra note 805.  
859 Ibid, Article 2(a). 
860Lima Call for Action (Decision -1-CP.20), online: 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/application/pdf/auv_cop20_lima_call_for_climate_action.pdf.   
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used to carve out the first international agreement on climate change.  
  Despite the existence of numerous international Agreements that referenced the 
importance of finances in assisting developing and least-developed countries,861 financial 
mechanism provisions were finally incorporated in the Paris Agreement.862  These financial 
requirements currently in the Paris Agreement already existed in Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the 
UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement however added a new layer of mandatory reporting attached to 
the voluntary pledges. 
The financial mechanism in the Paris Agreement is one of the most important elements of 
the Agreement.  National climate change strategies are decided by the COP21 in the Paris 
Agreement and the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) for the Climate Fund.  
Contributions to the GC Fund are voluntary.  It was anticipated that the Green Climate Fund (“GC 
Fund”) would replace the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, the Global Environmental Facility 
(“GEF”) and the World Bank’s Climate Investment Fund.  The Ad Hoc Working Group on long-
term Cooperation Action (AWG-LCA) outlines how the GCF would be implemented.  It was 
decided by the AWG-LCA that the GCF would be “accountable to and functions under the 
guidance of the Conference of Parties”,863 which is similar to the GEF which is also accountable 
to the COP. 
 The Financial Mechanism as outline in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement can only be 
operationalized within the context of climate change projects in sub-Saharan Africa if they respond 
to the concerns of investors, including economic risk, the bankability of the project needs, political 
                                                 
861Montreal Protocol, supra note 857; UNFCCC, supra note 241; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 240; Bali Action Plan, 
supra note 233; Copenhagen Accord, supra note 857; Agenda 21, supra note 857; TRIPS, supra note 857. 
862Paris Agreement, supra note 805.   
863 UNFCCC (2010) “Outcome of the Work f the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under 
the Convention” Advance unedited version, Draft decisions -/CP.16.Available, online: 
www.unfccc.int/file/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para 102 accessed July 22, 2017. 
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and regional risk factors.  In the case with solar projects that are based on feed-in tariffs, the issue 
of bankability relates to the ability of the particular government to meet its financial commitment 
from the commercial operation period, and at the minimum to cover the risks covering the 6 year 
old break-even period.   Factors such as a country’s credit rating affect its perceived bankability, 
and if the ability of the government to pay is in question, this concern impacts the developer’s 
ability to obtain equity and debt financing. 
 Another method that can be adopted in climate financing is public credit guarantees.  These 
instruments could be raised to offset the risk that the government will default on its payments 
under the contract.  Credit guarantees simultaneously address the financial risk and also the 
political instability risk by insuring that payments would be made in the event of a default.  The 
default could arise due to political instability, change in regulation, or the inability of the 
government to meet its debt obligations.  In this regard, the government shares the risk of default 
with the insurer or guarantor, thereby encouraging financiers to undertake these projects by 
guaranteeing the initial prospect investment. There is an argument that while mitigation measures 
like renewable energy projects could be funded by loans, grants should be seriously considered 
especially among least-developed countries.   
The chart below shows the difference in private and public sector climate finance 
initiatives.   
 
 
 
 
264
Figure 12: Climate Finance, Public versus Private Funding864 
 
Investments and credit guarantees could also have the effect of creating confidence in a regulatory 
scheme, which may have the effect of creating stability even if there is a change in government. 
This could bring consistency and continuity within the new regulatory framework.  
 Another method of operationalizing Article 14 of the Paris Agreement would be to 
encourage lending institutions to provide funding to governments similar to that provided for 
private ventures.   Many financing entities distrust government bureaucrats in the developing world 
who have, in the past, been accused of misappropriating funds.  In this regard, financing in the 
form of grants can be channeled through universities that would be accountable to the funder, and 
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manage the funds in collaboration with government.  
 The Paris Agreement recognizes that the past efforts of climate change abatement 
financing have not been particularly robust.  In this regard, the Agreement stipulates that 
“mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.”865  The 
Agreement also recognizes that generating these funds, including public funds, should focus on 
“supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the need and priorities of developing 
country Parties.”866  The Agreement also encourages “scaled-up financial resources” aimed at 
“achieving a balance between adoption and mitigation” that take into account individual country 
needs and “the priorities and needs of developing country Parties”.867  In meeting the financial 
needs “[d]eveloped country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and 
qualitative information” related to how they have met these financial goals of “supporting country-
driven strategies”.868 The reporting requirement is both quantitative and qualitative requiring 
developed countries not only to provide statistical data on the quantum of investments, but the 
qualitative outcomes from those investments.  One shortcoming of the Agreement is that while 
developed countries are required to voluntarily report financial information, no concrete financial 
goals were set in the Agreement. 
 The underrepresentation of sub-Saharan Africa in climate finance flows to the region has 
been addressed in the Paris Agreement.   For the first time, developing countries are required to 
report the “financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under 
Article 9, 10, and 11” of the Agreement.869  While this provision is non-obligatory, it provides 
                                                 
865Paris Agreement, supra note 805 Article 9.3. 
866Ibid,  Article 9.3. 
867Ibid, Article 9.4. 
868Ibid, Article 9.5. 
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somewhat of an incentive to developing nations that have been neglected from climate finance to 
express their needs.  It also reveals tacit biases in the system by presenting a clearer picture as to 
which nations are being supported in their climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.  
Given the impact of fossil fuel usage and the need for energy infrastructures in the 
developing world, it is not a surprise that the Paris Agreement would contain provisions to 
encourage public-private partnerships to address climate change through financing.  A financial 
mechanism was created.  The mechanism for reporting is entrenched in Article 14.  The goal of 
Article 14 is to “stocktake” the financial reporting information for assessment of “long-term” 
goals.  It also requires the Paris Agreement to “periodically take stock of the implementation of 
th[e] Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of th[e] 
Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the “global stocktake)”.870  In addressing the 
financial shortcomings that led to many countries not taking advantage of programs like the Clean 
Development Mechanisms, the Paris Agreement succeeded in setting increased finance adaptation 
as a primary priority.  This means that efforts to adopt new technologies and to steer countries 
towards choosing green energy over fossil fuels, will receive as much priority as mitigation efforts. 
Arguably, the lack of climate financing is one of the primary reasons for the under-participation 
of sub-African countries in green energy projects 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 Many sub-Saharan African nations have already implemented regulatory changes within 
the energy sector that should have increased investor confidence.  Specifically, there still appears 
to be greater reluctance to invest in green energy projects within the region. The Paris Agreement 
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did not resolve issues of long-term climate finance but laid the foundation for nations to pledge 
how they will contribute to solving the problem of climate change.  Financial support for mitigation 
will have to adapt to address regional factors that block investor interests.  An innovative approach 
to climate change abatement policies on the sub-Saharan African continent will have to incorporate 
regional financial solutions, rather than merely project specific outcomes.    
International commitments towards climate change mitigation including those found in the 
Paris Agreement cannot be achieved without considering new policies that address regional needs 
including the reluctance of private investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  While 
many sub-Saharan African countries have the political will to set strong environmental policies, 
they often lacked the financial ability to implement these initiatives.  Consequently, regulatory 
changes like renewable energy legislation and feed-in-tariffs system that encourage foreign 
investments, often remain stagnant as investors are unable to look beyond the financial risk of the 
project.  It highlighted the flexibilities that are contained in the Paris Agreement that facilitate the 
operationalization of climate finance on the sub-Saharan continent.  The Paris Agreement shows 
great initiatives and motivation on the part of nations to voluntarily move towards a solution to 
climate change.  The operationalization of the Agreement is worthy of entertaining, especially as 
it relates to the global south which are disproportionately affected by climate change.  Arguably, 
the lack of climate financing is one of the primary reasons for the under-participation of sub-
Saharan African countries in climate finance projects.  In this regard, this paper addressed some 
of the climate change financial risks that are germane to the sub-Saharan African region and 
propose possible solutions for mitigating these investor concerns that explore the connection 
between public policy, finance and private investments.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
Leslyn Lewis, “Innovative Policies for Overcoming Barriers to Financing Green 
Energy Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa” in Neil Craik, Cameron Jefferies, Sara Seck, and 
Timothy Stevens (eds), Global Environmental Change and Innovation in International Law 
(Toronto: Cambridge University Press, 2018)  
 
Abstract 
 
International organizations including the United Nations and the World Bank agree that 
sub-Saharan Africa’s (‘SSA’) development is inextricably tied to the growth of the energy sector 
within the region.  Moreover, industrialization of the region needs to occur within a framework of 
innovative, flexible and effective policy institutions and processes. As such, sustainable 
development in SSA must incorporate innovative policies that respond to local energy needs while 
also addressing regional financial challenges and global environmental goals as set by the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change (‘Paris Agreement’).   
In this regard, one of the goals of the United Nations Agenda 2030 is to ‘ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’.871Access to electricity is a key 
indicator of a nation’s progress on the development path,872 and correlates with economic growth. 
At the same time, new methods of electrification using fossil fuel generation is making a significant 
contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions.  According to the International Energy Agency 
(‘IEA’), energy generation and usage contributes to more than 60% of greenhouse gas 
emissions.873  Measured in global terms, African states make a very limited contribution to 
                                                 
871United Nations, The Millennium Development, Sustainable Development Goal 7, online at: 
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators: Featuring the Sustainable Development Goals (Washington: World Bank Group, 2016), online at: 
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872 Taryn Dinkelman, ‘The Effects of Rural Electrification on Employment: New Evidence of South Africa’ (2011) 
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873 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2013: Executive Summary, 1, online at: 
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greenhouse gas emissions in large part because of their comparatively small energy consumption. 
While the region comprises 13% of the world’s population, it only uses 4% of the world’s 
energy.874  The IEA has estimated that approximately 80% of the population of SSA (some 700 
million people) do not have access to clean cooking sources875 and that most of the energy is 
consumed within the residential sector, with high volumes of biomass (80%) used for cooking.876 
According to the World Health Organization (‘WHO’), the emissions from cooking are a major 
risk factor among women and children in SSA for respiratory and pulmonary diseases.877There are 
compelling arguments for expanding access to electricity to address this. The IEA estimates that 
almost half of the world’s 1.2 billion people who lack access to electricity reside in SSA.878This is 
because of a serious absence of adequate electricity infrastructure,879 which is a product of 
insufficient investment.880 
Economic development in SSA, and in Ghana specifically, is directly tied to energy 
availability within the region. Without adequate and reliable energy supply it is difficult for 
countries in SSA to achieve sustained and inclusive economic growth and to attract foreign 
investment. Improved access to energy, particularly electricity, is an essential ingredient not only 
for increasing economic growth and gross domestic product (GDP)881 but also for promoting 
                                                 
874 IEA, Africa Energy Outlook: A Focus on Energy Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa (2014), 13, online at: 
https://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/Knowledge/Energy/AfricaEnergyOutlook-IEA.pdf.  
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human development more generally.882  There is a very significant and growing demand for 
electricity in SSA, and as the region’s population grows, demand may double within the next 15 
years.883 Satisfying this demand is a major challenge for governments, especially because they are 
now operating in a carbon constrained context. This means that commitments to increasing 
affordable access to secure electricity supply in SSA must be achieved within nationally 
determined contributions (‘NDCs’) consistent with the Paris Agreement’s objectives to keeping 
global temperature rises well below 2ºC. Innovative industrial modernisation policies must 
therefore be tied to NDCs that are entrenched in regulatory policies which in turn set clear goals 
in alignment with the Paris Agreement. There are a number of studies that have explored 
developments in the finance sector that can enhance funding for renewable energy projects in 
SSA.884  This chapter seeks to build on these in assessing how an effective and sustainable energy 
policy can be implemented in the region.   
I Development Agency Interventions in Energy Modernisation in SSA 
The World Bank has recognized that‘[n]o country in the world has succeeded in shaking loose 
from subsistence economy without access to the services that modern energy provides.’885  In 1993 
                                                 
882 United Nations, Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all) online: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/energy/.   
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the World Bank formulated an ‘Electric Power Lending Policy’ with the mandate of creating 
reform of power sectors. The Policy set the requirement for the Bank to lend money to those 
developing countries that implemented the following four policy changes:886 
v. Transparent regulatory processes;  
vi. Commercialized and corporatized power enterprises; 
vii. Allowance for the importation of power services; and, 
viii. Encouragement of private investment in the power sector.  
 
In general terms, the main barriers to the modernization of the African power sector can be 
summarized as being of a regulatory, technical and financial nature. The UN Economic 
Commission for Africa has argued in response to these that Africa needs to create ‘institutions, 
rules, financing mechanisms, and regulations needed to make the market work in support of energy 
for sustainable development’.887  Over more than a decade, the UN has been active in energy policy 
development in Africa. In 2004, African delegates met in Rome to develop a framework for the 
creation of UN-Energy branch for Africa with a mandate to create a ‘collaborative framework with 
the objective to promote more efficient, coherent and coordinated actions of UN and non-UN 
organizations working in Africa on the issues of energy development’.888 The UN also investigated 
the causal relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth in 17 African 
countries.889 
More recently, the UN has linked energy issues to broader questions of effective industrial 
policy.890  African governments have been encouraged to establish Industrial Policy Organizations 
                                                 
886 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Power Sector in Africa: Policy Guidelines for the Sustainability 
of the Sector’ in UN-Energy/Africa, Energy for Sustainable Development: Policy Options for Africa, 53, online at: 
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(IPOs)to create ‘incentive structures for firms to expand production and investment in vital and 
high growth potential industries’.891 These industrial policies should be innovative and responsive 
not only to local factors and needs, but also include global climate change goals and international 
financier concerns. A particular challenge that has been identified is ‘weak institutional structures 
and poor policy design’ which are ‘at the root of Africa’s industrial policy problem throughout its 
post-independence history’.892 Africa is now in a unique position to pursue a more inclusive and 
environmentally sustainable path to energy modernisation. While not a blank canvas, there are 
certainly major opportunities to avoid mistakes made elsewhere in the world where carbon 
intensive modes of energy production and use have become entrenched:  
Climate change could hobble Africa’s economic growth momentum as the continent 
attempts to switch to industrialization and economic transformation. But it could also 
provide an opportunity: Africa has vast renewable energy resources of hydropower, 
geothermal, biomass, wind and solar. And as Africa is not locked in any technology 
preferences, it can follow a green and clean industrializing energy pathway and leapfrog 
old carbon-intensive models.893 
 
Recognizing that policies aimed at industrialization will require a great amount of capital infusion, 
the UN also emphasizes the importance of generating external financing for these projects. It notes 
that the ‘success of industrial policy projects depends heavily on African countries securing public 
and private finance in priority areas, especially infrastructure, education and technology.894 
The twin goals of economic development and increasing access to sustainable energy in 
SSA will require large financial investment from private investors, given the limitations and 
barriers that exist for public and local government funding sources. Many African countries will 
need to go beyond reform to their legal and regulatory infrastructure in order to attract foreign 
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investors as Independent Power Producers (IPPs).  The UN poses the question of how countries 
like Ghana can ‘build innovative, effective and flexible industrial policy institutions, processes 
and mechanisms to enhance industrialization and structural transformation in Africa’?895 It is clear 
that there are many possible responses to this question, with many different policies available to 
solve Africa’s energy problem. One of these is feed-in tariffs (FiTs), which are payments to users 
for renewable energy that they produce. FiTs are an important policy tool to assist in meeting 
development and energy security needs, although taken alone they are insufficient to assist 
countries like Ghana in moving from the Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’) stage to the financial 
close stage for solar photovoltaic (‘PV’) plants.   
This chapter focuses on two case studies to illustrate how FiTs can be utilized along with 
other innovative industrial policies to address investor reluctance. While FiTs are not the only 
policy tool available, the chapter highlights how two particular FiTs may be best used to avoid 
certain pitfalls and overcome local barriers with financing and technology. The study draws 
lessons from Ghana and Uganda, which have both implemented a FiT system to address barriers 
to investing in renewable energy projects. However, while Uganda has had several successes, 
Ghana still struggles to attract foreign investors for its renewable energy projects. This raises 
questions about some of the strategies and policies that Ghana can employ to attract financiers for 
these high-risk projects. The aim of this study is thus also to collect a series of best practices that 
will improve the private investment climate for renewable energy projects among SSA countries 
through implementing innovative industrial policies.896  
II The Problem of Financing High Capital Renewable Energy Plants in SSA 
A Independent Power Producers (IPP) and Private Finance in SSA Renewable Energy 
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Projects 
 
Addressing the vast energy needs of SSA will inevitably require private investors to bridge 
the financing gap left by public financing. A common approach to private investing has been 
through IPPs, which are non-public entities that own and operate facilities to generate electricity.  
These are financed primarily through private funds and are privately developed, owned and 
operated, often through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that enters into Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPA). The parties to the PPA are usually the government buyer (often called the off-
taker) and the private investor/developer. The solar IPP projects in SSA often have a mix of 
financing, ranging from one corporation funding the entire project to various debt and equity 
finance structures. Risk assessment is crucial in renewable energy projects and the 
creditworthiness of the off-taker is of paramount importance.  
The vast majority of IPP projects in SSA Africa are concentrated in Kenya, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.897 The emergence of IPPs has not resolved the barriers that 
financiers encounter in developing renewable energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, local 
financing is not an option in the majority of cases. For example, Nigeria is one of the few countries 
in SSA that has the infrastructural banking system to finance these kinds of large investments, but 
it often only finances such large-scale projects for up to 5 years (whereas solar PPAs are usually 
for 15 to 20 years).  Few sub-Saharan African countries have sufficient sovereign wealth funds to 
finance large-scale, long-term projects. As such, renewable energy projects based on 20 year PPAs 
often have to find equity on the international market. With the low credit rating of many SSA 
countries, raising the debt and equity needed to finance a project can be challenging.   
Some scholars have attributed the absence of renewable energy projects in SSA to a failure 
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of management.898 Ikejemba et al. conclude that despite the implementation of many small and 
medium-size PV projects in SSA, ‘most of them have been left to deteriorate with no maintenance, 
no cleaning, no repairs and more importantly no sustainable management method that 
encompasses them all’.899  Moreover, many projects have faced many challenges in getting off the 
ground. For example, one of Ghana’s largest renewable energy projects by Blue Energy received 
a substantial amount of attention, but never materialized.900  While Blue Energy received a PPA 
in 2011, the project never reached financial close, much less commercial operation.901 Issues of 
sustainable management and lack of financing are often attributed to the reluctance of investors to 
undertake PV projects because of these kinds of risk factors.  
Foreign investors have shied away from high capital renewable energy projects in SSA due 
to numerous perceived barriers to investment.  Attracting investors to renewable energy projects 
in the developing world requires effort in reducing perceived risks, including those of a regulatory 
and political nature.902  The UNDP ‘De-risking Renewable Energy Investments’ identified several 
barriers to investment that result in higher financing costs for these projects in the developing 
world. There are a number of impediments such as political instability and inadequate regulatory 
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frameworks that impact on the ultimate barrier of financing renewable energy projects in SSA.903  
These barriers increase the risks associated with the high capital-intensive costs, resulting in the 
initial risk often outweighing the financial gains.904 A recent approach to mitigating risks bifurcates 
the burden, so that ‘private international investors are exposed only to the general political risks 
while international development banks cover mainly the regulatory risk’.905 
The capital-intensive nature of renewable energy projects increases the financial risks and 
consequently limits the number of financing tools available. In addition, national factors including 
country-specific political and economic barriers906 must also be considered in project financial 
risks assessment, especially with respect to solar projects.907  Many investors insist that a risk-
mitigating solution would be to have the host country guarantee the off-takers’ payments, should 
a default arise. These sovereign guarantees generally arise when the off-taker has a poor credit 
rating, or the risk of default on payments is high. These guarantees are recognized as government 
debts, and consequently, recording them on the books may affect a nation’s balance sheet.908  For 
this reason, governments are reluctant to indebt the nation in pursuance of one project owned by a 
foreign corporation.  Therefore, innovative solutions are needed to satisfy investor concerns.   
The overwhelming majority of renewable energy projects in Ghana have never passed the 
approval stage, primarily because of local barriers to finance. These investment risks to financiers 
include the following:  
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905Steurer, Manatsgruber and Jouégo, supra note 903, 183. 
906Merce Labordena, et al., ‘Impact of Political Economic Barriers for Concentrating Solar Power in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (2017) 102 Energy Policy 52-72.  
907 Michael Peters, et al., ‘Shedding Light on Solar Technology – A Techno-economic Assessment and Its Policy 
Implications’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 6422-6439.  
908Mauro Mecagni, et al., Issuing International Sovereign Bonds: Opportunities and Challenges for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014).  
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1. Commercial risks (engineering, procurement and construction (EPC), as well as 
development, operation risks); 
 
2. Political risks (changes in government, dishonouring of contracts, regulatory 
changes);909 
 
3. Technological barriers, including low grid capacity;910 
 
4. High Sovereign Credit Risk (foreign exchange rate risk and inflation; or off-taker 
defaulting on payment, currency risk). 
 
Investors are concerned with offsetting the above risks before a project can be deemed 
viable. Thus, innovative industrial policies and institutions as envisaged by development agencies 
are essential for mitigating these risks.  Currently, Ghana struggles to generate sufficient power 
for residential and commercial purposes,911 but is also unable to accrue additional debt by 
sovereign guarantees for projects owned by an IPP. The chapter now turns to examine Ghana’s 
circumstances in more detail as a case study of the role of innovation in energy policy development 
in SSA. 
 
III The Ghanaian Case Study: Attracting Investments for IPP through 
Innovative Industrial Policy 
 
In the early 1990s, the World Bank required the developing countries which sought loans 
from it to undergo significant power sector reforms, which entailed changing the legal and 
                                                 
909 International Finance Corporation, supra note 884. Large scale bonds in USD were issued in Kenya and Zambia 
in 2014 to mitigate political risk: see Tomoko Matsukawa and Odo Habeck, Review of Risk Mitigation Instruments 
for Infrastructure Financing and Recent Trends and Developments (Washington DC: The World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007), andsee Trends and Policy Options #4, online: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6778/405300Risk0mit101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
910Akanksha Chaurey and Tara Chandra Kandpal, ‘Assessment and Evaluation of PV Based Decentralized Rural 
Electrification: An Overview’ (2011) 14:8 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2266-2278. 
911 Energy Commission of Ghana, National Energy Statistics 2005 – 2014, online at: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/Energy%20Statistics_2015.pdf. 
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regulatory frameworks to improve transparency.912  In compliance with the World Bank’s demand 
that developing countries adopt a transparent power sector model, in 2011 Ghana implemented a 
renewable energy framework that incorporated the FiT scheme under the Ghana Renewable 
Energy Act (2011) and the Renewable Energy Purchase Obligation (‘RPO’).913 This model is based 
on the government off-taker entering into a PPA with the developer. In this case, the electricity 
price and the revenue risks are shifted to the government off-taker. Other than the currency risk 
(which can also be addressed in the PPA), the only other financial risk relates to the inability of 
the off-taker to make payments on the electricity purchased. In such cases, the government off-
taker will almost always reject sovereign guarantees in favour of a revolving bank guarantee 
security payment that would be replenished monthly. In this regard, rather than indebting the entire 
nation, the national government can provide a limited guarantee in the form of a payment security 
to the developer to offset the risk of defaulting under the obligations under the PPA. Ghana does 
not currently have higher tariff rates for peak periods, so setting the default payment (bank 
guarantee) will be easier than projecting an increase in energy prices.   
A number of green energy projects have been approved in Ghana, with an energy license 
being issued by its governing body. Despite this approval, the projects have had difficulty 
acquiring construction financing.  Since 2013, Ghana has issued 65 licenses to produce and supply 
for solar projects, but only one company has successfully commercialized and connected a 20 MW 
solar photovoltaic plant to the grid.914  Despite the fact that Ghana has complied with international 
                                                 
912 World Bank, The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector: Policies for Effective Institutional, Regulatory, 
and Financial Reform (1993), online at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/477961468782140142/The-
World-Banks-role-in-the-electric-power-sector-policies-for-effective-institutional-regulatory-and-financial-reform. 
913Renewable Energy Act, 2011, Act 832 of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, Dec 31, 2011 [‘Ghana Renewable 
Energy Act’] online at: 
http://energycom.gov.gh/files/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20ACT%202011%20(ACT%20832).pdf. The 
Renewable Energy Act should be read in conjunction with the Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541), online at: 
www.energycom.gov.gh/files/ACT.pdf. 
914 Electricity Company of Ghana, Provisional Wholesale Supply and Generation Licence Holders, online at: 
 
 
 
 
279
demands to upgrade its power sector’s regulatory infrastructure, it still has not attracted an influx 
of foreign investments in the renewable energy sector.  This raises questions about whether there 
are regional peculiarities that act as barriers to investments which can explain why some regions 
have experienced an influx of investment while SSA has not. 
 
A The BXC Project 
Ghana has had one successful connection of an IPP to the grid. In 2013, Beijing Xiaocheng 
Company(BXC) was granted a ‘Provisional Wholesale Supply and Generation License’ by 
Ghana’s Energy Commission.915  The 20 MW plant took approximately 8 months to complete and 
was financed exclusively by Chinese firms.916  This endeavour is unique because BXC self-
financed the US$30 million required to bring the project to the commercial operation phase. The 
20 MW plant, which is scalable up to 40 MW, is connected to the ECG sub-station in Winneba. 
The plant is located in Gomoa Onyzandze in the Central Region (about 20 miles from the capital 
of Accra), and is currently Ghana’s largest solar PV plant with operational grid connectivity.   
The reasons that led BXC to self-financing are multifaceted. Firstly, this company had the 
capacity to provide many aspects of the transaction, including Operation and Maintenance (which 
was easier as a sister company supplied the solar panels), as well as the Engineering and 
Procurement. To finance the 20 MW project, BXC tapped into the Sovereign Wealth Fund (China 
African Development Fund) established by the China Development Bank.917  The plant cost 
                                                 
http://www.energycom.gov.gh/files/Provisional%20Wholesale%20Supply%20and%20Generation%20Licence%20
Holders.pdf.  
915 Ibid.   
916 Guest Contributor, ‘Ghana’s Largest Solar PV Project Just Connected to the Grid’, Clean Technica, April 17, 2016 
online at: www.cleantechnica.com/2016/04/17/ghanas-largest-solar-pv-project-just-connected-to-the-grid/. 
917 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, China-Africa Development Fund, online at: www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/china-
africa-development-fund. 
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US$30 million to build and began when BXC Ghana, a subsidiary of BXC Beijing China, entered 
into a PPA with the ECG that guaranteed tariff rates for the fixed contract period. The parent 
company solely funded the project without any infusion of government finance.918  It is clear the 
BXC solution is not an option that will be available for all developers, and thus alternative 
solutions like the GET FiT program successfully adopted in Uganda must be considered as a means 
to address the impediments that discourage investors in Ghana.    
B  Model Jurisdictions for Renewable Energy Investment in SSA:  
Ghana and Uganda Compared 
 
Ghana has a regulatory framework which encourages renewable energy projects and 
innovative approaches that can be taken to address barriers to investments. But Uganda is perhaps 
the best example of a SSA nation that has succeeded in attracting private investment in renewable 
energy. South Africa has the largest number of IPPs in SSA and of the 67 IPPs outside of South 
Africa, Ugandan projects comprise almost one-third (19 projects).919 A notable example is the 
Ugandan ‘GET FiT’ program, which is a joint project between the Electricity Regulatory Agency 
of Uganda and KfW (the German government’s development bank). The program’s primary goal 
is to ‘leverage private investment into renewable energy generation projects in Uganda’.920 The 
program is supported by the governments of Norway, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  
Within the past three years, Uganda has provided evidence that a SSA country can 
implement an innovative policy framework that facilitates the expeditious development of new 
generation capacity. Not only has Uganda implemented the GET FiT program, but it has done so 
                                                 
918 D Ola, ‘BXC Connects 20MW Solar Plant to Ghana’s National Grid’, PV-Tech, 15 April 2016, online at: www.pv-
tech.org/news/new-solar-farm-launches-20mw-into-ghanas-national-grid.  
919Anton Eberhard, ‘Powering Africa: Facing the Financing and Reform Challenges’, Research Papers (Dec 2015), 7, 
online at:  
http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/Scientifiques/Papiers%20de%20recherc
he/21-papiers-recherche.pdf. 
920 GET FiT Uganda, Annual Report 2016, 13, online at: https://www.getfit-uganda.org/downloads/.  
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while overcoming many similar challenges as those faced by Ghana. Uganda has also successfully 
combined development within the energy sector with sustainable environmental practices in the 
renewable and alternative energy sectors. By 2012, the time when Ghana was beginning to 
implement its Renewable Energy Act, Uganda had 11 IPP projects. It is projected that between 
‘2015 and 2018 … up to 20 small-scale (1-20 MW) projects will be added to this portfolio through 
the government’s cooperation with the German Development Bank on the GET FiT Uganda 
program’.921 
The GET FiT initiative is in its infancy stage in Uganda (the GET FiT policy having been 
launched in 2013) but has nonetheless experienced considerable success. By 2016, Uganda had 
installed 86 MW of new power plant capacity.922 In 2016, 8 plants reached financial close under 
the GET FiT program for a total of 11 out of 17 projects.923  By December 2016, Uganda marked 
the connection of its first solar plant to the Grid under the program (the 10 MW Soroti plant). On 
the back of these developments, Bloomberg’s ‘Climatescope 2016’ has ranked Uganda second on 
the continent of Africa for its clean energy investment and progressive climate change policies.924  
Impressively, Uganda is ranked seventh out of 55 developing countries worldwide in renewable 
energy investment.925 
Uganda makes a good comparative case study with Ghana because the electricity markets 
of the two countries are virtually identical. While there are minor variations between the two in 
the way electricity is distributed to rural areas, the number of distributors, and the distinction 
between bulk versus regular consumers, the dispatch and regulation of electricity closely mirrors 
                                                 
921 Eberhard, et al, supra note 897, xlvii. 
922 GET FiT Uganda, supra note 920, 5. 
923 Ibid, 9.  
924 Ibid,7. 
925 Ibid.  
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each other.  Figure 13 highlights the similarities in the two countries’ respective electricity 
distribution systems.  
Figure 13: Comparative organizational structure of Ghanaian and Ugandan Electricity Sectors926 
 
The Electricity Company of Ghana Ltd, the Northern Electricity Distribution Company Ltd and 
one private distribution company are responsible for the distribution of electricity across the 
country. Electricity connection sites are located at Akosombo, Kpong, Aboadze and Tema and 
electricity is distributed to the various load centres across the country.927  Like Uganda, electricity 
in Ghana is fed through a central grid. In Ghana’s case, the Ghana Grid Company Ltd (GRIDCo) 
acts as an Independent Systems Operator and manages the transmission networks across the 
country, while the Public Utility and Regulatory Authority (‘PURC’) sets the tariff rates (the 
guaranteed tariff rate is designed to act as an assurance to IPPs that the price of energy will not fall 
                                                 
926 This diagram was constructed using data obtained from the Ghana Grid Company and the Ugandan Regulatory 
Authority:see Ghana Grid Company, online at: http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2013_CD/countryprofiles/Ghana/Ghana.htm.  See also Joseph Mawejje, 
Ezra Munyambonera and Lawrence Bategeka, Uganda’s Electricity Sector Reforms and Institutional Restructuring 
(Economic Policy Research Centre, 2012), online at:  http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/150239/2/series89.pdf.  
927 GRIDCo, National Grid, online at: http://www.gridcogh.com/en/national-grid.php.  
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below the rate for a fixed period of usually 10 to 15 years). Both Uganda and Ghana have a Limited 
Liability Electricity Distribution Company that distributes electricity to consumers. 
In Ghana, IPPs play a significant role in supplementing the energy produced by the state-
owned power generation utilities (the Volta River Authority and Bui Power Authority). GRIDCo, 
the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company 
(NEDCo) are responsible for feeding government-produced energy and the energy produced by 
IPPs into the same grid.  The FiT scheme is intended to provide some certainty to IPPs that the 
high upfront financial outlays associated with renewable energy projects can be recouped with a 
profit over the contract period. 
 The World Bank has implemented the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (‘SREP’) 
through its climate investment funds sector, an $839 million funding program aimed at 
encouraging renewable energy usage in the developing world.928 The SREP Program in Ghana is 
designed to address local problems around the inadequate grid capacity. The solar PV solution 
promoted by the SREP program resolves some immediate energy problems, but does not go as far 
as rectifying Ghana’s low capacity grid problem, which is a major reason why financiers shy away 
from investing.929 Instead, the SREP program supports rooftop and battery operated standalone 
systems that do not need to be fed into the grid. The SREP Ghana program identifies the main 
barriers to investment in renewable energy resources as ‘limited experience and track record of 
utility-scale solar development, high perceived risk by private developers of a largely untested new 
FiT regime, and limited access to affordable financing’.930 However, the Ghanaian problem goes 
                                                 
928 Climate Investment Funds, SREP: Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, online at: www-
cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/fund/scaling-renewable-energy-program.  
929 Climate Investment Funds, SREP Investment Plan for Ghana, vii, online at: www-
cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/SREP_13_4_SREP_Investment_Plan_for_Ghana.pdf. 
930 Ibid, 33. 
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beyond affordable financing, because even if the project were to reach financial close, the grid 
capacity issues may make it impossible for the new power station to feed its energy into the 
outdated grid. This adds another dimension to the reluctance of foreign investors to support 
renewable energy projects in Ghana. 
 
IV Building Innovative Industrial Policy Institutions in the Ghanaian 
Renewable Energy Sector 
 
A The GET FiT Solution 
There are a number of innovative policies that support global renewable energy projects.931 
The goal of the GET FiT Program has been identified as ‘to support renewable energy policies that 
reduce or mitigate investment risks, and consequently attract significant private capital to drive 
markets for commercially-available technologies’.932  Private capital is attracted by the GET FiT 
Program’s partnership with project developers, investors and financiers to address a number of 
barriers including political, local currency, off-taker, market and insurance risks.933 
The adoption of the GET FiT model in Ghana will require the implementation of 
innovative industrial policies.  These policies would need to contemplate how the financial 
concerns of IPPs and financiers will be managed.  In addition, the policy must go beyond just the 
ability to attract debt and equity financing for the project but also consume other national risk 
factors, including the following: 
1. Return on investment: whether the tariff offers sufficient returns, especially in long 
term projects that do not contain a price escalator;934 
                                                 
931 DB Climate Change Advisors, Global Climate Change Policy Tracker: An Investor’s Assessment (2009), online 
at: http://climate.columbia.edu/files/2016/04/2009_DBCCA_Policy_Tracker_Exec_Summary-4.pdf.  
932 DB Climate Change Advisors, GET FiT Program: Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariffs for Developing 
Countries (2010), 6, online at: www.institutional.deutscheam.com/content/_media/GET_FIT_-_042610_FINAL.pdf. 
933 Ibid, 7. 
934 One of the Development Partners can provide additional support to supplement the tariff subsidy. These include 
the AfDB, the World Bank Group (WBG), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the AgenceFrançaise de Développement (AFD), the KreditanstaltfürWiederaufbau (KfW), the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the State Secretariat for Economic A airs (SECO): Climate Investment Funds, 
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2. Whether there is an enabling regulatory environment (renewable energy legislation 
and feed-in tariff scheme); 
 
3. Political risk: the political stability of the country.   
 
4. Insurance issues 
 
a. Corruption index: How corrupt is the country? Will insurance cover political 
risk? 
b. Early termination fears: concerns that the project will abort prior to term as 
stipulated in the PPA (usually 15 to 20 years); 
c. Credit rating issues of the off-taker: will insurance guarantee payments by 
government off-taker in situations of political instability? 
 
5. Currency Index: how volatile is the country’s currency?  Are hedging instruments 
required? 
 
6. Technical issues / no grid capacity: even if the project meets financial close and enters 
the commercial operation phase, the energy produced from the plant may never get 
fed into the grid due to the inability of the grid to handle the load. 
 
The GET FiT Program offers direct incentives, risk mitigation strategies involving international 
organizations and local institutions, and technical assistance addressing non-financial barriers.935 
 
  
                                                 
SREP Investment Plan for Ghana’ (Meeting of the SREP Sub-Committee (2015), 26, online at: www-
cif.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/SREP_13_4_SREP_Investment_Plan_for_Ghana.pdf. 
935 DB Climate Change Advisors, supra note 931; DB Climate Change Advisors GET FiT, supra note 932. 
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Figure 14:936 Challenges that Innovative Industrial Policies Need to Address. 
 
 
Figure 14 captures the main institutional challenges that SSA nations face in implementing 
renewable energy alternatives. Many of these risks can be mitigated by the implementation of an 
innovative IPO such as the GET FiT Program. 
 
B Building Financial Relations for an Innovative Industrial Policy 
The first step to implementing an innovative industrial policy that can manage the GET FiT 
initiative is to build relationships with potential partners. For example, if a GET FiT Program were 
to be initiated in Ghana, it could begin as a joint initiative between the Government of Ghana 
(Ministry of Energy), PURC and the ECG and international green climate funds (Green Climate 
Fund and/or African Climate Fund and African Development Bank). 
                                                 
936 This diagram adopted features from GET FiT Uganda, Annual Report 2014, 8, online at: https://www.getfit-
uganda.org/downloads/. 
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Figure 15 illustrates the successful industrial policy relationships that need to be forged 
between Development Financial Institutions (DFI) that can assist in securing initial project funds 
(the African Development Bank, the World Bank (International Finance Corporation), KfW and 
FMO). Ghana may also be able to apply for early funding from KfW or the African Development 
Bank to assist with transition services in the early stages of implementing projects.  KfW and the 
African Development Bank can also play a role in providing a tariff subsidy to the ECG under the 
GET FiT program.  
Figure 15: Industrial Policy GET FiT Organization 
 
The GET FiT program also has the capacity to assist local governments in providing guarantees. 
In most cases an international sponsor would provide the guarantee for the GET FiT payment, 
which releases national governments of the obligation to enter into sovereign guarantees that act 
as national debts. Political risks can also be addressed through insurance offered by MIGA or other 
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private sector providers. 
The African Development Bank could possibly act as the overseer of GET FIT Programs 
that obtain funding from the Green Climate Fund or the African Climate Fund. Similarly, the 
success of the Ghanaian renewable energy sector lies in its strategic partnerships.  Once 
relationships have been established, innovative IPOs should ascertain any co-finance and credit 
investment approval requirements that the DFI will set for the project. For example, can a partial 
risk guarantee from the World Bank supplement government letters of credit?937  This arrangement 
ensures that tariff payments from the state-owned utility will be covered by the partial risk 
guarantee. The MIGA guarantee may also include a termination payment support.  These 
provisions remove the need for sovereign guarantees which act to encumber the financial 
obligations of the state. Countries like Uganda received approval on March 2014 from the World 
Bank IDA Partial Risk Guarantee (‘PRG’) facility for small-scale renewable energy projects in 
Uganda.938  The US$160 million PRG facility is also used to mitigate investor risk by providing 
‘short term liquidity support’ for PPA obligations, along with ‘[t]ermination compensation events 
of government/utility default under the PPA/ IA’ and ‘[c]ommercial debt guarantee’.939  In 
addition, the GET FiT Technical Facility provides training and development assistance to facilitate 
project implementation, as well as with respect to operation and maintenance. 
 
                                                 
937 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which is a part of the World Bank Group, has a coverage policy 
called ‘Non-Honoring of Financial Obligations’ (‘NHSFO’), which ‘protects the lender against losses resulting from 
a government’s failure to make a payment when due under an unconditional financial payment obligation or guarantee’ 
given in favor of a project that otherwise meets all of MIGA’s eligibility requirements: MIGA Brief, MIGA’s Non-
Honoring of Sovereign Financial Obligations Product, online at:  
http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/MIGA_NHSFO_brief.pdf. Note that this product does not require a claimant 
to first go through arbitration or obtain a court order to receive a payout under the policy. Unlike arbitration award 
default (AAD) coverage that converts regulatory and commercial actions into ‘political acts’ irrespective of intent and 
provides coverage for these contractual breaches. 
938 GET FiT Uganda, Annual Report 2015, 15, online at: https://www.getfit-uganda.org/downloads/.  
939 Ibid. 
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C Creating Incentives to Invest: 
the Ugandaian GET FiT Model and its Application to Ghana 
 
The Ghanaian GET FiT Program could begin by identifying key areas that would benefit 
from small-scale renewable generating projects (up to 20 MW). The GET FiT Program would be 
able to create an IPO that would govern the implementation of the Programs with three main 
objectives:940 
1. GET FiT Premium Payment Mechanism (a results-based top-up); 
2. Guarantee Facility (secures against off-taker and political risk); 
3. Private Financing Mechanism (offers debt and equity concessional loans at competitive 
rates). 
 
Each of the above instruments can work together and would be closely monitored by the GET FiT 
Program Steering Committee, which would include a representative from each development 
partner.941 The Steering Committee may also have one representative from the Ghanaian 
government, with the African Development Bank or the Green Climate Fund, the World Bank and 
the GET FiT Secretariat having non-voting roles on the Steering Committee.942 
Ensuring that the PPA is bankable is also very important and thus the innovative industrial 
policy must work with the Government of Ghana (through the Ministry of Energy) to ensure that 
all contracts can account for currency pitfalls in the tariff rate as set by PURC and administered 
by the ECG. The tariff rate must be hedged against currency risk, especially beyond the 
construction stage when payments are due.  The PPA could contain a price escalator to account 
for currency and interest rate risk by fixing the tariff rate in a stable foreign currency.  If the tariff 
is not expressed in a stable foreign currency, then a provision must be included for the rate to be 
                                                 
940 Note that there are similarities between the objectives as adopted by GET FiT Uganda. However, national 
peculiarities are not conducive to a cookie cutter approach. 
941 GET FiT Program Uganda, GET FiT Information Letter, online at: www.getfit-uganda.org/downloads/. 
942 Ibid.  
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fully adjustable, taking into account the foreign exchange rate risk. In addition, the fear that 
consumers will not be able to afford increased utility costs is addressed by guaranteeing that the 
off-taker pays the market rate to the IPP and that additional costs to the consumer are offset by this 
arrangement.  The GET FiT payment portions are usually made in US dollars, thereby minimizing 
the currency risk.  
The GET FiT Program would thus create an enabling environment that provides direct 
financial support and risk mitigating strategies to address barriers to investments.  Once those 
concerns are mitigated, the IPP can enter into debt and equity financing with financiers.  In the 
case of Ghana, the GET FiT Program could channel the funds to the Ministry of Energy, which 
would then divert them directly to the ECG (the party to the PPA).The payments under the PPA 
would be guaranteed by the GET FiT Program.  In addition, the ECG could collect regular utility 
premiums and combine them with GET FiT guarantees to make direct payments to the IPP.   
 
Figure 16: Providing Incentives to Invest: Tariff Top-Ups 
 
As indicated in Figure 16, an innovative industrial policy approach would begin by addressing the 
overall issue of insufficient incentives by implementing a program like the GET FiT, which 
involves built-in top-up payments on the fixed tariffs offered by PURC.    
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Ghana has already completed the process of standardizing its legal documentation in the 
energy sector (PPA, Implementation Agreement, and Direct Agreements). This helps streamline 
the PPA process, and creates uniformity and consistency and assures developers and banks that 
contracts will not be hindered by lengthy negotiations and amendments, thereby reducing 
transaction costs for all parties.  Having a bankable PPA (and/or IA) is a crucial part of an IPP’s 
assessment of the project viability.  
Ghana is currently ranked 29th by the Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s Climatescope 
Report.943One of the primary impediments to the development of renewable energy projects in 
Ghana, and in sub-Saharan nations in general, is the request for governments to provide sovereign 
guarantees to investors. There are various possible solutions to this challenge.  For example, Ghana 
could use ‘front-loaded results-based premium payment designed to top-up’ its feed-in tariffs 
which could be paid out in an accelerated payment over the first five years of operation.944 Figure 
16 highlights the process that could be adopted to facilitate front-loaded top-ups.  The practice 
may instill confidence in investors by utilizing a top-up payment for the actual delivery of energy 
to the grid over the period of the PPA (which is usually 20 years).    
The front-loaded mechanism has been used in other SSA countries like Uganda and has 
been described as a process of ‘discounting the total support over the 20 years and disbursing these 
funds through the first five years of operation’.945  The goal behind this innovative financing 
practice is to ‘enable commercial lending to projects, by providing additional cash flow to project 
owners during critical (early) debt repayment periods’.946  In the Ugandan case, the top-up amount 
for solar was set at USc/kWh 11 for a 20 year period with a 50% GET FiT premium offered on 
                                                 
943 Climatescope 2016, online at: http://global-climatescope.org/en/compare/#?compare=gh&with=ug. 
944 See Get Fit Uganda,2015, supra note 938. This practice was implemented in Uganda.  
945 Ibid, 13. 
946 Ibid.  
 
 
 
 
292
commercial operation date (COD) disbursed over the first five years of operation.947  This policy 
and practice is attractive to investors, especially in the solar sector, which requires high financial 
outlays to reach the commercial operation stage. The goal of the premium upfront payment is to 
provide additional cash flow to the projects in the early critical stages of high debt repayment and 
cash outlay.948The local Electricity Regulatory Authority’s contribution to the Facility is set at the 
tariff rate (which is set at US$0.11), while the GET FiT provides the top-up portion.949 
After sufficient incentives to invest in the region have been established, the IPO should 
attempt to develop equity and debt partnerships. For example, in the Ugandan case, the equity 
portion was a combination of straight equity and a mezzanine debt facility offered by the Green 
Africa Power facility (with a commitment of £98 million from the UK government and £121 
million from the government of Norway).950  This arrangement allows debt financiers not only to 
invest in the project, but also to retain a small portion of the equity in the company (the Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). In addition, local banks are often not equipped to advance financing based 
on a 15 or 20-year contract. Funds such as the Emerging African Infrastructural Fund lend money 
to the private sector at highly concessional rates and rarely consider long-term contracts beyond 
10 years (which is usually not the case with conventional banks).951  In addition, the GuarantCo 
fund addresses local currency debt issues by providing ‘credit enhancement of local currency’ to 
‘private, municipal and parastatal infrastructure sectors in lower income countries’.952  GuarantCo 
also provides partial risk guarantee coverage and default risk guarantee for construction failures 
                                                 
947 Ibid, 13. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid,14. 
950Green Africa Power, Executive Summary (2016), online at: 
www.greenafricapower.com/docs/GAP_executive_summary_2016.pdf.  
951 GET FiT Uganda, 1st GET FiT Stakeholder Meeting: Kampala, 9 April 2013, 3, online at:https://www.getfit-
uganda.org/downloads/. 
952 Ibid. 
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and revenue shortage.953  In addition to the overall organizational barriers, financiers are concerned 
with direct financial impediments. The six barriers listed previously can be managed by 
implementing policies that directly address these investor concerns.  Figure 17 below highlights 
some solutions for these investor concerns. 
Figure 17: Industrial Policy Solutions to Investor Concerns954 
As Figure 17 illustrates, even if all of the financial fears are addressed, an innovative policy 
organization must consider technical assistance issues which could impede the final 
implementation of a project. Even if Ghana is able to obtain financing for renewable energy 
projects, the problem of having sufficient capacity on the grid to accommodate the energy 
generated from the project also arises. Grid capacity issues can be addressed through innovative 
industrial policies that are aimed at grid optimization and modernization.  In the Ghanaian case, 
                                                 
953 Ibid. 
954 For similar concerns raised in Uganda, see GET FiT Uganda, supra note 951.  
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the Africa Development Bank, through the Green Climate Fund, can mitigate the risk by financing 
a high proportion of the overall capital needed for the project. Due to issues with interconnectivity 
in Ghana, innovative IPOs should include an Interconnectivity Support Assistance Program which 
will assist with transmission and distribution of the energy to and via the grid.955A key component 
of the innovative IPOs would thus need to ensure that the energy that is produced actually reaches 
the grid, and that the grid has capacity for the produced energy.  In this regard, interconnectivity 
support is crucial and may need to begin early on, and be included as a part of financing 
projections.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that resolving financing challenges to facilitate the development 
of renewable energy projects in SSA will require the implementation of innovative industrial 
policies. These policies need to bring together governments, developers, investors, global 
institutions like the World Bank and local entities such as the African Development Bank in a 
concerted effort to finance renewable energy projects in SSA. The chapter demonstrated that that 
despite the implementation of a FiT program and a regulatory framework that complies with World 
Bank recommendations, large-scale foreign investment in renewable energy projects have still not 
materialized among many SSA nations such as Ghana. In relation to climate change and energy 
insecurity in Africa, the chapter revealed that innovative IPOs can address some of the financial 
barriers to investors financing renewable energy projects in the region. The Ghanaian example 
demonstrates that creating a regulatory structure that incorporates the FiT is insufficient to allay 
the financial concerns of foreign investors. The SSA energy solution is intrinsically tied to the 
ability to obtain innovative private financing for energy projects. SSA state goals of development 
                                                 
955 Clean Energy Pipeline, Clean Energy Africa Financial Guide (2015), online at: www.cleanenergypipeline.com.  
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cannot be satisfied without a viable energy infrastructure that will fuel industry and growth. 
Fortunately, SSA countries like Ghana can look to regional successes like Uganda for inspiration 
in implementing innovative IPOs that address the urgent energy and development needs, while 
simultaneously adhering to global environmental targets set under the Paris Agreement. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion 
 
CONCLUSION 
The collection of papers herein explored the connection between international law and 
local legal and regulatory harmonization efforts within developing countries like those in the sub-
Saharan region.  The chapters in this portfolio share a common theme that addresses whether WTO 
agreements impede the development of government climate change abatement policies because of 
the requirement that these programs meet a minimum standard of compliance with international 
law?  This question was addressed by exploring a number of issues including whether climate 
change policies can be viewed as a “public good”.  Three other concerns arise as a corollary to the 
public good issue:  whether the most-favour nation provision in the GATT that may render FIT as 
“subsidies”; whether local policies that can increase FDI; and, if sub-Saharan Africa requires its 
own unique climate finance strategies and innovative policy solutions. This study explored why 
countries like Ghana that adhered to processes of implementing enabling legislative and regulatory 
structures in sectors such as energy, were still not receiving a proportional share of foreign 
investments. It queried why, despite the implementation of various international laws, 
modification of the regulatory infrastructure and the approval of renewable energy projects, Ghana 
still was unable to attract FDI to finance these projects without a sovereign guarantee.  While issues 
of development have persisted for a longer period with IPR, the energy sector is just beginning to 
implement the enabling environment to facilitate foreign investors. 
 A number of international trade agreements were predicated on the notion that increased 
harmonized standards would create a local environment that is conducive to attracting foreign 
investment and increasing trade.  Beginning with TRIPS, many developing countries optimistically 
implemented global IP laws and standards, that would increase investor confidence and translate 
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into development initiatives within in the region.  International trade agreements like TRIPS soon 
incorporated flexibilities that would assist developing nations in modernizing their local IP laws.  
The paper The Applicability of TRIPS Flexibilities to the Developing World for Climate Change 
Mitigation as a Public Good in Green Technology Projects concluded that flexibilities in TRIPS 
could be used for climate change abatement initiatives.  Specifically, chapter 3 explored whether 
the applicability of flexibilities like national urgency (Article 31) in TRIPS could potentially be 
invoked for the purposes of obtaining access to green energy technologies.  
 The importance as energy as a precondition to development has been acknowledged by 
many international organizations including the WTO, the World Bank and the United Nations. 
Similarly, the commitment to encourage developing nations down a sustainable path with less 
reliance on fossil fuels is echoed across the globe.  Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has 
witnessed one too many failed international policies promising the fruits of modernization.   
Beginning with the failed optimism that joining the WTO brought and signing of TRIPS as a 
panacea for affordable medicines in the region, disappointments also emerged in the energy sector. 
Unfortunately, energy and development policies in many sub-Saharan African countries did not 
cure local impediments to attracting FDI.  
 The gap between how a policy is conceived and implemented is often related to 
intervening local factors.  In the case with several sub-Saharan nations, implementing an entirely 
new national regulatory framework for the purpose of attracting investments was insufficient, and 
this shortcoming raises questions about the inflexibility of the imposed international policy 
framework. The affordable medicines example informs us of an instance where an international 
treaty, namely TRIPS (Article 31), represented a local barrier to accessing the very resource that 
the treaty protected.  In the case with TRIPS, many developing nations were unable to afford 
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medicine to treat their citizens due to the global harmonization of patent laws.  Flexibilities needed 
to be imposed in order to counteract this unintended negative outcome.  In a similar manner, 
chapter 3 explored whether climate change can be regarded as a “public good” in the same manner 
as affordable medicines? This raises questions about whether exceptions and flexibilities should 
be included in international treaties to account for global climate change commitments. This 
chapter found that patents have increased the cost of green technology, which has a negative effect 
on developing countries. The impact of patents on green energy projects is most profound in the 
area of technology transfer.  Specifically, this research found that not only can patents affect 
technology transfer that may be necessary to meet environmental targets, but that international 
treaties may also pose obstacles.  For example, Article 31 of TRIPS permits for an exception to 
patent terms on the basis of “national urgency”, however, it is unclear whether the provision can 
be applied in the case of climate change.  In any event, most of the solar panels in question are off-
patent, so one may argue that harmonized global patent laws do not have a negative impact on the 
green energy industry.  This research has found that even though products may be off-patent, the 
enhancements made to them may be protected by a trade secret (which runs as long as the secret 
remains undisclosed). This reality raises issues about corporate abuses that may arise from the 
practice of “evergreening”.    
The FIT scheme is another example of where policies derived from international 
organizations and treaties may have unintended consequences.  The FIT scheme is an international 
policy recommendation that has been implemented in several sub-Saharan African countries to 
attract renewable energy project investments but concern arises on the issue of climate change as 
a  subsidies may affect the desired policy outcome.   The paper The WTO Canada Renewable 
Energy Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing 
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World: The Abdication of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement within Green 
Energy Conflicts highlighted the role of FIT Programs as a commonly used policy tool to 
encourage renewable energy usage in the developing world.  Chapter 4 explored the impact of 
international agreements like the SCM Agreement on FIT initiatives on sub-Saharan Africa.  
Countries like Ghana implemented significant regulatory changes to the energy sector, however, 
these enhancements were still insufficient because of potential conflicts between international law 
and local policies like FIT.  The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case raises questions about 
whether local policies aimed at addressing climate change will be attacked as subsidies under the 
SCM Agreement.   The Canada Renewable Energy/FIT case did not unequivocally address whether 
FIT schemes that guarantee payments to foreign developers to encourage investments and mitigate 
risks, will be considered a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  This highlights concerns relating 
to the compatibility of some international agreements with local sustainable development policies.  
The Canada Renewable Energy case also calls on the WTO to reconsider the viability of a non-
actionable subsidy category for renewable energy projects that may be challenged FIT as an 
incentive to local energy producers under the most favoured nation provision of the GATT.  The 
Canada Renewable Energy case leaves a number of unanswered questions in the area of subsidies 
and climate change.  Specifically, the ambiguity of the decision of whether feed-in tariffs are 
subsidies creates uncertainty for nations like Ghana that have recently changed the regulatory 
framework as well as those that have implemented incentive energy programs like FIT.  Finally, 
this chapter concluded that if FIT programs are deemed to be subsidies, then considerations should 
be extended to granting an exception under the SCM. 
  This study also found that international agreements can facilitate or impede local climate 
change strategies.  Chapter 4 reviewed the local policy instrument of FIT to encourage renewable 
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energy investments and projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  In The WTO Canada Renewable Energy 
Feed-In Tariff Case and its Application to Green Energy Projects in the Developing World: The 
Abdication of Subsidies and Countervailing measures Agreement within Green Energy Conflicts 
it was found that treaties like the SCM Agreement  may have a direct impact on local climate 
change policies.  The removal of the non-actionable subsidies provision from the Agreement means 
that policies like FITs (which is the most commonly used renewable energy policy world-wide) 
could be attacked as creating trade barriers under the MFN clause of the GATT.  While the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body addressed the issues of FIT and subsidies, there was no clear 
determination of whether FITs should be classified as a subsidy under international law.  The 
Canada Renewable Energy case highlights the connection between international treaties like the 
GATT, and how local policies will be interpretation by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  The 
decision also creates uncertainties for development policies like technology transfer and local 
content requirements that directly promotion the growth of local industries for development 
purposes.  Serious consideration needs to be given to whether the SCM Agreement should create a 
non-actionable provision for climate change abatement strategies. Again the issue of unintended 
consequences gives rise to questions regarding whether regional development needs may require 
that “flexibilities” be read into international treaties like TRIPS, the GATT and the SCM 
Agreement.  This research revealed a paradox of developing nations implementing enabling 
regulatory frameworks to attract foreign investments, while international organizations maintain 
unclear treaty provisions that may create uncertainty for foreign investors.  
Chapter 5 considered whether there are existing corporate practices that may impede the 
transfer of green technology to the developing world.  In Evergreening Through Trade Secrets as 
an Impediment to Green Technology Transfer to the Developing World the impact of life-extension 
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strategies like evergreening was explored within the context of climate change abatement 
technology.  The practice of evergreening through extending the life of a patent through an 
enhancement protected by a trade secret may impact on the transfer of green technology to the 
developing world.  In this regard, it was found that the protection of off-patent technologies 
through trade secrets that have no fixed expiry periods, may inadvertently act as a barrier to green 
technology transfer in the developing world.  Similarly, global patent protection as contained in 
TRIPS has an unintended consequence of permitting products to be evergreened.  This practice 
was popularized in the pharmaceutical sector to extend the lifecycle of popular medicines.  The 
concern within the energy sector is that treaties like TRIPS may lead to inequalities for developing 
nations, especially for products like photovoltaic solar panels that rely heavily on trade-secret 
protection.  Climate change National Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement 
may have technology transfer provisions, especially for renewable energy products.  The issue of 
evergreening may limit access to products that should be in the market but protected indefinitely 
under a trade secret.  Chapter 5 found that trade secret protection of off-patent green technologies 
may act as an inadvertent barrier to technology transfer within the developing world, and may 
facilitate corporate abuses such as “evergreening”.  This chapter gives rise to similar concerns 
surrounding whether flexibilities need to be read into Article 39(2) of TRIPS relating to setting a 
term limit (perhaps 20 years as with patents) on how long a trade secret that deals with 
environmental abatement can be protected.  
The paper A Study of the Economic and Technical Analysis of Large Scale Photovoltaic 
Plants in Ghana: A Model to Increase Foreign Direct Investments demonstrated that implementing 
sustainable energy regulations within the region is insufficient to attract foreign investors.  The 
paper addressed a model that foreign investors may use to assess the cost of producing the 
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electricity (Levelised Cost of Electricity “LCOE”) versus the rate that is offered under the PPA 
and also charged to the consumer.  This study is important because there were no clear indicia of 
LCOE within sub-Saharan Africa.  In addition, very few studies focuses on the LCOE in Ghana 
from the perspective of attracting foreign investments. The study is also important because it 
identified a number of factors, like bankability of the PPA, that can reduce the LCOE.   Instead 
practical environmental and cost factors including region factors like political risk, bankability of 
the PPA and sovereign guarantees were identified as complementary to regulatory reform.  Chapter 
6 revealed that in order to attract foreign investors, risk mitigation initiatives must complement not 
only regulatory reform but also local finance facilitating factors.  
This research also found that a financial policy infrastructure needs to be created within 
developing nations.  Chapter 7 identified regionally specific financial risks for sub-Saharan Africa 
and examined possible solutions.  In Creating a Green Energy Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Climate Finance as an Innovative Solution to the Under-Representation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa in Green Energy Projects, various climate finance instruments aimed at addressing the 
problem of sustainable development in Africa were advanced.  This research found that 
international agreements and the harmonization of local laws and regulatory processes is 
insufficient to facilitate sustainable development, especially within the renewable energy sector in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Issues of long-term climate finance were not resolved with the Paris 
Agreement, although it does lend support to mitigation through its financial mechanisms.  This 
does not reduce the need for regional financial solutions to be implemented on a country-by-
country basis, rather than merely project specific outcomes.   The specific regional considerations 
are essential for the success of international commitments as found in the Paris Agreement.  The 
financial risk of the project continues to overshadow strong local policies like FIT, this is also 
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compounded by uncertainty in the international legal regime on whether such ventures will 
eventually be considered as subsidies.  This chapter highlights the need for climate finance in 
mitigating investor risks and instilling confidence. 
 Despite the World Bank’s recognition in 1993 that Africa’s power sector required technical 
and financial infusion,956  and that the energy problem in Africa was related to “the lack of 
institutional infrastructures”,957 it was not until 21 years later that, the United Nations realized that 
industrial development in Africa necessitates the implementation of “effective Industrial Policy 
Organizations (IPOs)”.958  Chapter 8 builds on the early theme that developing nations need to 
project beyond the international harmonization of laws to include changes in local policy 
organizations.  In Innovative Policies for Overcoming Barriers to Financing Green Energy 
Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa the paper addressed regional financial impediments that act as 
barriers to attracting foreign investors in renewable energy projects.  The paper revealed that local 
obstacles to climate financing can be mitigated by implementing policies that increase investor 
confidence.  The Ghanaian case study revealed that despite regulatory energy reform, the country 
still was unable to attract foreign investors in the renewable energy sector.  Of the numerous solar 
PPAs issued, only one reached financial close and that project was privately financed by a Chinese 
conglomerate.  On the other hand, success stories like Uganda exists in sub-Saharan Africa and it 
was found that the reluctance of private investors could be mitigated by implementing innovative 
industrial policy solutions like the GetFiT initiative.  
Regional and financial impediments were also identified as barriers to the implementation 
alternative renewable energy choices in sub-Saharan.   In this regard, the lack of FDI on the sub-
                                                 
956 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, supra note 886.   
957 Ibid.  
958 Ibid at xvi. 
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Saharan continent is connected to factors beyond the implementation of an enabling regulatory 
framework as recommended by international organizations like the World Bank. This chapter 
reviewed the mitigation of local obstacles that affect private climate financing within the sub-
Saharan African region.  Equally important are the local conditions that explain the reluctance of 
private investors to undertake projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  For example, there are risks beyond 
those identified by the World bank that are specific to the sub-Saharan Africa.  Consequently, 
solutions for attracting FDI to the region must address these regionally specific risks.  This analysis 
requires the connection between public policy, finance and private investments.  For example, 
what good is a feed-in tariff program if the existing grids are too old to support any newly generated 
electricity.  Surely, a policy would be needed to provide financing to upgrade the grid capacity or 
provide some alternative to the existing grid.  These are some of the policy solutions that require 
specific local consideration and implementation and cannot be achieved by an overarching policy 
paper from organizations like the UN or the World Bank. The World Bank’s implementation of 
the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) Program in Ghana was an attempt to address 
some of the local problems and also learn from past mistakes.  However, while the program 
identified a number of financing problems in Ghana, it fell short of resolving Ghana’s low capacity 
grid problem.  Simply put, investors are not interested in building a power station that cannot be 
fed into the grid because of capacity problems.  As a temporary solution, the SREP program uses 
rooftop and battery operated standalone systems that do not need to be fed into the grid.  This 
chapter highlighted factors beyond those traditionally identified (currency risk, political risk, and 
sovereign risk) to include local technical problems that need to be corrected if for investors to 
consider green energy projects in the region. 
The question of why sub-Saharan countries like Ghana that have implemented regulatory 
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energy reform, were not been able to attract FDI within the green energy sector, while other 
countries like India, China and Mexico have succeeded in attracting foreign investors for green 
energy initiatives is partially answered by examining local impediments.  Several success stories 
like Uganda emerged in sub-Saharan Africa, and it was revealed that such nations tailorized their 
climate finance policies to overcome local issues and barriers.  This study found that countries like 
Uganda identified specific financial risks that were germane to green energy projects within their 
country, and proposed possible solutions for mitigating investor concerns.  These solutions 
explored the connection between public policy, finance and private investments and the optimum 
domestic policies for mitigating investor risk concerns.    
The collection of papers has revealed one simple truth: the panacea of implementing an 
enabling regulatory structure to attract certain investments into a region has proven to be a 
simplistic solution to the problem of sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa.  Despite 
many sub-Saharan nations implementing an enabling regulatory framework as recommended by 
international organizations like the World Bank, this did not address the local barriers to finance.  
This research has shown that specific regional climate finance initiatives must be undertaken to 
address local problems.  Examples of this approach have been adopted in the Ugandan example.  
However, clear investment barriers appear to exist to prevent foreign investors from initiating high 
capital projects such as solar PV plants within the region.  For example, several green energy 
projects have been approved in Ghana (with an energy license being issued by the governing body), 
despite this approval, the projects have had difficulty acquiring construction financing.  With 
respect to energy and development, attracting FDI must include changes to the structures and 
processes that go beyond mere regulatory changes to include local factors that address barriers to 
investments.
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